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ABSTRACT 
 
 
International criminal law lacks a coherent theory suitable for its own context. This 
lacuna has left the International Criminal Court (ICC) – the most prominent global 
penal institution - without clear theoretical premise(s) to guide prosecution and 
punishment. In its current incarnation, international criminal draws on Western 
liberal modalities founded on dominant domestic penal rationales of retribution and 
deterrence. However, these principles appear incongruous to the crimes the ICC 
prosecutes. The theoretical rationales of ICC have barely been interrogated against 
an extant case. In 2012, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) rebel leader Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo became the first defendant to be convicted and jailed by the ICC for 
the conscription, enlistment and use of child soldiers. The use of child combatants 
for purposes of war is a pernicious global problem outlawed in international criminal 
law. However, of the crimes designated as ‘egregious,’ it has historically been under-
enforced and inadequately articulated as a mass crime, and allocated lesser gravity. 
The seminal case of Lubanga provides us with a propitious opportunity, not only to 
locate child soldiering, but also inquire into the theoretical underpinnings of the ICC 
with regards to mass crime. Mass crimes are distinct from ordinary crimes. 
International courts charged with adjudicating them face constraints and can only 
prosecute a few of the suspected perpetrators. The overarching theoretical and 
analytic framework for this thesis is premised on the notion that international 
criminal law needs a plausible theory or rationale suitable for its context and crimes 
it prosecutes.  It is important for the ICC to premise its work on a realistic rationale 
for it to be purposive. A more logical analysis of international penality would draw on 
the conceptual underpinnings of the whole project of international law and specific 
features of the ICC. A good starting point is to note that international criminal justice 
is largely symbolic. A more plausible penal rationale would consider the inhibitions 
the ICC faces and the role it can still perform with regards to mass crime. The ICC 
symbolises contemporary standards of an ‘international community.’ It is this 
concept from which we can extrapolate viable rationales for ICC penology. How do 
the trial, conviction and punishment of Lubanga for the ‘mass crime’ of child 
soldiering serve the collectivist ethos of international law and society? The project 
that follows proposes a penal rationale that accounts for the ICC’s sui generis 
character, the nature of crimes it adjudicates and what the court can realistically 
achieve. The ultimate value of international criminal law may rest not in its functions 
of retribution or deterrence, but in its role in identity construction, in particular in 
constructing a cosmopolitan community identity. The overall argument for the thesis 
is that while retribution and deterrence are valid, the most plausible rationale for ICC 
penality is the expressive function of law (expressivism). The few cases of mass crime 
the ICC can prosecute can achieve primarily more realistic aims of expression of 
global or ‘cosmopolitan’ norms, norm internalisation and the reinforcement of 
collectivism international law and society. Lubanga provides an illustrative exemplar 
for this argument. 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
First I would like to thank Prof Trevor Buck whom I owe a profound debt of gratitude 
for his relentless supervision over the past three years. His advice, direction, 
continuous probing and attention to detail have helped me complete this project.   
 
Gratitude is also due to staff members of the De Montfort Law School for according 
me considerable support and kindness. Mr Tim Hillier, my second supervisor, in 
particular, has been helpful with critiques of the work. My gratitude also goes to Mrs 
Jo Samanta for her assessments of my work over the three years. 
 
I could not have completed this project without the support of my family. Gratitude 
is owed to my wife, Ellen and my daughter Sasha, my father, mother and family in 
Zimbabwe, who have all supported me during the course of this project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
ACRWC  African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child  
AFRC   Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
ANSA              Armed non-state group 
AP      Additional Protocol   
CAR   Central African Republic 
CDF     Civil Defence Forces  
CRC  UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
DRC    Democratic Republic of Congo 
ECCC   Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia  
FPLC  Forces Patriotiques pour la libération du Congo (Patriotic Force for the 
Liberation of Congo) 
ICC    International Criminal Court 
ICL  International Criminal Law 
ICTR      International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda  
ICTY      International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia  
IHL        International Humanitarian Law 
IHRL      International Human Rights Law 
IMT        International Military Tribunal  
IMTFE   International Military Tribunal for the Far East   
KLA         Kosovo Liberation Army  
OPAC     Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict  
OTP      Office of the Prosecutor 
PTC       Pre-Trial Chamber  
RUF     Revolutionary United Front 
SCSL     Special Court for the Sierra Leone 
10 
 
SPSC     Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor 
TC       Trial Chamber 
UDHR             Universal Declaration for Human Rights 
UNICEF  United Nations Children's Fund 
UPC      Union des Patriotes Congolais (Union of Congolese Patriots) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Table of cases 
 
Nuremberg Tribunal 
United States of America v Friedrich Flick et al., Nuremberg Military Tribunal Judgment 
[22 December 1947] 
United States of America v Carl Krauch et al., Nuremberg Military Tribunal Judgment [30 
July 1948] 
United States of America v Alfried Krupp et al., Nuremberg Military Tribunal Judgment [31 
July 1948] 
United States of America v Karl Brandt et al., Nuremberg Military Tribunal, Judgment [19 
August 1947] (‘Medical Case’) 
United States of America v Josef Altstötter et al., Nuremberg Military Tribunal, Judgment [4 
December 1947] (‘Justice Case’) 
 
ICTY 
Prosecutor v Erdemovic, ICTY-IT-96-22-T Sentencing Judgment [ICTY 29 November 1996]  
 
Prosecutor v Furundzija, ICTY -IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment [10 December 1998] 
 
Prosecutor v Tadic, Case, ICTY - IT-94- A, Appeals Chamber [July 15 1999] 
 
Prosecutor v Kupreskic, ICTY- IT-95-16-TJudgment [14 January 2000]  
 
Prosecutor v Blaskic, ICTY- IT-95-14-T, Judgment [3 March 2000] 
 
Prosecutor v Aleksovisk, ICTY- IT-95-14/1-A Appeal Judgment [24 March 2000] 
 
Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovac and Vuković, ICTY - IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T Trial 
Judgment [22 February 2001]  
 
Prosecutor v Krstić, ICTY - IT-98-33-T (TC I), [2 August 2001]  
 
Prosecutor v Delalic et al., ICTY - IT-96-21-A, Judgment, Appeals Chamber ICTY [20 
February 2001] 
Prosecutor v Nikolic  ICTY - IT-02-60/1-S Sentencing Judgment ICTY [2 December 2003] 
 
Prosecutor v Brdanin, Judgment, TC II ICTY- IT-99-36-T ICTY [1 September 2004]  
 
Prosecutor v Kordić and Cerkez, ICTY - IT-95-14/2-A ICTY Appeals Chamber [17 December 
2004] 
 
Prosecutor v Babić, ICTY-IT-03-72-A Appeals Chamber [July 18 2005] 
 
Prosecutor v Deronjić, ICTY-IT-02-61-A Appeals Chamber [20 July 2005] 
 
12 
 
Prosecutor v Martić, ICTY-95-11-T, Trial Judgment [12 June 2007] 
 
Prosecutor v Milošević, ICTY-IT-98-29/1-T, Trial Judgment [12 December 2007] 
 
Prosecutor v Delić, ICTY-1T-04-83-T, Trial Judgment [15 September 2008] 
 
Prosecutor v Milutinović, ICTY-IT-05-87-T, Trial Judgment [26 February 2009] 
 
Prosecutor v Lukić, ICTY-IT-05-87 Trial Judgment [20 July 2009]  
 
Prosecutor v Popović, ICTY-IT-05-88-T, Trial Judgment ICTY [10 June 2010]  
 
 
ICC 
 
Prosecutor v Kony, ICC-02/04-01/05 [11 July 2007] 
 
Prosecutor v Ntaganda and Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-169 [13July 2006) 
 
Prosecutor vKatangaICC-01/04-01/07 [22 October 2007] 
 
Prosecutor v NtagandaICC-01/04-02/06 [9 June 2014] 
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN PTC, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges [29 January 2007] 
 
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06 Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of 
the Statute, Trial Judgment [14 March 2012] 
 
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-
01/04-01/06 Judge Odio Benito, Separate and Dissenting Opinion[14 March 2012] 
 
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC‐01/04‐01/06 Public Prosecution’s Sentence 
Request [14 May 2012] 
 
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Sentencing Judgment ICC-01/04-01/06 [10 July 
2006]  
Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-02/05-01/09 [27 
August 2010] 
 
Prosecutor v Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11 Pre-Trial Chamber II’s Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Summonses to Appear for Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru 
Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali [15 March 2011] 
 
Prosecutor v Germain KatangaICC-01/04-01/07 Judgment [7 March 2014] 
 
Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui ICC-01/04-02/12 Judgment [18 December 2012] 
 
ICTR 
 
Prosecutor v Kambanda, ICTR 97-23-S Judgment and Sentence [4 September 1998]  
 
Prosecutor v Jean Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T [2 September 1998]  
13 
 
 
Prosecutor v Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T Sentence [2 October 1998]  
 
Prosecutor v Kayishema, ICTR-95-1-TJudgment [21 May 1999] 
 
Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana ICTR 95-1-T [21 May 1999]  
 
Prosecutor v Musema, ICTR-93-13- T Judgment and Sentence [January 27 2000] 
 
Prosecutor v Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3-T [6 December 1999]  
 
Prosecutor v Kambanda ICTR-97-23-S Judgment and Sentence (TC) [4 September 1998]  
 
 
SCSL 
 
Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor SCSL 03-01-T [29 May 2007] 
 
Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, Kanu, SCSL, SCSL-2004-16-T [20 June 2007] 
 
Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa, SCSL-04-14-T [9 October 2007]  
 
Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa, SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment [28 May, 2008] 
 
Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment [2 March 2009] 
 
Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, SCSL-04-15-A [26 October 2009] 
 
Prosecutor v Sam HingaSCSL–2003–08–PT (‘Norman Case’)  
 
Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor SCSL 03-01-T [30 May 2012] 
 
Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay TaylorSCSL-03-01-T Sentencing Judgment [20 May 2012]  
Prosecutor v Sam Hinga: SCSL-2004-14- AR72 (E)Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment) 
Appeals Chamber, Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson [31 May 2004] 
 
SPSC (East Timor) 
Deputy Prosecutor-General for Serious Crimes v Anton Lelan Sufa Case No 4a 2003, [25 
November 2004] 
 
 
ECCC (Cambodia) 
 
Prosecutor v Kaing Guek Eav (Duch) Case File/Dossier No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
Following the Nazi atrocities, the trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo after the Second 
World War marked the birth of an international criminal law (ICL). This paradigm 
has focused on ‘mass atrocities’ such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide. Mass atrocities are distinct from ordinary crimes. The crimes are often 
considered to be a manifestation of collective pathologies and ‘structural or system 
criminality.’1 These types of crime are ordinarily aided by the state bureaucracy, state 
functionaries and non-state actors. Nonetheless, individuals rather than states are 
held accountable.2 The reason is that the ‘Western concept of criminal justice rejects 
collective responsibility and strongly emphasises individual criminal responsibility.’3 
Further, while international criminal justice demarcates ordinary domestic crimes 
from these extraordinary crimes, its modalities of prosecution and punishment and 
theories mimic familiar municipal law principles. The departing point for this thesis 
is, thus, that ICL lacks a theory offering credible philosophical justifications for 
prosecution and punishment of individuals for these extraordinary mass crimes. 
Essentially, this thesis draws on the philosophy of international law, primarily 
international penology. The standard that shapes our conceptions of penology is ‘the 
philosophy of punishment.’4 Several tribunals have been established since 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, prosecuting and convicting individuals for mass crimes.  
However, philosophical justifications for the penology of these courts have been 
obscure or less plausible. As noted, the dominant penal rationales are retribution and 
deterrence. While this thesis contrasts these two to its favoured position, it also 
considers its proposition within the context of the whole melange of ICL goals that 
has since emerged. As one author observed, ‘the current views on the objectives of 
international criminal courts are in disarray.’5  One of the consequences is that the 
                                                          
1A. Smeulers, ‘Punishing Enemies of All Mankind’ (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International Law, 
971, 971 
2Ibid 
3Ibid 
4 D. Garland, ‘Sociological Perspectives on Punishment’ (1991) 14 Crime and Justice 115 
5 M. Damaska, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ (2008) 83 Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 329, 330 
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performance of international criminal courts cannot be assessed reliably.6 
International penal objectives include incapacitation, rehabilitation, reconciliation, 
restoration and access for victims, among other purposes. Each of these theories may 
proffer some plausible justification, and their significance will vary according to the 
circumstances of particular cases. When deconstructed, however, the main goals of 
international criminal justice have been retribution and deterrence.7  These, as 
noted, derive from municipal law. A paradox arises. The crimes that international 
courts adjudicate are remarkably distinct from ordinary domestic crimes. 
Criminologists, jurists and scholarship in international criminal justice caution 
against this transfer of rationales to the international plane. International criminal 
courts do not have the capacities to prosecute all offenders, nor can they exact 
sufficiently retributive punishments that also deter both the offender and potential 
transgressors from such mass, often passion-driven and organic crimes. This thesis 
focuses on the recent prosecution and punishment of Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) rebel commander, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (hereinafter ‘Lubanga’)8 by the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) for the conscription, enlistment9 and active use of 
child soldiers Although mass criminality has often been discussed in terms of 
widespread killings, child soldiering10, while not always resulting in fatalities, is also 
a large scale activity with diffuse social and political dynamics. Agents have included 
state, non-state and community or/and individual social actors often driven by 
political and or ethnic motives. As noted, ICL approaches have been modelled on the 
liberal paradigm allocating individual guilt. This homogeneity has been the subject of 
                                                          
6 Ibid 330 
7See eg Prosecutor v Kupreskic, Judgment ICTY - IT-95-16-T [ 14 Jan. 2000] para 848; Prosecutor v 
Kordić and Cerkez, ICTY-IT-95-14/2-A [Appeals Chamber, 17 December 2004] para 1076 (‘both 
individual [n.b. specific] and general deterrence serve as important goals of sentencing…’)Prosecutor 
v Popović, ICTY-IT-05-88-T, Trial Judgment [10 June, 2010] para 2128; Prosecutor v Lukić IT-05-87 
Trial Judgment,[20 July, 2009] para 1049; Prosecutor v Milutinović ICTY - IT-05-87-T, Trial 
Judgment [26 February 2009] para 1144; Prosecutor v Delić  ICTY-IT-04-83-T, Trial Judgment, para 
559 [ICTY 15 September, 2008]; Prosecutor v. Milošević, ICTY-IT-98-29/1-T, Trial Judgment, para 
987; Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa, SCSL-04-14-T Sentencing Judgment [9 October 2007] para 
26, citing Prosecutor v Aleksovisk ICTY- IT-95-14/1-A Appeal Judgment [24 March 2000]para 185; 
Prosecutor v Kambanda ICTR-97-23-S Judgment and Sentence (TC) [4 September 1998] 
[Hereinafter ‘Kambanda Trial Judgment’] para 28 and Prosecutor v Nikolic ICTY - IT-02-60/1-S 
Sentencing Judgment (TC)[2 December, 2003] para 86 
8Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06 [hereinafter ‘Lubanga’] 
9 Distinctions have been made between ‘conscription’ [coercive] and enlistment [voluntary] See 
Lubanga Judgment para 607, Chamber also citing R. Lee (eds.), The International Criminal Court, 
Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence ((Ardsley, Transnational Publishers 2001)  
205 
10 In this study, I shall use ‘child soldiering’ or ‘child soldiery’ to mean the conscription, enlistment 
and use of children for purposes of warfare. 
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critique. The criticism has centred on what some scholars describe as the Western 
model’s fixation on the individuation of guilt when such crimes involve multiple 
agents.  The liberal model is thus deemed unsuitable for accounting for mass crime. 
These are valid contentions but perhaps even more difficult to effectuate.  In this 
study, I seek to identify what the ICC can achieve from its present approaches and 
circumstances. The question that animates this thesis is: what is the most plausible 
philosophical justification for the prosecution and punishment of Lubanga by the 
ICC for the mass crime of child soldiering?   
1.1 Background 
 
This study attempts to make sense of the work of the ICC by examining the case of 
Lubanga and the criminal phenomenon of child soldiering as a reference point for 
the mass and core crimes the court adjudicates. The idea of establishing an effective 
independent international criminal court had been in the making for decades.11 The 
establishment of the two international criminal tribunals, for the former Yugoslavia 
and for Rwanda, by the UN Security Council in the early 1990s and the work of these 
two tribunals, as well as the hybrid courts and mixed tribunals12 which have been 
established since, resulted in the maturation of ICL into a putative and significant 
body of law.  The creation of ICC through the Rome Statute of 1998 marked the 
zenith in the development of ICL. The Court came into effect on 1 July 200213. In 
2012 – 10 years after its formation - the ICC, in its very first case, convicted DRC 
rebel leader, Lubanga14 of the war crime of conscripting, enlisting and using child 
soldiers.  Lubanga, a national of the DRC, was a founder of the Union des Patriotes 
Congolais (UPC) and served as commander-in-chief of its armed military wing, the 
Forces Patriotiques pour la libération du Congo (FPLC). The UPC is a rebel 
organization, established in 2000 and dominated by the Hema ethnic group, of 
which Lubanga is a member. Since the 1990s, armed conflict between governmental 
                                                          
11 S. Anoushirvani, ‘The Future of the International Criminal Court: The Long Road to Legitimacy 
Begins with the Trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’ (2010) 22 Pace International Law Review 213  
12 Hybrid and mixed courts have been established in Sierra Leone (2000), East Timor (2000), Kosovo 
(2000), Cambodia (2003) and Lebanon (2007). However, the latter has focused on cases of terrorism. 
Set up in 2009, Its primary mandate is to hold trials for the people accused of carrying out the attack 
of 14 February 2005 which killed 23 people, including the former prime minister of Lebanon, Rafiq 
Hariri, and injured many others. For its limited mandate, this thesis does not include the Special 
Tribunal of Lebanon for analysis.  
13See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court., opened for signature 17 July, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3 [Hereinafter ‘Rome Statute’ or ‘ICC Statute] 
14Prosecutor v Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06  
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and rebel forces, and among rebel forces inter se, has been pervasive throughout the 
DRC - in particular, its north eastern Ituri region.15 On April 19, 2004, the DRC 
president referred to the ICC prosecutor (self-referral) the situation within the DRC 
for investigation in line with provisions of crimes of the Rome Statute establishing 
the court. Investigations began in June 2004. On February 10, 2006, Pre-trial 
Chamber I issued an arrest warrant against Lubanga. Lubanga was arrested by 
Congolese authorities on domestic charges relating to an attack on UN peacekeepers. 
Lubanga made his first appearance before that ICC on 20 March 2006. In line with 
procedure, a confirmation of charges hearing – to assess the prosecution case against 
him - was conducted in November of 2006. The Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) issued its 
decision confirming the charges on 29 January 2007.16 The ICC also issued a warrant 
of arrest for Lubanga’s co-accused Bosco Ntaganda, former Deputy Chief of the 
General Staff of the FPLC, for a similar war crime.17 
The trial began in 2009. Following three years of hearings, a three-judge panel found 
Lubanga guilty, as co-perpetrator, of ‘conscripting’ and ‘enlisting’ children under the 
age of fifteen years into the UPC/FPLC and ‘using’ them to participate actively in 
hostilities within the meaning of Articles 8(2)(e)(vii) and 25(3)(a) (co-perpetrator) of 
the Rome Statute from early September 2002 to 13 August 2003.18 Article 8(2) (e) 
(vii) outlaws ‘[C]onscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into 
armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities.’ He was 
sentenced to 14 years in prison.19On 3 October 2012, Lubanga appealed both the 
verdict and sentence, asking for an acquittal and annulment, or a reduction, of the 
sentence. On the other hand, the ICC prosecutor appealed for the sentence to be 
revised upwards. On 1 December 2014, the Appeals Court dismissed Lubanga’s 
appeal and upheld his conviction and sentence.20 
                                                          
15See Prosecutor v Lubanga Decision on confirmation of charges, ICC-01/04-01106 [Pre-trial 
Chamber I [29 January 2007] [Hereinafter ‘Lubanga Decision on Confirmation of Charges [29 
January 2007’]para 1 
16Lubanga Decision on Confirmation of Charges [29 January 2007] 
17See ICC-01/04-02/06 Prosecutor v Ntaganda: Seven counts of war crimes: enlistment of children 
under the age of 15, conscription of children under the age of 15, using children under the age of 15 to 
participate actively in hostilities; murder, attacks against the civilian population, rape and sexual 
slavery, and pillaging; and three counts of crimes against humanity: murder, rape and sexual slavery, 
and persecution. 
18See Prosecutor v  Lubanga Sentencing Judgment ICC-01/04-01/06 [10 July 2012] [hereinafter 
‘Lubanga Sentencing Judgment [10 July 2012’] para 1358 
19Ibid para 98 
20 See Prosecutor v  Lubanga ‘Case Sheet’ ICC website http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20c
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1.2 Argument and objectives of thesis 
 
The prosecution and punishment of Lubanga was regarded as a milestone. However, 
for some time some scholars have asked questions on the justifications of 
prosecution of international criminals21 and the legitimacy of international 
tribunals.22 The ICC, as now the foremost global criminal court, has not escaped 
these crucial questions. Some authors suggest that an important focus would 
examine the broader criteria for assessing its impact, while others posit that the true 
test of the ICC’s success will depend on whether it helps to combat impunity and 
deter future human rights atrocities across the globe.23 The centrality of this latter 
proposition has rested on the philosophy of punishment in ICL. Can international 
courts exact retribution and effectuate deterrence? Are these the most appropriate or 
viable penal objectives? Lubanga provides a propitious moment and an extant case 
at a global penal flagship for ICL scholars to inquire into the philosophies of 
contemporary international criminal justice. Lubanga capped ‘many ‘firsts’ in the 
young life of the first global permanent international criminal justice mechanism: the 
seminal verdict of the ICC, the first international trial to focus exclusively on child 
soldiering.24Another trial, later divided into two - against Congolese militia leaders 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui – had also been concluded by the ICC. 
On 18 December 2012, Ngudjolo, who had been charged with seven counts of war 
crimes, including using children under the age of fifteen to take active part in 
hostilities,25 was acquitted.26 The court ruled the Prosecutor had failed to prove a 
case against him beyond any reasonable doubt.On 7 March 2014, Katanga was found 
guilty the crime against humanity of murder and the war crimes of wilful killing, 
intentional attack against the civilian population, pillaging and destruction of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ases/icc%200104%200106/Pages/democratic%20republic%20of%20the%20congo.aspx (last 
accessed 15 December 2014) 
21 M. Damaska, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ (2008) 83Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 329  
22See eg A. Cassese, ‘The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals and the Current Prospects of 
International Criminal Justice’ (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law 491 
23L.Laplante, ‘The Domestication of International Criminal Law: A Proposal for Expanding the 
International Criminal Court’s Sphere of Influence’ (2010)  43 John Marshall Law Review 635 
24 S. Dana, ‘The Limits of Judicial Idealism: Should the International Criminal Court Engage with 
Consequentialist Aspirations?’ (2014) 3 Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs 30, 32 
25 Apart from child soldiering, he was also accused of directing an attack against civilians; willful 
killing; destruction of property; pillaging; sexual slavery; and rape) and three counts of crimes against 
humanity (murder, rape, and sexual slavery) allegedly committed during an attack on the village of 
Bogoro, in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on February 24, 2003. 
26Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui ICC-01/04-02/12 Judgment pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute  
[18 December  2012] 
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property.27 He was, however, acquitted of charges of sexual slavery and rape as well 
as using child soldiers.28The Lubanga verdict, as the court’s first, focused solely on 
child soldiering, was thus hailed as a ‘landmark ruling,’29and a ‘great victory’ for child 
soldiers in the DRC and elsewhere.30As a novelty institution adjudicating its seminal 
case, the ceremony that succeeded the conviction, from the ‘international 
community’, was unsurprising. Previous tribunals were localised and lacked 
international visibility. Significantly, the conscription, enlistment and use of children 
for military combat had not featured on the statutes of these tribunals – until the 
Rome Statute and first prosecution at Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) 
established in 2002 - despite the fact that child combatants were used during 
conflicts that necessitated these judicial bodies. Of the crimes now deemed 
‘egregious’ or to ‘offend the international community as whole’ and ‘deeply shock the 
conscience of humanity,’31child soldiering has historically been under-criminalised. 
It is within the context of this under-criminalisation that the Lubanga case was 
viewed as a milestone. Nevertheless, ‘the successful prosecution of Lubanga is not 
likely to end the debate any time soon over the merits of the ICC and the role of 
international criminal justice mechanisms.’32 An important inquiry in ICL has been 
preoccupied with the plausibility of objectives or philosophies of international 
criminal courts.  
 
Like domestic justice, ICL’s central philosophical goals for punishment are 
retribution and deterrence.33 These are, of course, not the only penological goals: ICL 
                                                          
27Prosecutor v Germain KatangaICC-01/04-01/07 Judgment pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute [7 
March 2014] 
28Ibid. The Chamber also ordered that the time spent in detention at the ICC – between 18 September 
2007 and 23 May 2014 – be deducted from his sentence. 
29See ‘ICC: Landmark Verdict a Warning to Rights Abusers’ Human Rights Watch (14 March, 2012), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/14/icc-landmark-verdict-warning-rights-abusers; P Pruthi, ‘In a 
Historic Judgment, the International Criminal Court Convicts Thomas Lubanga Dyilo of Recruiting 
Children Into Armed Conflict,’ UNICEF [14 March, 2012] 
http://www.unicef.org/protection/57929_62002.html. 
30G. Mattioli-Zeltner, International Justice Advocacy Director of HRW, called the Lubanga verdict ‘a 
victory for the thousands of children forced to fight in DRC’s brutal wars.’ ‘ICC: Landmark Verdict a 
Warning to Rights Abusers’ Human Rights Watch [14 March, 2012] 
31 ibid Preamble 
32 S. Dana, ‘The Limits of Judicial Idealism: Should the International Criminal Court Engage with 
Consequentialist Aspirations?’ (2014) 3 Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs 30, 32-
33 
33See eg Prosecutor v Kupreskic, Judgment ICTY-IT-95-16-T [14 January 2000] para 848; Prosecutor 
v. Kordić and Cerkez, ICTY-IT-95-14/2-A Appeals Chamber [17 December 2004] para 1076 (‘both 
individual [n.b. specific] and general deterrence serve as important goals of sentencing…’)Prosecutor 
v Popović, ICTY-IT-05-88-T, Trial Judgment [10 June, 2010] para 2128; Prosecutor v Lukić, ICTY- 
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has an array of objectives. But as the sentencing jurisprudence evolved, retribution 
and deterrence emerged as the primary rationales in ICL punishment.34 Many 
judgments have held that retribution and deterrence are the dominant philosophical 
purposes of prosecution and punishment at the tribunals.35 The Rome Statute 
created an institution whose purpose is the prosecution of those most responsible for 
the commission of genocide,36 crimes against humanity,37 war crimes38 and the 
‘crime of aggression.’39 The Statute has also implied retribution and deterrence as 
primary justifications for the ICC’s work.  The Lubanga judgment alluded to these 
classical and dominant presumptions of criminal justice.40  The post-conviction 
jubilatory reactions to Lubanga were premised on, almost invariably, the notion that 
his conviction and sentence would ‘send a message’ to potential offenders.41 In both 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
IT-05-87 Trial Judgment, para 1049 [ICTY 20 July, 2009]; Prosecutor v Milutinović, ICTY-IT-05-87-
T, Trial Judgment [ 26 February 2009] para 1144; Prosecutor v Delić, ICTY- 1T-04-83-T, Trial 
Judgment, [ICTY 15 September 2008] para 559; Prosecutor v Milošević, IT-98-29/1-T, Trial 
Judgment, para 987; Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa, SCSL-04-14-T Judgment on Sentencing  [9 
October 2007] para 26, citing Prosecutor v AleksoviskIT-95-14/1-A Appeal Judgment [ICTY 24 March 
2000] para 185; Prosecutor v Kambanda ICTR-97-23-S Judgment and Sentence (TC) [4 September 
1998] [‘Kambanda Trial Judgment’] para 28 and Prosecutor v Nikolic ICTY-IT-02-60/1-S Sentencing 
Judgment (TC) [2 December 2003] para 86 
34 S. Dana, ‘The Limits of Judicial Idealism: Should the International Criminal Court Engage with 
Consequentialist Aspirations?’  (2014) 3 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 30  
 
36See Rome Statute Art. 6 
37 Ibid Art. 7 
38 Ibid Art. 8 
39 Ibid Art. 5: The ‘crime of aggression’ was not defined in the Statute. On 11 June 2010, the Review 
Conference of Rome Statute adopted by consensus amendments to the Rome Statute which include a 
definition of the ‘crime of aggression’ and a regime establishing how the Court will exercise its 
jurisdiction over this crime. An act of aggression is defined as ‘the use of armed force by one State 
against another State without the justification of self-defence or authorization by the Security 
Council.’ The provisions of both article 15 provide that the Court will not be able to exercise its 
jurisdiction over the ‘crime of aggression’ until: (a) at least 30 States Parties have ratified or accepted 
the amendments; and (b) a decision is taken by two–thirds of States Parties to activate the jurisdiction 
at any time after 1 January 2017. 
40Lubanga Sentencing Judgment [10 July 2012]  para 16  
41 For reactions by key actors on children’s welfare and rights, see  Reactions to the first verdict of the 
ICC - ICC OTP Weekly Briefing Issue 115; 16 to 26 March 2012; See also UN News Centre ‘In landmark 
ruling, ICC finds Congolese warlord guilty of recruiting child soldiers’14 March 2012 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41537&Cr=ICC&Cr1; See also Civil Society 
Reflections on the Lubanga Trial’ International Coalition for the Right to Protect (14 March 2012)  
http://icrtopblog.org/2012/03/16/civil-society-reflections-on-the-lubanga-trial/See also ‘SRSG 
Coomaraswamy welcomes the International Criminal Court's first verdict - the conviction of Thomas 
Lubanga for child recruitment’ [OSRSG/140312-4] Office of the Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict 12 March 2012  The Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict [SRSG] Rhadika Coomaraswamy pronounced: ‘ 
…In this age of global media, today’s verdict will reach warlords and commanders across the world 
and serve as a strong deterrent.’ See ‘International Criminal Court’s Conviction of Thomas Lubanga 
for Conscripting Children ‘Important Step Forward’ in Ending Impunity, Says Secretary-General’: 
SG/SM/14155  AFR/2352  L/3187 [14 March 2012]; The UN Secretary-General’s Office stated: ‘Mr 
Lubanga’s conviction for the war crimes of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15 is 
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the jurisprudence and social reactions, it was presumed that Lubanga’s trial and 
punishment would have both specific but more importantly, general deterrent effect 
on child soldier recruiters. From a deontological perspective, he also deserved to be 
punished proportionately. This mechanical transfer of domestic philosophical 
justification is at the centre of this inquiry.   
 
Theorists are generally unenthusiastic about retribution and skeptical about 
deterrence, particularly when transposed to the international sphere where the 
crimes are distinct. Unlike domestic crimes such as robbery or burglary, 
international crimes are different in nature. While ICL premises itself on individual 
criminal responsibility, the crimes it prosecutes are mass crimes. These crimes 
involve large scale communal engagement often referred to as ‘mass atrocities’. 
Differences between mass crimes and general crime exist in their form and also in 
their scope and severity. However, ICL still draws on the familiar penal principles of 
municipal law. This extension of ‘western doctrines’ onto the transnational plane is 
problematic because it tends to obfuscate the collective character of ICL crimes - a 
feature that distinguishes them from most similar crimes of violence in the national 
sphere.42 War, mass violence, and collective pathologies can distort the viability of 
the common cost-benefit calculus on which that model is predicated.43 International 
courts can prosecute only a handful of defendants in situations of these mass crimes. 
The ICC thus needs a more plausible justification suitable for its own context and the 
crimes it adjudicates. A more cogent purpose for the prosecution of the few select 
defendants the courts prosecute needs to be established. Some excellent scholarly 
contributions in the field of ICL and mass atrocity have proffered alternative 
responses to collective crimes. It has been suggested that pluralistic responses ‘such 
as truth commissions, civil liability (including of states or corporations), legislative 
and institutional reform, and lustration and commemoration, may be better suited to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
an important step forward in realising the international community’s commitment to ensuring that 
perpetrators of crimes against children in situations of armed conflict are brought to justice.’ 
42 R. Sloane, ‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment’ (2006) Columbia Public Law & 
Legal Theory Working Papers, citing Prosecutor v Tadic, ICTY- IT-94-1, Judgment [15 July 1999] para 
191, stating that: ‘Most of the time [ICL] crimes do not result from the criminal propensity of single 
individuals but constitute manifestations of collective criminality: the crimes are often carried out by 
groups of individuals acting in pursuance of a common criminal design.’ 
43 Sloane, ‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment’ (2007) 43 Stanford Journal of 
International Law 39 
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the collective nature of mass atrocity.’44 Such approaches are critical of the extant 
legal tradition which allocates individual guilt in cases of mass criminality. In this 
study, I do not depart from the current modalities on individual agency that guide 
the ICC’s work. Polycentric propositions offer alternative approaches to mass crime. 
These would help account for more perpetrators. However, implementation of such 
diverse modalities is nettlesome. Further, the ICC, as a global criminal institution, 
has a symbolic status which exceeds its instrumental function. What is important is 
whether the prosecutions it conducts can be justified to society.  In this study, I 
attempt to establish the most plausible justification for prosecution of individuals by 
the ICC. While the study focuses on Lubanga, as a case study, what the thesis 
proposes may be applicable to the category of all mass crimes the ICC adjudicates.  
 
It ‘is imperative that the ICC coalesces around a primary justification for its work and 
set modest expectations.’45 Setting ambitious objectives can eviscerate its legitimacy 
and only generate disillusionment. Plausible theorisation should be founded on what 
the ICC can realistically achieve if its work is to be authentic and plausible. Apart 
from drawing on the features of mass crime, realistic theorisation would also 
consider the ICC’s situational constraints. Understanding Lubanga would call on us 
to be conscious of the environment in which the ICC operates. Organisational theory 
might assist us here. Several authors have argued that context effects are 
fundamental to an understanding of organisational phenomena that contextual 
analysis should become a distinctive feature of organisational scholarship.46 The 
danger of context insensitive research theory is that it reinforces a pattern of context 
insensitive scholarship.47 The ICC is ‘the emerging punitive arm of the supra-state of 
                                                          
44 D. Robinson, ‘International criminal courts and tribunals: A cosmopolitan liberal account of 
international criminal law’ (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 127 citing eg M. Drumbl, 
Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (Cambridge  2007); M Osiel, ‘The Banality of Good: 
Aligning Incentives against Mass Atrocity’  (2005)  Columbia Law Review 1751; L. Fletcher and H. 
Weinstein, ‘Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation’ 
(2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 573  
45 S. Dana, ‘The Limits of Judicial Idealism: Should the International Criminal Court Engage with 
Consequentialist Aspirations?’ (2014) 3 Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs 30 
46 D. Rousseau ‘Issues of level in organizational research: Multi-level and cross-level perspectives’ 
(1985) 7 Research in Organizational Behaviour 1-37; G .Johns ‘The essential impact of context on 
organizational behaviour’ (2006) 31 Academy of Management Review 385; R House, R., D Rousseau 
and M. Thomas-Hunt ‘The meso paradigm: A framework for the integration of micro and macro 
organizational behaviour’ (1995) 17 Research in Organizational Behaviour 71  
47 D. Whetten, ‘An Examination of the Interface Between Context and Theory Applied to the Study of 
Chinese Organizations’ (2009) 5 Management Organisation Review 29 
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international organization.’48 While it has generated high expectations, the court 
operates within a unique mix of complex and restrictive social, political, economic 
and other factors, associated with its sui generis character.49 Firstly, states created 
the ICC to adjudicate ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole.’50 However, they have been allocating the court budgets 
incommensurate with the work it needs to undertake. The ICC depends on financial 
contributions of states. However, for economic and other reasons, some states are 
unable to meet their obligations. Further, the ICC lacks a coercive authority or police 
force to account for suspects. On this, the ICC is also dependent upon the 
cooperation of states.  In some cases, states have, however, refused to co-operate 
with the court. Where states have chosen to co-operate, they have done so for 
political expediency with the acquiescence of the ICC. The ICC has at times, in its 
selection of cases, sacrificed fairness for pragmatism, focusing on non-state actors, 
exempting state actors who co-operate in the arrest of rebels. The overall effect of 
these constraints is that the ICC can only prosecute a handful of defendants. These 
conditions do not help the court fulfil the objectives of retribution and deterrence 
upon which ICL has been traditionally predicated. Addressing the broader dynamics 
of mass crimes under these circumstances requires a more imaginative and realistic 
premise. A re-conceptualisation of prevailing legal theory and practice may be 
necessary for the work of the ICC to be purposive. A context sensitive approach to the 
work of the ICC would, instead, consider the value of prosecuting a few individuals 
by the constrained court. Such value can be identified in the foundational philosophy 
of the international law regime in its totality. The argument I seek to cultivate in this 
thesis is premised on communalism and shared values of international law. The 
ultimate value of international criminal law may rest not in its functions of 
retribution or deterrence, but in its role in identity construction, in particular in 
constructing and reinforcing a cosmopolitan community identity.  
                                                          
48 M. Drumbl, ‘Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity’ 
(2005) 99 Northwestern University Law Review 539, 541 
49 M. Arsanjani and W Reisman,  ‘The Law-in-Action of the International Criminal Court’ (2005) 99 
American Journal of International Law 385, 385 stating: ‘The drafters of the Rome Statute' benefited 
from important previous experiments-the Nuremberg Tribunal and the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. But once the Court is launched, the 
predecessors and prototypes that were so helpful in the drafting stages will be of less and less 
assistance. The ICC must operate in a substantially different context than the earlier efforts, and the 
problems it will encounter (and already is encountering) will be different from and may prove more 
formidable than those facing its prototypes.’ 
50See Rome Statute Preamble 
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1.3 Importance of the study 
 
When the ICC was formed, it was hailed as a major development in international 
criminal law. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan described it as ‘[u]ndoubtedly, the 
most significant recent development in the international community’s long struggle 
to advance the cause of justice and rule of law.’51According to the Preamble of the 
Rome Statute and Articles 1 and 5, its objectives are the prosecution and punishment 
of the most serious crimes of international concern.52 The Statute describes crimes 
prosecuted by the ICC as ‘unimaginable atrocities’, and ‘grave crimes’ that ‘deeply 
shock the conscience of humanity.’53 The ICC was established ‘to these ends and for 
the sake of present and future generations.’54 Apart from these assertions, the court 
lacked any clear theoretical guidelines when it was established. Koller noted, 
however, that: 
 
The lack of theoretical reflection is not necessarily a negative. Had the participants in 
the Rome Conference or its predecessors focused on discussing abstract philosophical 
notions underlying international criminal law—let alone tried to agree upon a 
comprehensive theory for the field—such time and effort would likely have 
substantially delayed, if not prevented, realization of the practical objective of 
establishing an international criminal court.55 
 
 
Until today, the court lacks sufficiently clear goals and priorities to justify its 
decisions.56  However, the provisions in the Preamble of the Rome Statute have been 
interpreted as meaning that retribution and deterrence are primary goals of the 
ICC.57 Pronouncements at Lubanga’s trial appeared to confirm this. This unreflecting 
mimicry of domestic principles in ICL is problematic. For reasons already noted, 
municipal penal rationales are ill-suited for the crimes on the international sphere.  
This vexing disjuncture animates this treatise. The objective of this thesis is to 
                                                          
51See ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies’, Report of the 
Secretary-General, para 49, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (23 August, 
2004) cited in D. Koller ‘The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer’ (2008)40 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Policy1019 
52See Rome Statute, Preamble, para 4 and Art. 1 and 5 
53 Ibid Preamble 
54 Ibid para 9 
55D. Koller, ‘The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer’ (2008)40 New York University Journal 
of International Law and Policy1019,1020-1021 
56 M. deGuzman,  ‘Choosing to prosecute: Expressive selection at the International Criminal Court’ 
(2012) Michigan Journal of International Law 265 
57 E. Mendes, Peace and Justice at the International Criminal Court: A Court of Last Resort (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2010) 143 
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identify a philosophical rationale that is suitable for ICL and the ICC’s own context.  
Identifying a primary justification for international criminal law, of course, does not 
mean that ICL cannot make a meaningful contribution to other goals.58  This thesis 
attempts to establish the most plausible rationale for ICL, and the prosecution and 
punishment of Lubanga. The contention I make is that the other penal rationales are 
only less credible as principal justifications for ICC penology. Further, many of the 
other multifarious objectives that ICL has set for itself, such as, for example, 
‘achieving’ reconciliation and peace, should be left to other institutions. In other 
words, the ICC should set modest and credible objectives suitable for its own context.    
 
Genocide, crimes against humanity and other war crimes have been designated as 
the most egregious crimes. The paradigm of ICL has historically focused on these 
mass crimes. Over time, these crimes have established meanings in international 
jurisprudence. Some judges have arrogated legal significance to social meaning by 
situating genocide at the top of a hierarchy of international crimes.’59The 1998 
opinion on Kambanda described genocide as ‘the crime of crimes;60 the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) invoked it in sentencing 
genocidaires, often to the maximum sentence, life imprisonment.61The use of 
children in armed conflict is as old as warfare.62  While child soldiering has been a 
historical phenomenon, the current trend in the use of children is unprecedented 
both in terms of scope and levels of abuse.63  The UN estimates that the number of 
child combatants increased with 100,000 soldiers between 1988 and 2002.64Though 
an exact number is difficult to establish, most analysts estimate the total number of 
                                                          
58 S. Dana, ‘The Limits of Judicial Idealism: Should the International Criminal Court Engage with 
Consequentialist Aspirations?’ (2014) 3 Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs 30 
59D. Amann, ‘Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide,’ (2002) 2 International Criminal Law 
Review 93,130 
60Prosecutor v Kambanda, ICTY-ICTR 97-23-S, Trial Chamber, Judgment and Sentence,  [September 
4, 1998] para 16 
61 See Prosecutor v Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber 1, Sentence [2 October 1998] (remarks of 
Justice Laty Kama, President), available at http://www.ictr.org/ (visited 26 September 2014); See 
Prosecutor v Kayishema,ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgment  [21 May 1999] para 9;  
Prosecutor v Musema, ICTR-93-13, Trial Chamber I, Judgment and Sentence [27 January  2000] 
paras 981, 1001; Prosecutor v Rutaganda, ICTR- 96-3, Trial Chamber 1, Judgment and Sentence, 
para 451 
62 D. Francis, ‘Paper protection’ mechanisms: child soldiers and the international protection of 
children in Africa's conflict zones’ (2007) 45 The Journal of Modern African Studies, 207 
63 M. Fox,  ‘Child soldiers and international law: Patchwork gains and conceptual debates’ (2005) 7  
Human Rights Review 1, 27 
64V. Achvarina and S. Reich, ‘No Place to Hide: Refugee, Displaced Persons, and the Recruitment of 
Child Soldiers’ (2006) 31 International Security 127, 128. 
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child soldiers to be approximately 300 000.65However, an analysis of the 
jurisprudence of international tribunals seems to show that, until the establishment 
of SCSL and the ICC, child soldiering had not‘deeply’ shocked ‘the conscience of 
humanity.’ It has historically been under-criminalised and under-judicialised. It 
would appear international criminal justice had a fixation on mass murder crimes.  
This focus on the prevention of future deaths of civilians66 appeared to have 
influenced, or perhaps, exaggerated penological assumptions about ICL institutions’ 
abilities to exact retribution and effectuate deterrence. The Holocaust, Sebrenica and 
Rwanda, for example, tend to readily evoke a sense of outrage. Mass murderers had 
to be punished to prevent this ‘radical evil.’67 This ‘primacy of the massacre’, as it 
were, appeared to eclipse consideration of other immoralities and transgressions in 
conflict. Crimes against children were only mentioned as part of mass atrocities 
committed against the civilian population in general.68 While conscription, 
enlistment and use of children for military combat  was not regarded ‘atrocious’ or 
‘shocking’ enough, the dynamics of child soldiering as a ‘mass crime’ also appear less 
salient in scholarly discourse, if not distinguished, from the murder crimes 
mentioned above. This is because, perhaps, child soldiering does not necessarily 
entail large scale murders of the victims. Child soldiers are at times demobilised back 
into their communities during or after hostilities. In this study, child soldiering is 
taken as a ‘mass crime.’ Ordinarily, children are conscripted, enlisted and used in 
armed conflict in large numbers.69 One of the objectives of this thesis is to accentuate 
this diffuse nature of child militarisation often overshadowed by the horrors of 
widespread killings. Lubanga and child soldiering provide ICL scholarship an 
opportunity to assess theoretical approaches of the ICC to mass crime.  Plausible 
justification and theorisation for the prosecution and punishment of Lubanga would 
                                                          
65See UNICEF report  ‘Child protection from violence, exploitation and abuse’ 
http://www.unicef.org/protection/index_armedconflict.html 
66 P. Akhavan, ‘Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?’ 
(2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 7; J. Ku and J. Nzelibe, ‘Do International Criminal 
Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities’(2006) 84 Washington University Law 
Review,777; E. Baylis, ‘Reassessing the Role of International Criminal Law: Rebuilding National 
Courts Through Transnational Networks’, (2009) 50 Boston College Law Review 1  
67 H. Arendt, The Human Condition (University of Chicago Press  1958 ) 241 
68See ‘International Criminal Justice and Children’ (No Peace without Justice and UNICEF, 2002), 12   
69See eg Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, 319, stating ‘massive’ recruitment took place among the 
refugee and IDP communities in eastern Chad by Sudanese armed opposition groups in March and 
April 2006; See also  eg M. Wessels, Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection (Harvard University 
Press 2007) 40-41, referring to the LRA recruitment on one occasion of 139 girls from a school 
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thus take cognisance of the organic characteristics of child soldiering as a mass 
crime.     
 
The thesis is situated within this broad theoretical framework with a view to 
furthering the discourse on mass crime and ICL. Though the objective of the treatise 
is more modest in its focus on Lubanga, the discussion hopes to supplement the 
debate and scholarship on all the mass crimes that the ICC adjudicates. Such 
reflection ought to recognise, first and foremost, that international criminal justice is 
largely symbolic; it has limited resources, faces political constraints, and thus cannot 
prosecute large numbers of defendants in cases of mass crime. The ICC can 
prosecute only a few select individuals. A subsequent and important question would 
rest on what the handful of prosecutions would ‘symbolise.’  As noted earlier, the 
most important value of the few international criminal prosecutions could lie in their 
identity construction. This thesis argues that, rather than retribution and deterrence, 
the most viable objective for the prosecution of Lubanga is the expressive function of 
law. Lubanga was only one of the perpetrators of the ‘mass crime.’ His prosecution 
can thus, at best, help disseminate global norms on the conscription, enlistment and 
use of children for purposes of war. An objective to disseminate global norms 
presumes the existence of a ‘global community.’ Since the establishment of the UN, a 
trajectory has emerged of political integration and shared norms. The rise of 
international organisations such as the ICC and the development of international law 
illustrate the existence of an ‘international society.’ Of course, this society is not 
perfect – most ‘societies’ are not. But a paradigm of shared norms has undeniably 
emerged across geographical and cultural spaces.  The proposition I advance centres 
on the claim that the most valuable effects of international criminal law may be its 
contribution to the creation and affirmation of cosmopolitan identity. This argument 
is not based on sentimental idealism but on what the ICC, given its constraints, can 
realistically achieve. 
 
Expressivism is an under-explored rationale of international criminal. Yet it proffers 
a more realistic rationalisation for international penology. In short, an expressive 
approach to ICL suggests that a principal goal of international criminal trials is to 
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express these global norms.70Such an approach is cognisant of the limitations of 
international criminal justice and extrapolates value of penal process under 
constrained circumstances. Such prosecutions, few as they may be, would still 
symbolise the value of law, identity affirmation and foster the globally shared norms 
of international society. The major contribution to knowledge of this project is that it 
brings attention to, and advances, this alternative philosophical rationale for the 
prosecution and punishment for such crimes with reference to a seminal case of child 
soldiering at the world’s first and foremost international criminal court. Retribution 
and deterrence as penal principles have been explored exhaustively. This study 
departs from these well-trodden theoretical paths to apply a lesser popular but 
credible rationale of ICL. As Amann notes, expressivism has been under-studied, yet 
much of international criminal law since Nuremberg was nothing but expression, in 
the form of treaty after treaty defining certain behaviour as criminal.71 Scholarship 
on expressivism and international law has been scant. However, more recently some 
commentators have begun to focus on expressivism as possibly the most viable 
rationale for the prosecution and punishment of international criminals. The project 
that follows attempts to contribute to the growing attention on an expressive or 
expressivist approach to international law by invoking a most recent case. While 
mass crime has been theorised with regards to tribunals since Nuremberg, it has not 
been explored adequately with reference to the ICC; that is because the court had not 
prosecuted defendants since its establishment in 2002. Lubanga thus has 
jurisprudential significance. At the core of expressivist scholarship is the socio-
pedagogical function of law. Some scholars have concluded that Lubanga, as the first 
international proceeding involving only child soldiering crimes at the ICC, ‘offered a 
first interpretation of the main features characterising these crimes…’72  and it ‘more 
generally provided early clarifications on both procedural and substantive legal 
issues relevant to the international criminal justice system established by the Rome 
                                                          
70 M deGuzman, ‘Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court’ 
(2012) 33 Michigan Journal International Law 265 
71See D. Amann, ‘Assessing International Criminal adjudication of Human Rights Atrocities’ 2000-
2003 Third World Legal Studies 169, 177 referring to M. C. Bassiouni and E. Wise 
AutDedereAutJudicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law; (M. Nijhoff 
Publishers; Dortrecht/Boston/London, 1995 )(compiling treaties defining behaviour that violates 
international criminal law) 
72T. Mariniello, ‘Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: The First Judgment of the International 
Criminal Court’s Trial Chamber’ (2012) 1  International Human Rights Law Review 137, 138 
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Statute.’73 The case offered ‘interesting insights on the socio-pedagogical role of 
international criminal justice.’74To the knowledge of this author, this is the first 
project to invoke expressivism to the work of ICC comprehensively. Other authors 
have made fleeting and general references to expressivism and Lubanga, or made 
lesser intensive explorations on it.75  Some scholars have proposed the prioritisation 
of historically under-enforced norms by international criminal courts through 
‘thematic prosecution’ in order to serve expressive objectives.76  ‘Thematic 
prosecutions’77 focus on preferential prosecutions in order to propagate undervalued 
norms and develop prosecutorial capacities for such crimes.  This is apposite to this 
study considering the historical under-enforcement of child soldiering. Still, the 
literature on this interesting approach with regards to Lubanga has been sparse. 
The thesis will defer to some International Relations theories to cultivate a premise 
for expressivism. Since expressivism is predicated on the diffusion of global norms, 
the idea is to, first, illustrate collective normative developments.  
 
To be sure, this thesis is not intended to give a blind endorsement to expressivism 
with regards to Lubanga. The case was characterised by some omissions and 
commissions. The study can only add value if it critiques the approach of the ICC, 
analysing ways the expressive value of Lubanga could have been enhanced. For 
                                                          
73Ibid 138 
74Ibid  
75See eg M. deGuzman, ‘Giving Priority to Sex Crime Prosecutions at International Courts: The 
Philosophical Foundations of a Feminist Agenda’(2011) 11 International Criminal Law Review 515; M 
deGuzman ‘Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court’ (2012) 
33 Michigan Journal International Law 265;  M. deGuzman, ‘An Expressive Rationale for the 
Thematic Prosecution of Sex Crimes’ in M. Bergsmo (ed), Thematic Prosecution of International Sex 
Crimes  FICHL Publication Series No. 13(Torkel Opsahl Academic E-Publisher, Beijing,  2012);  M. 
Drumbl, ‘The Expressive Value of Prosecuting and Punishing Terrorists: Hamdan, the Geneva 
Conventions, and International Criminal Law’ (2007) 75 George Washington Law Review 1165, 1195; 
D Amann ‘Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide,’ (2002) 2 International Criminal Law 
Review 93, 121; R. Sloane, ‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the 
National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law,’ (2007) 43 Stanford Journal 
of International Law 39, M. Drumbl Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2007) 
76See eg M. Bergsmo, A. Skre, C. Wui Ling and E Wood ‘Introductory remarks - Examining Thematic 
Prosecutions and the Challenges of Understanding and Proving International Sex Crimes’ FICHL 
Policy Brief Series No. 11 (2013) 1, stating that ‘In the Lubanga case – which results in the first trial 
judgment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) – the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in fact chose 
to focus on the recruitment and use of child soldiers. By focusing on these crimes, the ICC gave 
legitimacy to the practice of thematic prosecution.’ 
77See eg S. Greijer, ‘The Thematic Prosecution of Crimes Against Children’ in M. Bergsmo (ed) 
Thematic Prosecution of International Sex Crimes (Torkel Opsahl Academic E-Publisher, Beijing, 
2012) M. deGuzman, ‘An Expressive Rationale for the Thematic Prosecution of Sex Crimes’ in M. 
Bergsmo (ed), Thematic Prosecution of International Sex Crimes  FICHL Publication Series No. 13 
(Torkel Opsahl Academic E-Publisher, Beijing 2012) 
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instance, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) was heavily criticised for failing to 
include sex crimes charges against Lubanga. Insufficient charges can denude child 
soldiering of its full characterisation. Further, the tendency to exempt self-referring 
state actors and focus on non-state actors or rebels for prosecution does not comport 
with fairness and justice, and misses state targets whose prosecution could generate 
even more expressive mileage. Yet these prosecutorial indiscretions cannot deprive 
expressivism of its plausibility as a viable penal approach. As a basis for prosecution 
of international crimes, it remains viable. The other problem impacting on the 
expressive value of international criminal trials is the distance between locations for 
trials and affected communities. International proceedings, for security and other 
reasons, are at times conducted outside geographical spaces afflicted by hostilities. 
The ICC is situated in The Hague, Netherlands. This externalisation of proceedings 
may diminish the expressive value of law in the communities ravaged by hostilities.  
While their roles are largely symbolic, international criminal courts have adopted 
proactive programmes in order to engage with communities traumatised by human 
catastrophes. The work of international criminal courts would be inadequate if they 
did not conduct supplementary work to reinforce norms, especially in societies 
inclined to conflict. However, the court should only limit its work to informational 
provision. This engagement also has another important function: it denotes to the 
affected communities that they are part of the cosmopolitan or normative 
community. In this thesis, I discuss outreach programmes as a continuum of the 
socio-pedagogical expressivist project of international criminal justice.  ‘Expressive’ 
outreach would help in the internalisation of norms, which should be the ultimate 
purpose of law and a cosmopolitan project of justice. These approaches, I argue, 
transcend precepts of retribution and deterrence.  
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
The thesis is principally a theoretical study focusing, broadly, on the philosophy of 
law. It brings together three branches on international law – international 
humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHL) and ICL. While the 
thesis draws broadly on the philosophies of international law, the study ultimately 
converges on ICL and penal justifications of the ICC because of the focus on the 
seminal case of Lubanga. The study premises itself on the contention that 
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international criminal law lacks a credible philosophical theory of its own.  To this 
end, the study evaluates contemporary legal and penal theory through a critical look 
at historical jurisprudential practices and theoretical perspectives. The main research 
method used has been predominantly library-based. The thesis’ approach has been 
identifying and utilising relevant literature ranging from books, journal articles, law 
reports, web materials, as well as monographs and papers of eminent scholars. The 
study naturally recognises literature on the dominant penal theoretical perspectives 
to juxtapose them to the proposition it proffers. Such use of multiple data and 
literatures ensures that the issue is not examined through one perspective. As well as 
recognising existing literature, the project attempts to build on and add to existing 
work.  
 
The thesis relies on both primary and secondary sources. Philosophical theories must 
attend to the empirical actualities of that which they theorise.78The study anchors 
itself on Lubanga as a case study. Lubanga as a seminal case is important for its 
procedural and jurisprudential legacy. The thesis focuses on the prosecutorial and 
judicial practices using primary documents which include trial, verdict and other 
transcripts.  The study employs anecdotal and empirical evidence from research 
conducted in the DRC. Secondary analysis has allowed me, because of limitations of 
travel, to examine the issues without having to go through the process of collecting 
data in the field.  Among the justifications for deploying a case study is the intention 
to cover contextual conditions because of their relevance to the phenomenon under 
study.79This contextual nature of the case study is reflected in one definition of a case 
study as an empirical inquiry that ‘investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context and addresses a situation in which the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.’80 The ICC operates within a unique 
context. The court faces operational constraints; the crimes it prosecutes have certain 
gravity distinct from domestic or ordinary crimes. This study analyses these vexing 
‘contexts effects’ with reference to the scholarly literature and documents on the ICC 
in an effort to posit the most plausible justification for the court’s work. 
 
                                                          
78 A. Duff, ‘Theories of Criminal Law’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 
Edition), E NZalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/criminal-law/>. 
79 R. Yin, Case study research: Design and methods  (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage  2003) 
80 ibid 13 
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However, others argue that because of their focus ‘on a single unit, and a single 
instance, the issue of generalisability has been raised against them than with other 
types of qualitative research.’81 As such, single case studies cannot be of value 
because they are not generalisable into general propositions and theories.82Others 
argue that the case study is subjective, giving too much scope for the researcher’s 
own interpretations. Thus the validity of case studies would be wanting.83 However, 
other perceptions towards single case studies have been much more nuanced. For 
instance,  Eysenck asserts that ‘sometimes we simply have to keep our eyes open and 
look carefully at individual cases - not in the hope of proving anything, but rather in 
the hope of learning something!’84 The thesis attempts to highlight an alternative 
theoretical perspective to the traditional penal notions of international criminal 
justice. Flyvbjerg argues that single case studies have their ‘own rigor, different to be 
sure, but no less strict than the rigor of quantitative methods.’85There is no greater 
bias in a researcher’s preconceived case study toward confirming notions than in 
other forms of research.86 Difficulty in summarising case studies into 
general propositions is due to properties of the reality studied than the research 
method.87 This thesis exercises considerable rigour and eschews bias, by considering 
critiques of approaches of the ICC in the case study.  A case can be made for the 
generalisability of the case study. Mass crimes constitute ICL and the ICC core 
crimes.  As has been posited earlier, child soldiering is a mass crime. The distinction 
with other mass crimes only pertains to the nature of commission or perhaps, 
outcomes. While other crimes involve murder, conscription, enlistment and use of 
children for military combat does not always result in large scale fatalities. However, 
it often involves large numbers of children recruited to participate in armed conflict. 
                                                          
81See S. Merriam, Qualitative Case Study Research in Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and 
Implementation (John Wiley & Sons, 2009) Chapter 3, summary found on 
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33 
 
Some have argued that non-murder crimes are even more egregious. The seminal 
case of Lubanga could enhance our understandings on the purpose of prosecution of 
this group of diffuse crimes by the ICC.   
1.5 Structure of thesis 
 
The thesis argues that the most viable philosophical justification for the prosecution 
of Lubanga is expressivism. In order to elaborate on the principal argument of the 
thesis, the chapters, firstly, set out to examine a number of theoretical, and ancillary 
socio-legal issues that underpin expressivist discourse. These include 
conceptualisation of international relations and the creation and dissemination of 
norms. Following this introductory chapter, the thesis unfolds in nine subsequent 
chapters. Chapter 2 begins with an outline of the theoretical framework that 
animates the thesis. In order to gain purchase for expressivism, the chapter discusses 
the philosophies of retribution and deterrence. These have been the dominant goals 
in jurisprudence. The chapter then examines these rationales within the context of 
the Rome Statute. The overall objective is to highlight the limitations of these twin 
philosophies in ICL. To build on the proposition of the thesis, the chapter then 
locates the ICC within the collectivist standards of international law and society. 
International criminal law has developed as it has in part because of the individual 
and collective identities of those influencing the course of international law.88 The 
ICC fits into the cosmopolitan normative developments in international law. The 
chapter places child law within cosmopolitan discourse. The thesis focuses on 
children and armed conflict. Chapter 3 thus focuses on the historical development of 
norms on child soldiering and agents of ‘meaning’ change. A socio-historical and 
legal approach is significant for our understandings of the development of social 
meanings (international, in this case) and the graduation of practices into grave 
crimes. The chapter traces the trajectory of the construction of the concept of child 
soldiering from a mundane practice to the present opprobrious social meaning, 
established through the work of transnational agents. This historiography would help 
us appreciate Lubanga as a contemporary criminological phenomenon.  The chapter 
attempts to illustrate the dynamics of child soldiering as a ‘mass’ crime. As already 
noted, child militarisation has barely been depicted in its collective form. Without its 
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of International Law and Policy1019, 1023 
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correct characterisation, we cannot accord it appropriate gravity or formulate viable 
penal justifications for mass crime. The chapter also refers to the debate on whether 
child soldiers are victims or perpetrators. International law generally perceives child 
soldiers as victims but this meaning has been contested.  Chapter 4 discusses the 
legal architecture of child soldiering as instruments for the regulation of the 
established ‘social meaning’ that essentially deems children as victims and not 
perpetrators. This collective development of law ultimately aids our understandings 
and appreciation of the philosophical foundations of and justifications for 
international penality. Chapter 5 then shifts to international criminal justice. 
International criminal law institutions reflect collectivism against egregious crime as 
reflected by the laws discussed in the previous chapter. The chapter discusses how 
the social meaning of child soldiering has been or not been expressed or regulated 
through criminalisation; it examines approaches of tribunals established to 
adjudicate crimes committed during the conflicts. The conclusion is that child 
soldiering has historically been under-judicialised. International criminal justice 
seemed infatuated with mass murder crimes. Chapter 6 discusses the ICC; it 
highlights the situational constraints on the ICC. Financial scarcity, controversial 
selectivity and the lack of an enforcement mechanism mean the court can prosecute 
only a handful of cases out of the mass crimes.  Still, a realistic and imaginative penal 
rationale can be drawn from these limiting criminological and operational features. 
Taken together, the historicity of the grave mass crimes it prosecutes, the subsequent 
laws’ community-creating effect, and constraints of the ICC can help us formulate a 
plausible theory for ICC’s work. Chapter 7 introduces the case of Lubanga and 
discusses the ICC’s dominant philosophical justifications of retribution and 
deterrence with regards to the case. The purpose is to first highlight how these 
principles may be ill-fitting to be primary penal objectives in the case.  The chapter 
also briefly discusses other penal rationales of ICL. The observation here is that other 
objectives, like peace and reconciliation, are better left to other institutions.  Chapter 
8 firstly discusses ‘prosecutorial discretion’ focusing on the ICC’s selection criteria 
for situations and cases. The OTP has the discretion to select and proceed or not with 
cases referred to the court. Of particular interest to the chapter is, given the 
inhibitions on the ICC, what would be the most viable premise for the OTP’s selection 
of cases. The chapter discusses a proposition in an emerging body of scholarship on 
‘thematic prosecutions.’ Such prosecutions would select and focus exclusively on 
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particular norms which have historically been undervalued or under-enforced.  These 
prosecutions serve expressive objectives.  Chapter 9 seeks to apply expressivism to 
the penal process in Lubanga. To begin with, the chapter attempts to highlight the 
unique position of the ICC and ‘mass’ organic nature of child soldiering. Because of 
its elevated status, the ICC is uniquely situated to perform, principally, an expressive 
role in relation to mass crimes.  Thus, the chapter examines how this can be 
manifested through (a) the expressive effect of institutional status of the ICC as a, 
limited but comparatively, more visible court (b) the expressive function of trial and 
verdict ; and (c) the expressive function of sentence as both messaging tools for the 
reinforcement of social meaning and the law. The essence of this chapter is to 
illustrate that the few cases of mass crimes like Lubanga that the ICC prosecutes can 
achieve a primary objective of disseminating global norms more than it can 
effectuate ambitious aims of retribution and deterrence. Significantly, the chapter 
projects the importance of outreach programmes as a component of the expressive 
function of the ICC. Outreach programmes involve direct engagement with 
communities traumatised by human-sponsored calamities. Such approaches help 
bring afflicted communities into the cosmopolitan normative society through the 
process of norm internalisation. Chapter 10 concludes by harmonising and 
summarising key issues raised in the thesis. In particular, it reconciles the analysis in 
the previous chapters. It then draws conclusions on the importance of the findings 
and their implications. The study rounds off with a discussion on potential areas of 
future research.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Introduction 
 
The notion that individuals may be criminally responsible for certain acts that 
constitute international crimes has since been established under international law. A 
legal paradigm has emerged in the post-World War II era focused on punishing a 
handful of egregiously evil crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. The trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo after the Second World War marked the 
birth of an international criminal law regime.89 The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals 
played a critical role in the development of ICL, particularly in terms of how courts 
currently understand war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of 
aggression.90 The International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as well as the hybrid courts 
and mixed tribunals91 marked the maturation of international criminal law (ICL). 
Over the last decade defendants, including former senior state actors or leaders, have 
been charged and prosecuted, convicted and punished by these courts.  Former 
Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadžić92 and Ratko Mladić93 have been charged 
with genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity at the ICTY. In March 2012, 
Charles Taylor, the former Liberian leader, was jailed for 50 years by the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) for aiding and abetting war crimes.94 In 2010, the ICC 
issued an arrest warrant for President Omar al-Bashir for genocide committed in 
Darfur.95 
 
                                                          
89A. Smeulers, ‘Punishing Enemies of All Mankind’ (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International Law, 
971 
90 K. Heller The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law (OUP 
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91 Hybrid and mixed courts have been established in Sierra Leone (2000), East Timor (2000), Kosovo 
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93Prosecutor v Mladic ICTY-IT -09-92-T; IT-09-92-T 
94Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor SCSL-03-1-T 
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Most of the jurisprudence has essentialised mass ‘atrocities,’ popularly conceived of 
as mass killings. This focus on fatalities has, historically, overshadowed other 
transgressions that do not necessarily cause mass fatalities. The use of children in 
military hostilities, for instance, only relatively recently became a pernicious global 
concern. Its roots are steeped in a history of reticence. Child soldiering and its mass 
nature have been under-represented in jurisprudence. Since the problem was 
brought to the fore by human rights organisations, the proliferation of child soldiers 
‘has been matched only by the explosion of treaties outlawing the practice.’96 To date, 
states have ratified the humanitarian and human rights laws protecting children 
during war.97 The emergence of international criminal courts has provided fora for 
punishment for egregious crimes. In response to infractions of norms (for example 
against child soldiering), we prosecute and seek convictions against those who violate 
those laws.98 The first prosecutions were conducted SCSL, a hybrid or mixed tribunal 
established in 2002, extrapolating its provisions from the Rome Statute of 1998. The 
acts of conscription, enlistment and use of children in armed conflict are now 
regarded as a war crime. The seminal trial and conviction of Lubanga by the ICC has 
been viewed as a triumph for child soldiers in the DRC and beyond.99 However, what 
such prosecution can or ought to achieve in respect of these crimes remains unclear.  
International law has emerged as a thriving arena of philosophical inquiry.100The 
philosophy of international law is a special branch of jurisprudence, encapsulating 
both conceptual and normative questions about international law.101 In the 
philosophical debate about punishment, two main types of theories of punishment 
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dominate: utilitarian or deterrence theory and retributive theory.102 These rationales 
derive from classical domestic penal principles. Municipal courts adjudicate ordinary 
crimes such as robberies, burglaries and thefts. International crimes prosecute mass 
crimes which are organic and often widespread. As such, the replication of municipal 
theories to mass crimes on the international terrain presents vexing incongruity. The 
project that unfolds seeks to argue for a more cogent rationale for mass crime 
drawing on the ICC’s first case on child soldiering. This chapter sketches out the 
theoretical framework for the study. As already noted, scholarship on mass 
criminality and penology has offered various perspectives.  The thesis locates itself 
within this broad theoretical framework with a view to furthering the discourse on 
mass crime and international criminal law. The chapter is structured as follows. The 
first part discusses international criminal justice’s penal philosophies with a focus on 
the two dominant rationales of retribution and deterrence. These are, of course, not 
the only objectives of ICL. However, jurisprudence evinces they are the most 
prominent. The second part illustrates how these rationales are reflected in 
international criminal justice. The third part discusses the Rome Statute which 
created the ICC. The fourth part analyses international criminal law’s dominant 
rationales with regards to mass crime. The fifth discusses cosmopolitanism, 
international norms and foundational philosophies for international penology and 
places the Rome Statute within this context. The last part discusses the dynamics of 
norm diffusion. 
2.1 Criminal justice and penal philosophy 
 
This study locates itself, broadly, within the philosophy of international law. The 
subject matter of the study draws on the main branches of international law – 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHL) and 
ICL. A correlation ought to exist between this international legalism and objectives of 
punishment. The standard that shapes our understanding of penal issues is ‘the 
philosophy of punishment’- a branch of moral philosophy that has led criminologists 
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and jurists to re-examine the normative foundations on which the penal system 
rests.103 The central question that philosophers ask is why criminals should be 
punished. As in domestic law, this question preoccupies international criminal law. A 
central plank of this thesis is that international criminal law is bereft of a theory of its 
own.104 International criminal law in its current incarnation, in Drumbl’s words, 
‘cannibalises’ domestic rationales,105 mainly retribution and deterrence. These, as 
noted, have their philosophical foundations in municipal law. To be sure, retribution 
and deterrence are not the only penal philosophies that exist. The list of goals is very 
long.106 The objectives include: reconciliation, rehabilitation, incapacitation, 
restoration, access to victims, historical recording building, preventing revisionism, 
crystallizing international norms, general affirmative prevention, establishing peace, 
preventing war, vindicating international law prohibitions, setting standards for fair 
trials, ending impunity, and expressive functions.107 This manifold of objectives has 
led to the conclusion that the ‘current views on the objectives of international 
criminal courts are in disarray.’108[T]he normative structure of international criminal 
justice remains quite uncertain and confused when compared to domestic law. This 
is especially so from the point of view of the philosophy of punishment ...’109This 
situation ‘has several disquieting consequences, one of which is that the performance 
of international criminal courts cannot be assessed reliably.’110 In this thesis, my 
primary focus is on retribution and deterrence although some of the other penal 
philosophies are discussed in some detail in Chapter 7.  To this extent, the thesis 
seeks to place Lubanga within this expansive idealism. When deconstructed, 
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however, international criminal justice’s primary goals have been retribution and 
deterrence.111 
2.1.1 Retribution 
 
Retribution (also called ‘just deserts’ theory) is aimed at providing a moral 
justification for the practice of punishing criminals.112 Although there are many 
shades to retributive theory, these share in common the precept that the criminal 
deserves punishment and that this desert should be proportional to the gravity of the 
offence.113 Punishment would send the message that criminal responsibility will 
ultimately inflict moral blame which is followed by the harshest consequences any 
society has to offer: deprivation of liberty or assets or both.114The defining character 
of deontological analysis is that the value of an action ought to be grounded in the 
action itself rather than in an external ends.115 Simply put, if there is a duty to punish, 
then that duty can only exist because the act of punishing is justified in and of itself, 
and not because some other external benefit is created because of the 
punishment.116It is the claim that what makes the practice of punishment morally 
permissible is that criminals deserve punishment, regardless of whatever beneficial 
consequences might flow from imposing that punishment.117As such, retribution is 
backward-looking. Retributive punishment is not a means to some external end such 
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as the improvement of society, or the greater good of the community but that 
criminals deserve to be punished. The guiding penological principle has revolved 
around the gravity of the offence and sentencing. 118The criminal is punished 
proportionately because he or she deserves such punishment. The principle of 
proportionality-that penalties be proportionate in their severity to the gravity of the 
defendant’s criminal conduct- has traditionally been a basic requirement of 
fairness.119 
2.1.2 Deterrence 
 
Deterrence is often divided into specific and general deterrence. Specific deterrence 
presumes that a sentence will dissuade the particular offender from committing 
offences in the future. In jurisprudence, the focus is, however, largely on general 
deterrence, ‘namely the notion that if one person is punished, this will reduce the 
likelihood that another person in that same place or somewhere else will offend in 
the future.’120  As such, deterrence is forward-looking.  Potential offenders are 
dissuaded from committing offences for fear of punishment.121Deterrence theory is, 
thus, generally premised on the assumption that the potential criminal is a rational 
actor. It is founded on the belief that people calculate the likely costs and benefits of 
any action before deciding what to do. Deterrence theorists depict the punishment of 
criminal offenders as morally justified because it deters the offender and other 
people from committing crime and thereby produces a net gain to society, with the 
suffering inflicted by criminals outweighed by the larger quantity of suffering that 
potential crime victims are spared.122 
2.2 International criminal jurisprudence and penology 
 
International criminal law is premised on the prosecution and punishment of the 
crimes that offend the entirety of humanity.123While international criminal law has 
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demarcated international crimes as most serious, the penal objectives above – which 
derive from domestic law principles - suffuse the jurisprudence of Nuremberg and 
Tokyo, the two international criminal tribunals, for the former Yugoslavia and for 
Rwanda, established by the Security Council in the early 1990s, the hybrid courts, 
mixed tribunals and the ICC.124  Architects of international criminal law thus resort 
to these familiar domestic rationales for prosecution and punishment.125 Robert 
Jackson, the chief US prosecutor at the first trial at Nuremberg told the judges: ‘The 
wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant, 
and so devastating, that civilisation cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it 
cannot survive their being repeated.’126 As such, from a deontological imperative, 
there was duty to punish the offenders.  
 
In Erdemovic, the ICTY Trial Chamber discussed127 deterrence within declarations of 
UN Security Council members at the time of Resolution 872.128 One of the principal 
arguments made in favour of international criminal prosecutions is that they can 
serve to deter the commission of future atrocities.129 Punishment deters because 
potential war criminals know and fear the pain of incarceration, and act to avoid it.130 
The Trial Chamber noted that the UN members saw the ICTY as a powerful means to 
promote the rule of law ‘as well as deter parties to the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia from committing further crimes or to discourage them from further 
atrocities.’131 In punishing the defendants, the ICTR also invariably cited retribution 
and deterrence. The Tribunal wrote that its efforts must be aimed at dissuading ‘for 
good those who will attempt in the future to perpetrate such atrocities’ by showing 
them that the ‘international community was not ready to tolerate the serious 
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violations of international humanitarian law and human rights.’132 The sentencing 
judgment of Kambanda, aimed:  
 
‘…on the one hand, at retribution of the said accused, who must see their crimes 
punished, and over and above that, on other hand, at deterrence, namely dissuading 
for good those who will attempt in the future to perpetrate such atrocities by showing 
them that the international community was not ready to tolerate the serious 
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights.’133 
In the case of Fofana, for example, the SCSL declared that: ‘[T]he primary objectives 
must be retribution and deterrence.134 On specific deterrence, the ‘sentence should 
be adequate to discourage an accused from recidivism.’135 Although the Trial 
Chamber in the Dragan Nikolic case also recognised that specific deterrence ‘has an 
important function in principle and serves as an important goal of sentencing,’136 
nevertheless found that specific deterrence had no relevance in the case before 
it.’137In response to the Appeals Chamber’s affirmation of former Liberian president 
Charles Taylor’s sentence, SCSL Prosecutor Brenda Hollis stated that ‘[t]his sentence 
makes it clear that those responsible for criminal conduct on a massive scale will be 
severely punished.138 No sentence less than 50 years would be enough to achieve 
retribution and deterrence, the primary goals of sentencing for international 
crimes.’139The ICC cited these traditional rationales of retribution and deterrence as 
primary goals in the prosecution of Lubanga.140 
2.2.1 Philosophical foundations of the Rome Statute (ICC) 
 
The ICC was the first treaty-based court created to help ‘end impunity for the 
perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
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community.’141 Since these offences are deemed to offend humanity as a whole and 
‘deeply shock the conscience of humanity’, it is such crime that can justify an 
internationalisation of their prosecution…’142 The ICC represented the putative 
international criminal court, unlike the preceding hybrid models. Focus on its work, 
practices and philosophies would be inevitable. In terms of its penal philosophy, the 
ICC seemed to replicate the domestic penal traditions of its predecessors whose 
jurisprudence has been cited above. Supporters of the Rome Statute routinely urge 
ratification on deterrence grounds.143 According to the Preamble of the Rome Statute 
and Articles 1 and 5, its objectives are the prosecution and punishment of the most 
serious crimes of international concern.144 The Statute describes and seeks to end 
‘unimaginable atrocities’, and ‘grave crimes’ that ‘deeply shock the conscience of 
humanity.’145 These provisions have been interpreted as meaning that retribution 
and deterrence are primary goals of the ICC.146 As noted, the ICC referred to the 
principles of retribution and deterrence as principal goals in the prosecution of 
Lubanga.147 
 
Several authors argue, however, that the correlation between international criminal 
justice and such aims is tenuous.148Just as in the domestic realm, in ICL, offenders or 
those who disturb social order are punished in proportion to the moral magnitude of 
their intentionally committed harms.149 Critics of retributive justifications for 
international trials note, however, the inability of international courts to prosecute 
all or even most of the crimes committed in a given situation and the difficulty of 
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inflicting retributively proportionate punishments such as genocide.150 Also, the 
‘massive nature of atrocity cannot be reflected in retributive punishment owing to 
human rights standards, which cabin the range of sanction.’151 These ‘standards limit 
the amount of pain institutions can inflict upon convicts.’152 Inconsistencies in the 
quantum of punishment also arise because of the discretion reposed on judges.153 
 
Deterrence is notoriously difficult to assess. It is impossible to prove categorically 
that the existence or the type of punishment has had any bearing on subsequent 
events.154  Further, the belief that perpetrators make cost-benefit calculations before 
they commit crimes is extremely presumptuous.155 But more significantly the crimes 
that international courts prosecute – mass crimes - are distinct from those 
adjudicated in domestic law. If the ‘rational-actor model of deterrence is suspect in 
the national context, it is exponentially so in the international, where war, large scale 
violence, and collective pathologies, as well as the institutional and resource 
limitations of ICL can be expected to distort the viability of the familiar cost-benefit 
calculus on which that model depends.’156 Furthermore, it may ‘well be quixotic to 
expect ICL to exert a significant deterrent effect on war criminals and genocidaires 
merely through its potential to increase the perceived costs of international crime.’157 
These are often passion-driven crimes. The ICTY Appeals Chamber was circumspect 
about general deterrence as the most important sentencing purpose.158 Although it 
was of ‘general importance’ no ‘undue weight’ should be given to deterrence as a 
sentencing factor.159 In Tadic, the Appeals Chamber stated that it ‘accepts that 
[deterrence] must not be accorded undue prominence in the overall assessment of 
the sentences to be imposed on persons convicted by the International Tribunal.’160In 
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Delalic [Celebici Case] it was noted that’ a consideration of retribution as the only 
factor in sentencing is likely to be counter-productive and disruptive of the entire 
purpose of the Security Council, which is the restoration and maintenance of peace in 
the territory of the former Yugoslavia.’161 So the perception is that retribution does 
not spawn any benefits to the victims or society. 
 
Retribution and deterrence are not only objectives of ICL. The list of goals is long. 
The task ‘of fulfilling all these self-imposed demands is truly gargantuan.’162 This has 
led to the suggestion that ‘some of the presently accepted objectives of international 
criminal courts should be altered - that is, scaled down, or even abandoned, and left 
to other mechanisms of public response to massive human rights violations.’163 
Criminal courts ‘should play a more modest role in advancing the rule of law in the 
domain of international politics.164 There is no trellis, so to speak, to support the ivy 
of the courts’ aspirations.’165  In later chapters, I discuss some of these aims: the 
observation is that some of the objectives, such as establishing peace and 
reconciliation, should not be duties of international courts. These can be conducted 
by other organs, for example specialised UN institutions. The central proposition for 
this study is that is that ICL requires a modest theory of prosecution and punishment 
applicable to its context.166 Theorisation of ICL thus far appears divorced both 
conceptually and practically from context.  The goals of adjudication ‘are simply too 
disparate to be susceptible to being ranked against a common measure.’167 But ‘this 
does not mean that one must accept the existing absence of orientation. An 
improvement over the present situation would be if a goal could be selected as 
central to the mission of international criminal courts in the sense of providing an 
argumentative advantage in balancing competing goals.’ 168 It is imperative, for 
instance, ‘that the ICC coalesces around a primary justification for its work and set 
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modest expectations.’169 When unpacked, international criminal justice’s principal 
goals have been retribution and deterrence.170The other objectives only surface 
sporadically in jurisprudence. Whereas the ICC predicates its work principally on 
these domestic theoretical propositions of retribution and deterrence, it operates in a 
different context. Context insensitive research and context insensitive theory lead to 
a self-reinforcing pattern of context insensitive scholarship.171 Mass crimes are 
distinct from ordinary crimes. Yet international criminal courts cannot prosecute all 
or most offenders. Historically, tribunals have failed to account for large numbers of 
perpetrators.  Even after the Holocaust, the Allies’ enthusiasm for criminal 
prosecutions dissipated rapidly.172  An ‘implicit principle of Nuremberg and Tokyo 
was to hold highly publicised trials of a few leaders primarily responsible for a 
process of criminality in which hundreds of thousands had in fact been culpable in 
one way or another.’173 The subsequent tribunals ‘continuously struggled, with only 
partial success, to obtain the funding, personnel, and political support necessary to 
function even with relatively modest caseloads.’174It will ‘rarely be possible to 
prosecute more than a representative sampling of those responsible for genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes.’175A consensus seems to have emerged that 
the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) should negotiate the inherent limitations of 
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prosecutorial capacity by focusing investigations and prosecutions on those culpable 
individuals who occupied the highest levels of political or military authority.176 
2.3 International criminal law and mass crime 
 
 The tribunals established since Nuremberg have adjudicated genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. These crimes involve multiple actors. While these 
crimes have been discussed predominantly in terms of large scale murders,177 
conceptually, the category of ‘egregious’ crimes shares common organic 
characteristics. Of these crimes, the mass nature of child soldiering has been less 
salient in legal discourse, perhaps because it does not always induce the horror of 
mass eliminationism. However, ‘mass’ only denotes ‘large numbers.’ ICL ‘crimes 
involve extraordinary collective dimensions and extensive communal engagement.’178 
Just as it is a crime to kill thousands of people, criminality in child soldiering should 
be perceived through the wide-scale conscription, enlistment and active use of 
children for purposes of war. Some, as noted, consider such non-murder crimes as 
more grave. The numerous agents in child soldiering include state actors, rebels, (or 
as groups), parents and guardians. Therefore, the conscription, enlistment and use of 
children for military combat should be considered as mass crime. Liberal traditions 
of ICL have approached mass crime by focusing on the individual as a unit of action 
and punishment. Lubanga was charged and found guilty as co-perpetrator179 for the 
recruitment of child combatants. However, this individuation of guilt can obscure the 
collective character of ICL crimes - a feature that distinguishes them from most 
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similar crimes of violence in the national sphere.180Perpetrators of ICL crimes often 
act in a normative universe that differs dramatically from the relatively stable, well-
ordered society that most national criminal justice systems take as their baseline.181 
Therefore’ we cannot simply project familiar national principles onto ICL. We must 
inspect and re-articulate those principles to take into account the special contexts 
encountered by ICL, which include massively collective action…’182 
 
There are many other ways in which the special contexts raised by ICL may spawn 
new challenges, because they depart from the familiar context in which we normally 
conceive of criminal law. Some scholars have proposed a polycentric approach to 
mass crime, incorporating multiple judicial modalities, in order to encompass 
collective responsibility. Such an approach would account for a large number of 
perpetrators. A diverse of approach to mass atrocity is, ideally, appealing. However, 
it might be fraught with more impediments than the ICC contends with. In this 
study, I focus on the ICC in its present circumstances. The multi-pronged modalities 
‘would entail fragmentation of international criminal law: the multiplicity of its 
variations would be difficult to order in ways capable of preserving the system's 
coherence.’183 Further, the liberal model the ICC uses is not alien to most countries 
which were colonised by Western regimes. What is important is to be able to justify 
the prosecution of an individual to society. The ICC as the foremost global penal 
institution, and indeed Lubanga as its seminal case, presents a focal point for 
discourse on theoretical challenges for ICL in cases of individuated guilt.  The ICC 
receives numerous communications for prosecution of cases. Therefore, it has to 
exercise selective discretion, not least because of its limitations. Prosecutorial 
selection is vital because it determines the narrative for the judicial process. 
However, the ICC selection of situations and cases has been dogged by dispute. The 
prosecutor has been accused of targeting Africans and ignoring the excesses of 
Western countries, for example, British troops in Iraq.  Ambos and Stegmiller point 
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out that given ‘the high number of communications and referrals to the ICC, a 
focused strategy setting out the criteria for situation and case selection and 
prioritisation should be one of the priorities of the Prosecutor.’184 The Rome Statute 
does not clearly outline the purposes of prosecution and punishment, except stating 
aims to end ‘unimaginable atrocities’, and ‘grave crimes’ that ‘deeply shock the 
conscience of humanity,’185. These have been read as meaning retribution and 
deterrence are primary goals of the ICC.186 The ICC also alluded to the principles of 
retribution and deterrence as principal goals in the prosecution of Lubanga.187 For 
reasons discussed earlier - the limiting factors and the mass nature of the crimes the 
ICC prosecutes - this unreflective mimicry of domestic rationales to the international 
plane becomes problematic and may not be the best guiding principles for case 
selection. International criminal courts can prosecute only a handful of defendants. 
In that sense, international justice is largely symbolic.  A subsequent question would 
centre on what the few cases the ICC prosecutes would symbolise. Such approach 
may help us establish not only the most plausible but a realistic justification for the 
court’s selection of cases and its work.  
2.4 International collectivism and law 
 
To appreciate the trajectory of this project, it is important to conceptualise the 
underpinnings of the whole body of international law. It is through a prism of the 
broader dynamics and normative developments that we can establish what the ICC 
symbolises and plausible penal justifications. The concept of ‘international’ in law 
presupposes a legal community that transcends state individualism.  Unlike national 
criminal law, ICL ‘purports to serve multiple communities, and the figurative 
‘international community,’ which, needless to say, is not monolithic.188Arguments 
about state sovereignty and international law have been well-rehearsed. The 
‘Westphalian’ concept in the context of a nation-state’s right to monopolise certain 
exercises of power on its territory and citizens has been prized by those who maintain 
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‘realist’ views or who otherwise wish to prevent foreign or international powers and 
authorities from interfering in a national government’s decisions and activities.189 
Nevertheless, a new order of inter-state interaction in which states give up some of 
their decision-making authority to international organisations has emerged. 
Substantial increases in international and cross-national connections and 
institutions are challenging an international order dominated by the unitary state. 
According to Haas, ‘political integration is the process whereby actors shift their 
loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new center, whose 
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over preexisting national states.’190 
Lauterpacht presented one of the earlier works on the function of law in the 
international community.191 For Lauterpacht, the international community was a 
reality which over time would progress towards greater legal and political 
integration.192 In a critique, Feichtner argues, however, that Lauterpacht’s work is 
sentimental ‘given the impossibility of adhering to a notion of progress of 
international society towards international solidarity and justice or the notion of 
legal logic as the foundation of a convincing argument.’193 Despite our 
disillusionment, she notes however, that ‘Lauterpacht reminds us of what many of us 
international lawyers are missing today, but is needed now no less than it was needed 
then: a vision of global justice and global public ordering against which we may 
assess the current state of international law and legal practice.’194 While not 
monolithic, the idea of a ‘universal community’ is more a reality today than at any 
time in the past.195 The notion of an international society or Civitas maxima, a 
‘supreme state’ into which individual states have been combined ‘because they wish 
to promote the common good’196might be dismissed as idealistic and sentimental. 
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However, the creation and existence of the United Nations, ratifications of 
international law instruments (IHL, IHRL, ICL), including the Rome Statute, present 
objective evidence of some integration, however imperfect. Not many can speak of 
our societies as perfect and all-inclusive. 
2.4.1 Cosmopolitanism 
 
Various philosophies have been proffered to explain international global ethics. The 
proposition I proffer is premised on the claim that ‘the most valuable effects of 
international criminal law may be its contribution to the creation of a sense of 
cosmopolitan identity, an identity which values all human beings equally, 
independent of their national or other ties.’197 In this study, my approach interweaves 
two International Relations approaches, constructivism and cosmopolitanism, the 
latter as the primary framework mainly for its emphasis on the diversity of the 
collectivism, individual rights and duties towards one another. I shall enmesh these 
two approaches with Durkheim’s concept of the ‘collective 
conscience.’198Cosmopolitanism does not advocate the abolition of the state. The 
thesis takes ‘cosmopolitanism’, as the project which ‘searches for commonalities 
between cultures’ but ‘also recognises and respects differences, thus embracing 
pluralism and the building of a modus vivendi.199 One of the foremost writers on 
cosmopolitanism was Immanuel Kant. There are, of course, other philosophers who 
have articulated cosmopolitan ethos. However, Kant is regarded its most prominent 
proponent. In one of his essays, Kant noted that ‘the peoples of the earth have 
entered in varying degree into a universal community and it has developed to the 
point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere.’200  
According to cosmopolitanism, ‘regard for others does not stop at the boundaries of a 
given state; we are rightly concerned with the global community of humans;… 
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emphasis is placed on humans rather than states…’201  Central to cosmopolitan ethics 
are the rights of individuals over states. The human rights treaties, laws and 
declarations that have been generated since Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) seem to vindicate the growing pre-eminence of individual rights. Some 
criticise the UDHR for endorsing an inter-statal approach, but the truth is ‘the 
treatment by states of its citizens and residents within their boundaries is no longer 
an unchecked prerogative.’202 More recently, the principle of the individual as the 
subject of cosmopolitan law has been extended to minority groups within countries 
in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Nation, Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities.203 While ‘states are hugely important vehicles to 
aid the delivery of effective regulation, equal liberty, and social justice, they should 
not be thought of as ontologically privileged. They can be judged by how far they 
deliver these public goods and how far they fail.’204 One of the cornerstones of 
Westphalian sovereignty, namely that states have ultimate authority over all objects 
and subjects has been delegitimised through international law.205 Even in Africa, 
often regarded as culturally insulated, the normative frameworks now increasingly 
recognise individual rights. A significant number of African countries has ratified the 
Rome Statute of the ICC. Cosmopolitanism ‘resonates with the aspirations of ICL: a 
concern for human beings that extends beyond borders, a willingness to embrace 
alternative governance structures to supplement state structures, and inclusiveness 
of the concerns of the ‘international community as a whole’.206 In ICL, ‘the 
negotiation of the Rome Statute, for instance, delegates from all regions and legal 
traditions demonstrated a shared commitment to the fundamental principles of 
legality and personal culpability.’207 
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2.4.2 Constructivism 
 
Finnemore and Sikkink proffer a useful constructivist model on how collective 
standards of behaviour emerge.208Norm influence may be understood as a three-
stage process.209 The first stage of the norm cycle is ‘norm emergence’; the second 
stage involves broad norm acceptance, which follows a ‘norm cascade’; and the third 
stage involves ‘internalisation.’ The first two stages are divided by a threshold or 
‘tipping’ point, at which a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm (see 
Fig 1).210 
 
 
Fig 1 (Finnemore and Sikkink ‘norm life cycle’) 
 
Social constructivists argue that the study of international relations must focus on 
the ideas and beliefs that inform the actors on the international scene as well as the 
shared understandings between them.211  Anarchy is not unavoidable; it is, in 
Wendt’s words, ‘what states make of it.’212 States may be self-interested but they 
continuously (re)define what that means. Their identities may change. To appreciate 
the influence under which collective norms are adopted, it is important to explore 
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intersubjective meaning.213 Constructivist epistemology considers shared 
international norms to have an impact because of their mutually constitutive nature: 
interacting actors construct norms; norms guide the actors’ behaviour; and norms 
may change the definition of the actors’ preferences and even identity.214 Norms 
become ‘a set of inter-subjective understandings readily apparent to actors that 
makes behavioural claims on those actors.’ 215 Constructivism and cosmopolitanism 
have many parallels.216 Both call for cooperation, negotiation, equal treatment 
between states for peaceful co-existence within the international community.217 
Villanueva has described ‘cosmopolitan constructivism’ as a method for the inter-
subjective construction of norms, ideas and identities.218 International penology 
cannot be divorced from these broader philosophies of collectivism. State interaction 
has resulted in international statutes protecting individuals against that which 
‘concern the international community as a whole.’219 A sense of cosmopolitan ‘duty’ 
towards one another now abounds. Individuals are subjects of international law. 
International criminal trials would, apart from serving the interests of victims, serve 
the purpose of identity affirmation.  Haywood notes: 
 
As the word has ‘shrunk’ in the sense of people having great awareness of other 
people living in other countries, often at great distance themselves, it has become 
difficult to confine their moral obligations simply to a single political society. The 
more they know, the more they care. For cosmopolitan theorists, this implies that the 
world has come to constitute a single moral community.220 
 
2.4.3 Collective conscience 
 
ICL may also contribute to this change in politics by influencing our underlying 
conceptions of identity.221 The construction of a shared global identity is a necessary 
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precept in the establishment of a cosmopolitan community.222 The first and most 
fundamental way in which international law has an effect on identity creation is by 
contributing to building the particular community which identifies the need to 
respond to crimes.223 Most recently, this has been the development of a cosmopolitan 
community, reflected in the idea that crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
genocide are of universal moral concern.224 The recent emergence of attempts to 
exercise universal jurisdiction over such crimes is an explicit endorsement of their 
global moral concern.225 French sociologists Emile Durkheim, who is credited with 
the origins of expressivism, attributed the positive effects of ICL to a ‘collective 
conscience.’226 Cosmopolitans, constructivists and Durkheimian theorists share 
similar theoretical premise. Some authors find the roots of constructivism in 
Kantianism.227 Ruggie points out that contemporary social constructivists in 
international relations remain indebted to Durkheim for his concept of social facts, 
the centrality of social ideas and beliefs (‘laconscience collective’) in them, and for an 
ontology that steered clear of….individualism…’228Durkheim defined the ‘collective 
conscience’ as ‘totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the 
same society.’ 229This totality, which today we consider as ‘identity’, transcends the 
individuals that compose it. However, Durkheim’s theories focused on domestic 
primitive communities. Some scholars, nonetheless, agree his postulation about 
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collective identity and expression (expressivism) is applicable at international 
level.230Durkheim’s concept fits into the scope of Lauterpacht’s thoughts and 
constructivism. The development of laws against the use of children in armed conflict 
would thus illustrate the creation of international or collective norms and standards 
against the militarisation of minors across the world. In contemporary penology, this 
legal cosmopolitanism has been demonstrated by the creation of the ICC to prosecute 
egregious crimes, including the conscription, enlistment and use of children in 
armed conflict. According to Durkheim, the criminal process is, fundamentally, a 
manifestation of the ‘collective conscience.’231 The specificity of modern criminal 
justice systems is that this collective reaction is exercised ‘through the medium of 
body acting upon those of its members who have violated certain rules of conduct.’232 
Wise  notes rather enthusiastically that ‘this (Durkheim’s) particular insight about 
the function of criminal law in affirming social solidarity and community seems 
particularly apt – indeed stunningly apt – when we consider the likely effects of the 
Rome Statute.’233 On this assumption, the outlawry of child soldiering attests to an 
identity that abhors the phenomenon or practice. The Rome Statue, which 
established the ICC as the medium for international criminal justice, refers to crimes 
that ‘deeply shock the conscience of humanity.’234 If ‘a law expresses and effectively 
communicates common or shared values and identities, it may have what might be 
called a positive symbolic function.’235 Thus, ‘although the Rome Statute 
(establishing the ICC) is only one of a countless number of developments in the 
contemporary movement towards a more inclusive global community, it is a 
particularly significant development because of the constitutive symbolic function of 
criminal law as a community-creating, community-maintaining device.’236 To such 
theorists, this is also the ICC’s most realistic function. Wise points out that the ICC, 
rather than raising expectations on deterrence, would instead, in the Durkheimian 
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thesis, serve as ‘a symbolic affirmation of the ties that hold a community together 
and by fostering a sense that one is a law-abiding citizen.’237 The ICC cannot 
prosecute large numbers of people involved in mass crimes. The focus on 
investigations and prosecutions on those culpable individuals who occupied the 
highest levels of political or military authority concedes to these realities.238 Thus, 
‘the primary significance of the International Criminal Court will be its symbolic 
significance’239 and identity affirmation. 
 
The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials cultivated the social meaning of widespread killings 
as ‘radical evil’240 and later, ‘the crime of crimes’241 without prosecuting large 
numbers of defendants. Unlike genocide, the social meaning of child soldiering has 
historically been less salient. As Stuart Alford, co-chair of the International Bar 
Association’s war crimes committee stated: ‘Child soldiers are a ‘campaigning issue’ 
for human rights.’242 Child soldiering is now ‘cresting in global awareness.’243 In the 
ICC Statute, child soldiering is now recognised as a war crime.244 The prosecution of 
Lubanga would be symbolic of not only the criminality of the conscription, 
enlistment and use of children for military combat but a community, and 
reinforcement of its shared norms against the phenomenon. A realistic and plausible 
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objective for international criminal justice would thus be informed by the precepts of 
collectivism.  
2.5   Cosmopolitanism, constructivism and child law 
 
 
At the core of cosmopolitan thought is dignity and equality of individuals across 
borders and cultures. The recent proliferation of human rights ideas constitutes ‘a 
new form of cosmopolitanism. This emerging cosmopolitanism exemplifies a 
dynamic through which global concerns become part of local 
experiences.’245Cosmopolitan duties ‘to recognise individual equality apply to 
individuals as well as the global institutional/legal order.’246 Two major UN 
conventions, one declaring universal human rights as a new standard, the other 
declaring genocide an international crime, make up the foundation of human rights 
regimes.247  
 
In constructivist discourse, transnational agents perform a critical role in norm 
emergence and cascades, persuading states to adopt new norms. By establishing, 
articulating and transmitting norms that define what constitutes acceptable and 
legitimate state behaviour, international organizations may be able to shape state 
practices.248 A ‘collective conscience’ has emerged over the rights of children. A 
plethora of legal instruments has been promulgated to protect the rights of children. 
The regime includes the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); the Optional 
protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict (OPAC); the Convention 
concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour; African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child , 
UNDHR Article 25 (2); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(Article 24) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 
10) as well as soft law instruments. 249 Thomas Pogge, one of the prominent writers 
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on cosmopolitanism, states three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions: 
first, individualism: the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons. 
Second, universality: the status of the ultimate unit of concern attaches to every 
living being equally; third, generality: This special status has global force.250 The 
universality of the rights suggests that a violation of children’s rights ‘in one part of 
the world is felt everywhere.’251  Human rights instruments state that a child has the 
right to ‘full and harmonious development of his or her personality’252 and fully 
prepared to live an individual life in society.’253At the centre of the child law regime is 
ensuring that the ‘best interests of children are a primary consideration in making 
decisions that may affect them.254 All adults should do what is best for children.255 
When adults make decisions, they should think about how their decisions will affect 
children.’256  
2.6 Expressivism 
 
A significant step in the evolution of this ‘global legal order is the crystallisation of 
universal norms as more than mere soft law provisions, but rather as binding law 
backed by punishment for violations, especially norms embedded in human rights 
treaties and international humanitarian law conventions.’257 The Rome Statute 
incorporates children’s rights, punishing crimes committed against children, 
recognition that separate procedures are necessary to establish the criminal 
responsibility of children, special measures protecting children as victims and 
witnesses during judicial proceedings, and requirements that judicial staff have 
expertise on children’s issues. The Statute criminalises the conscription, enlistment 
or active use in hostilities of child soldiers under the age of fifteen years, both in 
international and non-international armed conflicts.258  Lubanga was charged with 
and convicted of the crime. This thesis will argue that the most plausible 
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philosophical premise for the prosecution and punishment of Lubanga is the 
expressive function of law. Expression denotes the ways that an action or a statement 
manifests a state of mind.259 Mental states require expression to be fully realised.260 
More importantly, an expressive approach aims to reinforce the community-creating 
effect of law. Scholarship on expressive law starts with the understanding that legal 
actions - lawmaking, law enforcement, and court judgments - can make statements 
expressing values, and that these statements can affect behaviour.261 The ‘didactic’ or 
‘socio-pedagogical’ function ‘translates into building awareness of the distinction 
between legal and criminal conduct during war or armed conflict, whether 
international or non-international in character.’262 Punishment reaffirms and 
reinforces collective beliefs about what constitutes right and wrong.263 I have already 
outlined factors that limit the ICC from effectuating its goals of retribution and 
deterrence.  Through the expressvist lens, the few trials the ICC conducts can 
primarily disseminate global norms on the crimes it selects. This, as stated, is what 
the court can realistically achieve within the constrained circumstances it functions 
but still reflect the community-creating impact.  
 
In international criminal justice, expressivism occupies a subaltern place.264 As 
Amman noted, while expressivism has been under-explored, it has been a feature 
since Nuremberg in the form of treaties defining certain behaviour as criminal.265 
The project that follows attempts to apply and argue for expressivism as the most 
plausible penal rationale for ICL. It is generally accepted that international criminal 
courts can prosecute only a handful of defendants. In the argument of this study, 
these prosecutions can only serve illustrative purpose of disseminating global norms. 
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The works of Mark Drumbl,266 Richard Sloane,267 and Margaret DeGuzman268, which 
take an international perspective on expressivism, provide important theoretical 
springboards for this thesis. DeGuzman’s contributions provide the base for this 
study in two ways.  As already noted from the international relations paradigm, the 
constructivist thesis postulates shared norms. I take DeGuzman’s proposition that an 
expressive approach to ICL suggests that a primary purpose of international criminal 
trials is to express these global norms269 as the basic premise for this thesis. 
Expressivism, therefore, presupposes a single moral community with shared 
standards. Expressivist writings have been reticent in articulating the dynamics and 
composition of such community.  In this study, I advance the ‘cosmopolitan’ moral 
community as the source and recipient of criminal law normative messages.  
Due to the under-enforcement and limitation of the ICC, the handful of cases it 
prosecutes can serve the expressive function of law. Because of the few cases the ICC 
can prosecute, the cases of child soldiering can serve primarily as illustrative cases 
for norm expression. Norm expression does not require that multitudes of 
perpetrators be punished – only a small number of illustrative prosecutions would be 
sufficient to convey the necessary message.270 The ICC’s selection decisions on the 
few cases would therefore be motivated primarily by international norm expression 
and identity affirmation. Secondly, DeGuzman’s application of expressivism to the 
historically under-enforced norms on sex crimes by international criminal justice 
leaves room for an analogous criminological and philosophical exploration of an 
equally under-criminalised practice of child soldiering.   Only in recent decades has 
international law made significant strides in defining and prosecuting rape as a war 
crime and crime against humanity.271Like rape, child soldiering has historically been 
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under-recognised. It is now ‘cresting in global awareness.’272  As a war crime,273 
falling within the crimes that shock the collective conscience, the stigma of child 
soldiering has been elevated from ordinary crimes. DeGuzman and others have 
argued for stigma-enhancing ‘thematic prosecutions’, the focused penology on 
particular crimes, an approach which draws from expressivist discourse.  This 
approach recognises and elevates crimes as abhorrent to the ‘moral community.’ 
International criminal courts contend with limitations. Sloane, focusing on 
punishment (rather than prosecution), asserts: 
‘The principal value of ICL punishment lies in its expressive dimensions, which more 
accurately capture the nature of international sentencing and ICL’s realistic 
institutional capacity to contribute to the ambitious objectives ascribed to it. 
International criminal tribunals can contribute most effectively to world public order 
as self-consciously expressive penal institutions: publicly condemning acts deplored 
by international law, acting as an engine of jurisprudential development at the local 
level, and encouraging the legal and normative internalization of international 
human rights and humanitarian law.’274 
Like Amman, Drumbl notes that expressivism is only a tertiary goal that emerges 
intermittently in international jurisprudence.275 However, according to Drumbl, 
there is cause to believe that expressivism may be a more plausible justification for 
the punishment for egregious international crimes.276 Expressivism, he points out, is 
designed to strengthen faith in the rule of law among the general public;277 it 
transcends retribution and deterrence in claiming as a central goal the crafting of 
historical narratives, their authentication as truths, and their pedagogical 
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dissemination to the public.278Further, popular trials define debate, remind us of the 
content and value of law or serve as intergenerational signposts in history.279 
To be sure, retribution and deterrence remain, to some extent, logical penal 
rationales. Retributive arguments, however, are much more vulnerable because of 
the backward-looking philosophy upon which they are predicated.  Retribution does 
not seem to produce any benefits to the victim or society. On the other hand, 
deterrence theories posit that individuals will be dissuaded from committing 
extraordinary international crimes because of fear of getting caught.280 This could be 
true in some cases. Deterrence thus remains a partial justification. Expressivist 
theories, nonetheless, take more of an intergenerational approach that speaks to 
audiences beyond those already tempted to commit crimes.281 Punishment may not 
simply frighten individuals who might themselves commit crimes but also play a role 
in communicating the standards of a community to its members, thereby influencing 
their moral and social development…’282 The ultimate objective is norm 
internalisation. 
Like all theories, expressivism is, nonetheless, not unassailable. A concern about 
expressivism is that proceedings are often externalised from affected communities. 
Some international or internationalised courts283 have conducted proceedings away 
from communities ravaged by hostilities. The ICC is located in The Hague. This distal 
factor does not augur well for moral and social development and internalisation of 
norms in communities bruised by carnage.  Indeed trials may achieve norm 
internalisation through expressivism, and media can perform the role disseminating 
global norms. However, international criminal trials stand to internalise norms more 
through proactive engagement, particularly in the affected communities. The work of 
international criminal courts would be inadequate without engagement with 
communities affected by social and political calamities. However, such engagement 
ought to be limited to providing information and clarification of the law to avoid 
burdensome extra-judicial activities. The ICC has formulated an outreach 
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programme. Such a programme has been implemented in, among other places, the 
DRC, the location of Lubanga’s crime. As human rights lawyers put it: 
 
‘Outreach is needed all the more because the ICC may often hold trials far away from 
the scene of the alleged crimes, and apply law with which most people in the 
communities affected by the crimes are unfamiliar.’284 
 
In this project, I incorporate outreach as a continuum of expressivism. The media 
perform a critical role in an expressive agenda. However, they may misrepresent or 
misinterpret events for sensationalist reasons or genuine lack of knowledge of the 
law and procedures. Outreach programmes can be conceptualised as the expressive 
function of law because such programmes can outline laws and reasons defendants 
were facing prosecution, directly to affected communities. Expressivism aims to 
clarify the law. The ultimate objective of law should be norm internalisation. Once a 
norm is institutionalised, ‘internalisation usually follows somewhat automatically in 
the sense that institutionalization leads to habitualization, which would indicate 
internalization of the norm.’ 285 Unlike retribution and deterrence, which are 
empirically indeterminate, ‘expressive’ outreach can be evaluated to assess norm 
internalisation. Rather than seeking to deter the potential wrongdoer through 
alteration of his or her cost-benefit analysis, norm internalisation seeks to modify 
personal morality, thereby reducing the number of people willing to commit 
atrocities and the social acceptance of those who do.286 Outreach engagement serves 
the significant purpose of signalling to the affected community that they are part of 
the normative society. If international punishment is to have the cosmopolitan 
‘community-creating’ effect around shared norms, outreach programmes would be 
an effective auxiliary means of achieving this goal.   
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2.7 Conclusion 
 
The discipline of international criminal justice does not have its own theoretical 
foundations287; it ‘cannibalises’ the domestic principles for penology. Like domestic 
justice, in its current incarnation, international criminal law’s central goals are 
retribution and deterrence. The Rome Statute of the ICC appears to replicate these 
penal rationales as the principal goals of the ICC. However, the ICC is confronted by 
a number of inhibitions. It is impossible for international criminal justice systems to 
prosecute all involved for instance in mass criminality, and many individuals escape 
prosecution and punishment.288Like the previous tribunals, the ICC has limitations 
and can only prosecute a few cases.  International criminal law requires an 
imaginative and realistic philosophical justification applicable to its context.This 
chapter set out to establish the theoretical framework for the analysis of the ICC and 
its seminal case of Lubanga and child soldiering. Firstly, it discusses the dominant 
penal rationales of retribution and deterrence. However, studies are circumspect on 
the viability of such aims, particularly on the international plane, given the nature of 
crimes upon which international courts adjudicate.  Given the limitations of tribunals 
and the ICC, it is unrealistic for courts to premise their work on these rationales as 
primary objectives. The ICC can achieve modest but important aims. It would appear 
that the most viable rationale for prosecution and punishment is the expressive 
function of law or expressivism. However, expressivism does not seem to be fully 
articulated. The chapter sought to formulate an expressivist framework that draws on 
cosmopolitanism, constructivism and the ‘collective conscience.’ The rise of 
international organisations, the formulation of laws and ratifications evince the 
international collectivism of shared norms that value individual rights. The 
formulation of laws against child soldiering symbolises and affirms the ‘collective 
conscience’ or legal cosmopolitanism against the practice. Secondly, prosecution and 
punishment can help in the internalisation of shared values thus enhancing the 
community-creating effect of law. However, international criminal courts, like the 
ICC, are often externalised from affected communities; these courts, considering the 
mass crimes that involve widespread communal engagement, would enhance norm 
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internalization through proactive engagement. Such engagement transmits to the 
afflicted communities the message that that they belong to the normative 
cosmopolitan society or ‘moral community.’  Rather than retribution and deterrence, 
ICL and more specifically Lubanga, would best serve the cosmopolitanism that 
underpins international law through expressivism by reinforcing communal norms.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
FROM HEROES TO VICTIMS: THE HISTORICAL MUTATION 
OF THE ‘SOCIAL MEANING’ OF CHILD SOLDIERING 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The active recruiting or ‘use’ of minors - by persuasion or force - to fight in or 
otherwise provide support for state and non-state armed groups during hostilities is 
a challenging global phenomenon.289 Lubanga’s conviction for the conscription, 
enlistment and use of children for military combatwas regarded as a milestone 
because it was the first trial for the violation of norms against the use of children in 
armed conflict by the world’s foremost criminal court. The last chapter set out a 
theoretical framework for this study based on expressivism. An expressive approach 
to international criminal law suggests that a primary purpose of such international 
criminal trials is to express global norms.290 However, ‘[N]orms do not appear out of 
thin air; they are actively built by agents (norm entrepreneurs) having strong notions 
about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community.’291 A good starting 
pointing for formulating plausible philosophical foundations for Lubanga’s penology 
is analyze the genesis of collective norms against child soldiering. Constructivists 
place importance on shared norms, and expressivists, on ‘social meaning.’ Social 
meanings can create formal norms; norms create shared social meanings. Norms and 
social meanings can change or be altered until they are collectively shared. It is the 
collective ethos from which one can draw plausible rationales for international 
penology.  
This chapter focuses on the history of child soldiering with the aim of locating 
normative developments within the socio-historical context, over time. Crucial links 
exist between the normative and socio-historical events. International crimes have 
particular meanings that have been acquired over time to become communal 
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norms.As noted, social meanings and norms are alterable. For instance, the other 
mass crimes have experienced meaning-change. The concept of genocide, for 
example, was initially considered to ‘overlap with crimes of homicide and assault.’292 
Genocide, including the intentional killing, destruction, or extermination of groups 
or members of a group as such, was first assessed to be purely a sub-category of 
crimes against humanity.293The social meaning of genocide changed to a separate 
international crime in earnest after World War II; the term ‘genocide’ was first used 
by Ralph Lemkin in his book published in 1944.294 Lemkin’s concept of genocide 
made it distinct from homicide. Similarly, through the work of transnational agents, 
the ‘international’ social meaning of child soldiering has mutated over the years to its 
current conception as an egregious mass crime. In these early chapters, the thesis 
devotes focus to the normative developments on child soldiering. The second 
objective of this chapter is to project the collectivism which underpins international 
law. The chapter traces the genesis of the current legal collectivism against the 
conscription, enlistment and use of children for military combat. In the Finnemore-
Sikkink model, this chapter would be placed in the first stage – the emergence of 
norms against child soldiering.  
The chapter is organised as follows. The first part foregrounds the discussion with a 
brief discussion on the concept of ‘social meaning.’  It then explores the historical 
meanings that underpinned the participation of children in military conflict. As the 
historiography will show, child soldiering had a particular discursive register around 
glorification of the child combatants. It examines constructivism and the change of 
such social conception of child militarisation, with particular reference to the work of 
transnational agents. The challenge to constructivism is relativism and rationalism. 
The second part discusses cultural relativism and contrarian constructions of 
childhood and child soldiering. Despite particularistic constructions of childhood 
and child soldiers, the social conception of militarising children has generally been 
transformed. The fourth section discuses ‘rationalism’ as an alternative explanation 
for child soldiering.  Child militarisation may arise out of instrumental 
rationalisation removed from cultures. The fifth discusses the contemporary social 
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meaning of child soldiering, examining factors contributory to the use of children in 
armed conflict and its nature as a mass activity. The sixth section examines 
arguments on whether child soldiers should be treated as victims of perpetrators.    
3.1 Norms and ‘Social Meaning’ 
Society attaches meaning to social phenomena through social construction over time. 
War is a historical social phenomenon to which meanings have been arrogated.  
Social meanings are products of informal and formal norms. ‘Social meaning’ is 
defined as ‘the semiotic content attached to various actions, or inactions, or statuses, 
within a particular context.’295  Such meanings are used by ‘individuals, or groups to 
advance individual or collective ends…’296 Kahan and Meares, focusing on US society, 
argue that guns, for instance, have social meaning among youths.  Gun possession 
‘can confer status on the carrier because it expresses confidence and a willingness to 
defy authority.’297 However, norms and social constructions are not static. Social 
meanings reflect what ‘a society’s values, what it esteems, what it abhors’298 at a 
particular time. Social meanings are socially constructed and reconstructed.  These 
meanings ‘are a result of the ways in which actions fit with (or fail to fit with) other 
meaningful norms and practices in the community.’299And when an action creates a 
stigma, that stigma is a social meaning.300  For instance, slavery thrived because 
‘norms about racial superiority, divine right, imperialism were once powerful 
because some groups believed in the appropriateness of the norm…’301 Within an 
international context, social conceptions can change as a result of the work of 
transnational agents. The abolition movement against the slave trade began in 1688 
when German and Dutch Quakers denounced the practice. Nadelmann describes the 
international agents as ‘transnational moral entrepreneurs’ who engage in ‘moral 
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proselytism.’302 Lessig describes them as ‘meaning managers’ or ‘meaning architects’ 
with the same kind of agency in the process of creating norms and larger contexts of 
social meaning.303 Within societies practising the slave trade, social constructivism 
eventually arrogated a negative meaning to slavery as sinful and immoral. Quakers 
saw the trade ‘as a violation of a fundamental belief that everyone is equal in the 
sight of God. No person has the right to own another.’304 Changing social meaning 
will have an impact on the acts that members of society sanction.305In countries like 
the US, Quaker abolitionists mounted forceful campaigns to end the practice.  By the 
1830s, both African-Americans and whites were battling to end the institution of 
slavery in the US. Anti-slavery movements in Britain contributed to the outlawry of 
slavery through the Slavery Abolition Act on 28 August 1833.306 Slavery in the US 
eventually ended in 1865, with the passing of the Thirteenth Amendment to the US 
Constitution,307 which abolishes and prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude. 
3.1.1 Early Meanings of Child Soldiering 
 
The brief outline of the theoretical framework above can help us understand the 
social dynamics of meaning-making and change, the work of international agents, 
and can thus assist us contextualise the evolution of the social conceptions of child 
soldiering discussed herein. This thesis interests itself in the ‘social role of social 
norms and social meaning’ with regards to child soldiering. The use of children in 
war is not ahistorical. Minors have been used in warfare in one capacity or another 
since medieval times. The ‘problem’ of militarising children has come to the fore in 
recent years but like slavery, the practice was common and acceptable for many 
years.  During this era, Aries argues, children were regarded as mini-adults who did 
not have any different needs than adults, and that they were not protected against 
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any of the aspects of adult life, such as for example, labour, sex and violence.308 
Young pages armed the knights of the Middle Ages and drummer boys marched 
before Napoleonic armies.309 In medieval Europe, children were seen as natural 
companions of adults, also in war. 310 The young boys that accompanied adult 
knights in battle on foot were called ‘infante’ by the Italians, and thus making up the 
‘infanteria’ – the infantry.311  The civil war in the United States was ‘a war of boy 
soldiers’ who ‘often had support roles but quickly graduated into combat roles.’312 
Child combatants fought most notably when a unit of 247 Virginia Military Institute 
cadets engaged Confederate Army in the battle of New Market (1864).313 During the 
American Civil War or the First World War, ‘the participation of child combatants 
was promoted and perceived through a very specific discursive register, that of the 
child hero. The actions of these children were valorised and their eventual deaths 
seen as ‘sacrifices in the name of a greater good, often the nation’s.’314 Van Emden’s 
account, Boy Soldiers of The Great War, offers a detailed account of the previously 
under-researched involvement and portraitures of child soldiers during the First 
World War (1914-1918).315 There were cases of boys as young as 13 who served in 
France. These children were said to have been motivated by patriotism. Also, 
thousands of under-18 British soldiers who fought in the First World War were (and 
are still) regarded as ‘brave young men’ who responded to their historical call.316 
 
The use of children in armed conflict was most widespread towards the end of World 
War II (1939-1945). Russian, German, Polish and Jewish children participated in the 
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fighting.317 It has been suggested that approximately 200 000 German children aged 
9–17 years were recruited as soldiers by the Nazi government; most of them were 
deployed as anti-aircraft auxiliaries at air force or marine bases.318 Polish children 
who resisted Nazi occupation are still commemorated as heroes.319 Customary 
international humanitarian law, as it traditionally related to children, was only 
premised on the two notions of the general protection of civilians in times of armed 
conflict, and the special protection of those groups regarded as being particularly 
vulnerable to the effects of war.320  The Geneva Conventions of 1949, promulgated 
four years after the Second World War, did not protect children who participated in 
war.  
  
In Africa, the participation of children in liberation wars against colonialism did not 
induce outrage. During the wars for independence, child combatants were deemed to 
have answered the historical beckoning to liberate their countries against the yoke of 
colonialism and white minority rule. In Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia), minor 
combatants were involved in the struggle for independence. For instance, Margaret 
Dongo, a well-known politician, joined the war when she was 15 together with three 
friends; she intoned that at first they were ‘just four little girls’ with ‘childish ideas.’321 
Nonetheless, such female combatants have been celebrated in post-colonial 
discourse as women of resilience.322 Similarly, the ‘children’ who fought in the 
Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO)323 and the Africa National Congress 
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(ANC) military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (South Africa), were not described as ‘child 
soldiers’, but venerated as ‘political activists’, ‘freedom fighters’ or ‘national 
heroes.’324 
3.1.2 Child Soldiering: Social Meaning-Change 
 
The brief historical account above illustrates that the social meaning of child 
soldiering did not elicit stigma; instead, it drew from the discursive prism of 
glorification. Nonetheless, social conceptions can change or are changed by the 
action of individuals or groups.325 Social meanings are aligned with social 
organization and social influence.326 Norms are deemed to enhance social 
organization or as reinforcing social organization. Social meanings are used by 
‘individuals, or groups, to advance individual or collective ends…’327Identity politics 
creates ‘new social movements,’ collective initiatives that are self-reflexive and 
sharply focused on the expressive actions of collective members.328 Collective agency 
is enacted in a moral space.329 Normative and ideational concerns have always 
informed the study of international politics.330 From a constructivist perspective, 
international structure is determined by the international distribution of ideas. 331In 
short, ‘constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international 
life… constructivists contend that not only are identities and interests of actors 
socially constructed, but also that they must share the stage with a whole host of 
other ideational factors that emanate from the human capacity…’332 The agents for 
transmission of such ideas are transnational ‘entrepreneurs’. One major task for 
these moral entrepreneurs is to get the norms they advocate on the agenda, to get 
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major actors to pay serious attention to the issue.333 In the first stage (norm 
emergence,) ‘norm entrepreneurs’ - international organisations, transnational 
advocacy networks or NGOs - attempt to socialise other States to become norm 
followers. While individuals usually have little control over norm-setting and social 
meanings,334 norm entrepreneurs help to achieve social change by: ‘(a) signalling 
their own commitment to change, (b) creating coalitions, (c)making defiance of 
norms seem or be more costly, and (d) making compliance with new norms seem or 
be more beneficial.’335 Over the years, social organisations have emerged around 
particular causes to influence behavioural change to establish a collective identity. As 
already noted, some norms now regarded as repugnant were once acceptable because 
some groups believed they were appropriate.336 It took almost a century of sustained 
effort by norm entrepreneurs and the use of a wide variety of diffusion mechanisms 
to abolish slavery. 
 
Norm entrepreneurs are critical for norm emergence because they call attention to 
or... ‘create’ issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatises 
them.’337Lemkin was regarded an exceptional example of a ‘norm entrepreneur’338 
who helped stigmatise mass atrocity by characterising ‘genocide.’  Like slavery, it has 
also taken time to transform perceptions on the use of children during armed 
hostilities, create and propagate norms and stigma. As pointed out, if an action 
creates stigmatic effect, such stigma constitutes its social meaning.339  Today, slavery 
and mass killings are stigmatic acts.  Like the Quakers with slavery, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been a key player in setting the agenda on 
appropriate conduct during warfare. Constructivist theorists view norms as shared 
understandings that reflect ‘legitimate social purpose.’340 As meaning managers, 
transnational agents shape national policies by ‘teaching’ states what their interests 
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should be.341 The ICRC succeeded in prescribing what was ‘appropriate behaviour’ 
for ‘civilised’ states involved in war.342 Relatively new agents such as Child Soldiers 
International (previously Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers) and War Child 
have come on board to sustain the agenda against the use of children in armed 
conflict, among other generic human rights groups.343 
 
As noted above ‘not only are identities and interests of actors socially constructed, 
but also that they must share the stage with a whole host of other ideational factors 
that emanate from the human capacity…’344  In some geographical, cultural and 
social spaces ideas contradict popular ideational movements. Part of the role of the 
transnational moral entrepreneurs is to suppress discredited or contrarian 
perceptions and behaviour. ‘Norm bandwagons,’ according to Sunstein, ‘occur when 
the lowered cost of expressing new norms encourages an ever-increasing number of 
people to reject previously popular norms…where it is adherence to the old norms 
that produces social disapproval.’345 Regardless of the perceived legitimacy of 
national military uprisings or popular revolutions today, the use of children in such 
causes generates disapprobation.  Norm entrepreneurs focus on socialising not only 
states but non-state actors. The use of children in contemporary conflicts against 
‘occupying’ or ‘oppressive’ regimes no longer elicits sentiments of bravery, heroism 
and patriotism in global humanitarian discourse. The Palestinian resistance to Israeli 
occupation, the Intifada, for instance, was fuelled by ‘the seductive power of the child 
hero bearing arms.’346 In March 2003 Hamas leader Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, declared, 
‘[I]f a boy is 16, he is a man. He is a mujaheed, a holy warrior, engaged in jihad.’347 
Children have been used by Palestinian armed groups although the scale and issue of 
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whether their use has been systematic or not is disputed.348 Children, as young as 14, 
were also reportedly involved349 in the military uprising against the regime of 
President Bashar al-Assad in Syria from 2011. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) received 
moral and, reportedly, military support as a belligerent seeking to topple an 
unpopular dictatorship.350 The FSA was particularly identified for using children in 
the conflict.351 However genuine the causes behind war may appear, humanitarian 
discourse has since sought to quash old conceptions ascribing bravery, heroism and 
patriotism to the participation of children in contemporary armed hostilities. Human 
Rights Watch, for instance, enjoined leaders of Syrian opposition groups, including 
the FSA, to immediately stop any recruitment or use of child soldiers, to discipline all 
those responsible, including commanders, and to cooperate fully with any 
investigation into the use of child soldiers.352 
3.2 Cultural Relativism 
 
For an action to convey a social meaning it must do so without appearing contingent 
or contested.353 As pointed out earlier, the international society is constituted of 
‘multiple communities.’ Such communities may not be readily attuned to the 
collectivism that internationalism posits. The transnational legal process driven by 
norm entrepreneurs agitating against the use of children during warfare contends 
with contrarian ideational forces. In global ethical issues, cosmopolitanism contends 
with rationalism or realism – which is individualist - and pluralism, which underpins 
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‘communitarian’ thought. Communitarians ‘value community and diversity; they 
recognise the many ways in which individuals are formed in different cultures is a 
good thing in itself.’ 354 Cosmopolitanism is deemed antithetical because it does not 
‘include the specific contextual elements with which human individuals and groups 
make rational and reasonable decisions according to their specific values, identities 
and interests.’355 Cultural relativism ‘is an undeniable fact; moral rules and social 
institutions evidence an astonishing cultural and historical variability.’356 Cultural 
relativists argue that childhood is a social construct: ‘its meaning is negotiated 
between different individuals and groups, often with conflicting interests. Thus, 
childhood is relative.’357 Rituals, initiations, marriage and childbearing are more 
appropriate indicators of adulthood rather than chronological age.358 Cultural 
particularism has been associated with practices in Africa, among other places. In 
Sierra Leone, for example, Shepler found that a child might have to sweep the house 
and compound, get water for the household, find wood in the forest and bring it 
home, work on the farm or garden or help the adults with whatever work they are 
doing.359 Once a person is doing such ‘adult work’ or has completed cultural rituals 
that lead to manhood or womanhood, he or she is regarded as an adult. 360 These 
rites of passage and ‘adult’ roles thus make the participation of children in warfare 
less stigmatic in such social spaces. Radical cultural relativism would suggest that 
‘culture is the sole source of the validity of a moral right or rule.’361 Child soldiering 
would thus be an emanation of accepted culture. This resistance can be understood 
through what Lessig terms the ‘defensive construction’ 362 of social meaning. 
Societies would defend, for instance, child soldiering. A social meaning is challenged 
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by an emerging practice, and to preserve the old meaning, ‘the emerging practice is 
prohibited or opposed. This resistance is a kind of social meaning construction 
because it aims to resist what would otherwise be an evolving social meaning.’363 In 
this sense, cultural relativism would, instead, be antithetical to the evolving 
cosmopolitan ideation. ‘Radical universalism’ would, on the other hand, posit that 
culture ‘is irrelevant to the validity of the moral rights and rules which are universally 
valid.’364  In fostering the ‘collective conscience’, norm entrepreneurs would resort to 
‘offensive construction’365  ‘where there is a new social meaning sought, or an old 
meaning to be changed.’366 Rosen puts it rather bluntly: ‘International humanitarian 
law is not merely ethnocentric; it is indeed intentionally ethnocentric. Its concern is 
not to respect local norms but rather to systematically alter them.’367 Donnelly states 
that ‘if human rights are the rights of every (one) simply because they are human 
beings, they would seem to be universal by definition.’368 A cultural relativist account 
appears to be guilty of logical contradiction, he argues.  If human rights are based in 
human nature, on the fact that one is simply a human being, and if human nature is 
universal, how can human rights be relative in any fundamental way?’369 The source 
of the dissonance may not necessarily lie in the content of rights. An opposition to, 
say, the right to life or education would be difficult to advance in most societies. The 
resistance would perhaps stem from the exogenous origins of the doctrine (human 
rights).  
 
3.3 Rationalism 
 
Cultural relativism would be a readily appealing explanation for a practice in an alien 
geographical and cultural space. While child soldiering is not peculiar to Africa, the 
fact that the continent has had the largest concentration of child combatants in 
contemporary hostilities promotes a perception of cultural relativism as the sole and 
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primary explanatory device. An alternative view, however, would suggest that 
recruiting children as combatants is actually linked to political realist or rationalist 
factors,370 not culture. Twum-Danso states, for instance, that: 
‘The evidence suggests that the use of children in armed conflict is a socioeconomic 
phenomenon, often representing pragmatic and deliberate military strategies. It also 
suggests that the incorporation of thousands of children into conflicts across the 
continent is not a result of African tradition or a dysfunctional notion of childhood in 
Africa..’371 
 
At the core of rationalism is instrumentalism: the pursuit of advantage by calculating 
costs and benefits. The upshot of the rationalist position is utility maximisation: 
when confronted with various options, an agent picks the one that best serves its 
objectives and interests.372 Civil wars have been much more frequent than 
international conflicts, and they last much longer.373 Many civil conflicts last for a 
decade or more. 374 Given these factors of frequency and duration, governments and 
non-state actors are seen as rational unitary actors with set preferences and a limited 
set of options. They will choose children, often from poor families, to replenish their 
ranks so that they can achieve military goals at the lowest cost. In war zones, there is 
‘a ready supply of children who typically compose half or more of the populations.’375 
These present a ready reservoir for recruitment. But the other reason for the utility of 
children is more sinister. On the battlefront, children are needed because they ‘sow 
disarray and confusion by confronting opposing troops, with the prospect of having 
to kill children, which most troops are reluctant to do.’376  Taken in this context, the 
acts of belligerents in armed conflict could merely be actuated by fixed preferences, 
often to gain power, rather than incommensurable cultural animus.  It has to be 
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noted too that while some children have volunteered to join armed groups, minors 
have also been threatened, abducted and conscripted.377 
3.4 Cosmopolitanism 
 
Contrary to conceptions of strict homogeneity, cosmopolitanism presupposes a 
single but diverse community of all ethnic groups premised on a modus vivendi of 
shared morality. Cosmopolitanism posits that despite the division in humanity into 
separate historically constituted communities, it remains possible to have a single 
moral community.378Critics of cultural relativism have shown that pure cultures, 
ones uncontaminated by external influences, are mythical. Once it is accepted that 
the boundaries between social groups can never be absolute, it follows that cultures 
must always be fluid and that different groups will share common practices and 
institutions.379 
 
‘The fact that a culture is not truly indigenous, however, does not necessarily imply 
that it is somehow unauthentic. Rather, the objectivity entailed in defending a culture 
and the existence of shared cultural practices suggest that cultural traditions are 
created and that the process of their creation may be contested. Deciding which 
elements will determine a culture involves choice. What is considered culturally 
typical can clearly never comprise the totality of a group’s ideas, material output or 
behaviour.’ 380 
 
Whether the impetus is rationalist or cultural, transnational legal process is perhaps 
a more ‘complex process’ than Rosen’s forthright assertion, involving ‘institutional 
interaction whereby global norms are not just debated and interpreted, but 
ultimately internalised by domestic legal systems.’381 Domestic civil society groups 
have helped the ‘cultural software’ of individuals change through time.382 Such 
processes can subsequently lead to alterations in municipal laws.  African civil 
society movements concerned with child welfare have developed over the years,383 
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and launched campaigns resulting in the ‘boomerang effect’; that is, when domestic 
avenues of influence are closed off to local advocacy groups, they may mobilise 
international allies who then lobby their own government to put pressure on the 
target state.384 International norms are likely to be adopted when there is a cultural 
match, that is, ‘a situation where the prescriptions embodied in an international 
norm are convergent with domestic norms, as reflected in discourse, the legal 
system…and bureaucratic agencies.’385 The work of domestic civil society may have 
cultivated conditions for a cultural convergence. The fact that children’s rights have 
subsequently been widely incorporated into Africa’s domestic legal systems386could 
be testament to a far-reaching legal ‘cosmopolitanism.’  
 
3.5 Contemporary meaning of child soldiering 
 
A theory premised on human beings’ incapability for ideational interaction and 
change is grossly anachronistic. Social conceptions are not inalterable. Social 
constructivism ‘aims to reconstruct the meaning of social phenomena by analysing 
their generative rules in dominant and embedded cultures’387: and the ‘reality’ which 
is taken to be objective knowledge and truth is understood as being ‘the result of 
perspective and ‘of the social processes accepted as normal in a specific context.’388  
As Lee rightly concludes, ‘our perceptions regarding the legitimacy and morality of 
children’s military participation is a historical construct, shaped by particular social 
and political forces.’389 As such cultural notions may contrast with contemporary 
legal thought or current contexts. Further, no matter how genuine the motivations 
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for popular uprisings might be, contemporary humanitarian discourse seeks to 
eviscerate old meanings of bravery, heroism and patriotism previously associated 
with children’s participation in war. The overarching contemporary ‘cosmopolitan 
social meaning’ of child soldiering attaches stigma to the practice.  In recent years, 
the stigma of child soldiering was heightened in the international humanitarian and 
human rights field with the release of Graca Machel’s UN Study on the Impact of 
Armed Conflict on Children in 1996390, which suggested that more than 300 000 
under-eighteen year olds were fighting in 31 conflicts around the world. Her report 
outlines the scope of child soldiery, the methods of recruitment, and the reasons 
children enlist. Machel observed that child soldiering affected ‘every aspect of a 
child’s development – physical, emotional, intellectual, social and spiritual.’391The 
Machel report became the global template for all humanitarian and human rights 
reporting on child soldiers.392 
 
3.5.1 Causal factors and contested social meaning 
 
Like genocide and crimes against humanity, child soldiering is often a mass crime 
with organic group characteristics.393 Children are rounded up ‘like fish in nets’394 by 
groups of recruiters. Mass recruitment campaigns have also involved mass rallies.395 
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While culture may have a part to play, children are recruited into military groups and 
state armies driven, as noted earlier, also by, or maybe purely, rationalist interests.396 
The recruited children would be subscribing to group rather than cultural codes. 
Because of the duration of the civil conflicts, replenishments to the forces are often 
needed. There is also a simple argument of supply, in countries where fifty percent or 
more of the population is under eighteen, there is a ready supply of children for 
recruitment.397 Technological improvements and the proliferation of light-weight 
weapons like assault rifles and hand grenades have enabled child soldiers to engage 
effectively in warfare. Both governments and armed groups use children because 
they are easier to condition into fearless killing and unthinking obedience; 
sometimes, children are supplied drugs and alcohol.398 Girls are often given up for 
use in armed hostilities to increase their marriage prospects while some were 
abused.Girls were used as ‘sex slaves’ or ‘bush wives’. 
 
Factors such as poverty, education, war, refugee camp securitisation, religious or 
ethnic identity, family or its absence and friends all play a role in determining the 
children available for recruitment.399According to a number of academics, activists, 
and intergovernmental organizations, poverty is a key factor in explaining the 
phenomenon of child soldier participation.400 Achvarina and Reich point out that the 
linkage makes intuitive sense. Rich countries, for example, generally do not employ 
child soldiers in battle, and many former child soldiers when interviewed gave 
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poverty as a reason for their recruitment.401 Many studies rely primarily on such 
interviews and therefore often cite the relationship between child combatants and 
poverty.402The NGO literature is also replete with anecdotal stories of gullible or 
frightened orphans being induced or coerced by belligerent forces to join their 
ranks.403  According to one report, ‘[C]hildren when interviewed made references to 
the situation of orphans in armed forces or groups. They spoke of orphans being 
taken in or finding their way to an armed group, in search of protection and a sense 
of belonging.’404 Other children are motivated by revenge for prior atrocities they 
endured. Often cultures glorify war and teach children to view fighting as 
prestigious.405 Some of these factors were at play in the DRC. Former UN Special 
Representative for Children and Armed Conflict Rhadika Coomaraswamy 
summarised the dynamics thus: 
 
‘The recruitment and enlisting of children in [the] DRC is not always based on 
abduction and the brute use of force. It also takes place in the context of poverty, 
ethnic rivalry and ideological motivation. Many children, especially orphans, join 
armed groups for survival to put food in their stomachs. Others do so to defend their 
ethnic group or tribe and still others because armed militia leaders are the only 
seemingly glamorous role models they know. They are sometimes encouraged by 
parents and elders and are seen as defenders of their family and 
community…..Children who ‘voluntarily’ join armed groups mostly come from 
families who were victims of killing and have lost some or all of their family or 
community protection during the armed conflict.’406 
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3.5.2 Victims or perpetrators? 
 
Global humanitarian discourse does not accord agency to child combatants; they are 
primarily regarded as victims not perpetrators. Child soldiers are characterised as 
almost entirely victims of adult malevolence. One could say that this is the dominant 
‘cosmopolitan social meaning’ of child soldiering. However, some child soldiers have 
been known to commit horrific brutalities, often under the influence of drugs 
supplied to them by their recruiters. In his memoir, Ishmael Beah, a former child 
soldier in Sierra Leone, describes some of the unconscionable brutalities by young 
soldiers, including himself. He recalls a scene when young rebels with blood-stained 
clothes ‘laughing and giving each other high fives’ and boasting about what they had 
done that day with ‘one of them carrying a head of a man, which he held by the 
hair.’407In an interview with Amnesty International, a 12 year-old former child 
combatant, recounted: ‘When I was killing, I felt like it wasn’t me doing these things.  
I had to because the rebels threatened to kill me.’408  Both global humanitarian 
discourse and ICL have been reticent to allocate blame on the child soldiers. The ICC 
does not prosecute persons under 18. However, there has been debate about the 
culpability of child soldiers. Disagreements on the status of child soldiers in law were 
reflected in the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). The UN 
Secretary-General noted: 
 
‘The Government of Sierra Leone and representatives of Sierra Leone civil society 
clearly wish to see a process of judicial accountability for child combatants presumed 
responsible for the crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Court. It is said that 
the people of Sierra Leone would not look kindly upon a court which failed to bring to 
justice children who committed crimes of that nature and spared them the judicial 
process of accountability. The international non-governmental organizations 
responsible for child-care and rehabilitation programmes, together with some of their 
national counterparts, however, were unanimous in their objections to any kind of 
judicial accountability for children below 18 years of age for fear that such a process 
would place at risk the entire rehabilitation programme so painstakingly achieved.’409 
 
Child soldiers after often demobilised and rehabilitated. However, resettling people 
who may have perpetrated horrendous crimes back into the same societies to live 
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side by side with their victims has raised questions about the effects of exempting 
child soldiers. Ultimately, the SCSL, included a provision for prosecution of child 
soldiers. The Statute of SCSL gives the Prosecutor authority to indict children for 
crimes they committed between the ages of 15 and 18. The basis for including this 
‘controversial provision’ was to give the Prosecutor legal authority to prosecute any 
child soldier he or she might consider as having borne the greatest responsibility for 
war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during Sierra Leone’s civil 
war.410However, the founding prosecutor, David Crane, made a decision he would not 
implement the provision.  International law views child soldiers ‘as only relatively 
responsible for the crimes they commit because of their lack of psychological 
maturity and susceptibility to negative influences and external pressures.’411 Crane 
argued: 
 
‘The Prosecution decided early in developing a prosecutorial plan that no child 
between 15 and 18 had the sufficiently blameworthy state of mind to commit war 
crimes in a conflict setting. Aware of the clear legal standard highlighted in 
international humanitarian law, the intent in choosing not to prosecute was to 
rehabilitate and reintegrate this lost generation back into society. It would have been 
impractical to prosecute even particularly violent children because there were so 
many.’412 
 
He further contended that ‘[L]egally, morally, and politically the international 
community… has separated out children from the horrors of combat, to protect and 
nurture, to rehabilitate and support, not to punish. No children found in combat 
should be held liable for their acts.’413However, Lee asserts that ‘if we accept that the 
discourse of ‘child soldiers’ exists as a historical construct’ (as discussed in this 
chapter) ‘we can begin to ask some critical questions regarding this construct and 
explore the possible gap between the global discourse and local realities.’414He argues 
that ‘child soldiering’ may have particular meanings in the local socio-cultural 
contexts’415 and ‘many young people had understanding of the causes and stakes of 
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their war and made conscious decisions to join fighting forces.’416Perhaps the most 
trenchant critique in recent years has been proffered by Mark Drumbl in his book 
Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy.417 He is critical of what 
he perceives as the international community’s tendency to ‘replay the same 
narratives and circulate the same assumptions’ about child soldiers.418 In this 
discourse, child soldiers are presented as ‘faultless, passive victims.’ These narratives 
and assumptions relate to the ‘themes of vulnerability, frailty, victimisation and 
incapacity.’419Drumbl argues that this well-intentioned ‘reflexive response’ is 
nonetheless short-sighted and verging on the ‘palliative’.420According to Drumbl, 
‘activists have turned to the Machel report to justify portraying the victimisation, 
faultlessness and passivity in the manner and tone that exceeds that Machel herself 
adopted.’421 This perception has suffused the ‘international legal imagination,’422 
which he defines as the ‘international and operational mix of international law, 
policy and practice – constituted as it directly and indirectly by a constellation of 
actors.’423 Child soldiers, he argues, should not be ‘cocooned’ from the reality of their 
possible involvement in mass violence by over-emphasising the faultless, passive, 
victim image.424 He proposes a more nuanced approach, suggesting what he calls ‘a 
model of circumscribed action’ which recognises children’s agency.425 He states: 
Presenting ‘circumscribed action’ in this dynamic fashion encourages procedural 
inquiry into the specific histories and experiences of the individuals located within its 
contours, while also prompting community involvement on questions of 
reintegration and restoration.426This model would seek to effect culturally 
appropriate measures designed to genuinely involve former child soldiers, 
encouraging ‘more fine-grained modalities of restoration, conflict resolution, and 
justice.’427  Drumbl makes an excellent contribution to the discourse of children and 
armed conflict.  He concludes, however, that ‘[t]ruly ameliorative reform will remain 
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elusive until the presumptive imagery shifts to something more dynamic and less 
controlling, such as circumscribed action’428 is well-supported.  In this thesis I do not 
intend to venture into this important debate.  Instead, I take the law as it is. An 
expressive approach focuses on the function of existing law and norms. Regardless of 
how much weight is placed on children’s agency in different cultures and contexts, 
‘the laws regarding child soldiers were not developed with the involvement of 
children nor do they consider any framework for the understanding  of children’s 
agency other than extreme protectionist constructions of childhood.’429  While I take 
law as it is, in Lubanga, I also intend to critique prosecutorial and penal practices 
that can fluctuate at the behest of judicial officers, and the effect of such practices on 
an expressivist agenda. 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
We shall not be able to formulate cogent theories of penology unless we understand 
the generative processes of norms and creation of the international law regime 
against child soldiering. This chapter sought to accomplish two important objectives. 
Firstly, it aimed to offer a brief historiography of child soldiering. The chapter 
analysed the evolution or construction of the prevailing ‘social meaning’ of child 
soldiering. Social meanings are central to expressivist discourse because law has 
social meaning. The purpose was, ultimately, to establish the genesis of cosmopolitan 
law on child soldiering. The social meaning of child soldiering has changed over time.  
From the early expressions of ‘bravery’ ‘heroism’ and ‘patriotism,’  the conscription, 
enlistment and use of children for military combatis now perceived through a 
discursive register of revulsion. As we now understand it, child soldiering is a 
collective or mass activity; young men and women voluntarily join or are forcibly 
recruited into groups with rational interests, or propelled by cultural impetus.  
Secondly, the chapter sought to highlight the collective paradigm which underpins an 
international society of shared norms. To this end, it recognised the historical and 
current role of transnational agents in the mutation of the conception of child 
militarization. Such endeavours have to contend with contrarian or cultural relativist 
and rationalist meanings. ‘Norm entrepreneurs’ have influenced state and non-state 
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actors with some degree of success. Through agency of ‘norm entrepreneurs’, the 
social conception of child militarisation now draws social opprobrium almost 
globally. An important debate has emerged on the status of child soldiers. 
International law is generally reticent about arrogating culpability on or agency to 
child soldiers. Drumbl has made some remarkable observations about ‘reimagining’ 
child soldiers, thus departing from existing portraitures of passivity, faultlessness 
and victimhood. This thesis, nonetheless, focuses on the function of extant law and 
penal practices.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON CHILD SOLDIERING 
Introduction 
 
Norms form the basis upon which laws are formulated. In international normative 
dynamics, norms occupy one end of the continuum; on the other end exists 
international law. Norms are understood to be ‘a set of intersubjective 
understandings readily apparent to actors that makes behavioural claims on those 
actors.’ 430 There is general consensus on the definition of a norm as a standard of 
appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.431What is important to the 
constructivist framework is the nexus between norms, law and social meaning.432As a 
result of the work of ‘norm entrepreneurs, a body of international law to protect 
children has since evolved over the years. It can be argued that, to use Drumbl’s 
phrase, this ‘legal imagination’ has shaped the predominantly accepted social 
meanings of child soldiering. From the Finnemore-Sikkink norm life cycle model, 
these developments would denote the second stage of ‘norm cascades’ which follows 
broad norm acceptance (diffusion).433 Since the problem child soldiering was 
brought to the fore by human rights organisations, numerous treaties against the 
phenomenon have been signed.434 The current legal orthodoxy consists of 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law and 
international criminal law embodying the values of child protection.  These make up 
‘hard law’; the framework includes ‘soft law.’ The objective of this chapter is to 
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analyse this normative framework. Penal codes are part of the legal architecture for 
children and armed conflict. These will be discussed in later chapters.  
 
An appreciation of the legal framework on child soldiering will help us understand 
the philosophy, processes and the ethos underpinning international law creation. 
This chapter is structured as follows: The first section foregrounds the chapter with a 
discussion on the ‘logics’ of law. The aim here is to establish the dominant 
foundational philosophy which influences the collectivism of international law. The 
second part discusses the process of law creation within the context of an 
international community. The section examines the development of international 
humanitarian law (IHL) instruments; and the third section, international human 
rights law (IHRL). These branches, constituting mainly ‘hard law,’ are examined 
within the expressive discourse of collectivism and norm diffusion. The fourth part 
analyses the process and meaning of ratification of international legal instruments 
through the expressivist perspective. The fifth section discusses ‘soft law’, and the 
last discusses the collective child soldiering norms as ‘cosmopolitan’ law. The last 
part assesses the effectiveness or otherwise of UN strategy of ‘naming and shaming’ 
suspected recruiters and users of child soldiers, again through the expressivist prism. 
4.1 Logics of international law 
 
In the field of international relations, various ‘logics’ - cosmopolitanism, 
communitarianism, realism or rationalism and so on - have been used to explain 
international law. On one hand, rationalists subscribe what March and Olsen term 
the ‘logic of expected consequences.’ 435 Scholars committed to this consequentialism 
perceive an international system of interacting autonomous, egoistic, self- interested 
maximisers.436 On the other hand, social constructivists argue that the study of 
international relations must focus on the ideas and beliefs that inform the 
international actors and the shared understandings between them.437This ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ sees actors driven by senses of identity.438  Within the tradition of a 
                                                          
435J. March and J. Olsen, ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’ (1998) 52 
International Organization 943 
436Ibid  
437 R. Jackson and G. Sorenson ) Introduction to international relations: theories and approaches 
(Oxford University Press 2008) 162 
438J. March and J. Olsen ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’ (1998) 52 
International Organization 943 
93 
 
‘logic of appropriateness’, actions are seen as rule-based. Scholars committed to this 
identity position see political actors as acting in accordance with rules and practices 
that are socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated and accepted.439 
Constructivists pose two questions; first a normative one, and second, descriptive. 
The normative question is whether one logic leads to a ‘better’ society than the 
other.440 The descriptive question is whether (or when) one logic is more likely than 
the other to be observed as the basis for actual behaviour.441  A judgment on what 
constitutes a ‘better’ society is, of course, a subjective matter that has preoccupied 
many philosophers, including Kant. John Rawls, John Locke, H.L.A Hart, Martha 
Nussbaum, and others essentially also address this question more expansively than 
can be accommodated here. But the greater philosophic discourse has centred on the 
rights of the individual. The scholars who have propounded the idea of a better 
society not only recognise the rights of the individual – especially the weak - but also 
their protection. The themes have ranged from justice, equality and autonomy. 
History has shown us that the protection of individual rights cannot be left to 
governments alone.  States acting without supranational oversight can be dangerous 
to their own citizens. The Holocaust and atrocities associated with the Nazi regime 
served as a catalyst for the human rights movement, propelling the issue into the 
international arena. After the Nazis attempted to systematically eliminate the Jewish 
population from Europe, as well as targeting gypsies, the handicapped, elderly, and 
homosexuals, the world’s response was one of horror.442 A ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
portends a ‘better’ society than individualist ethos. Since Nazi atrocities, an 
international regime has emerged placing emphasis on individual rights. Perhaps, 
there is no more ideal occasion for the ‘logic appropriateness’ than times of war. The 
measure of a commitment to a ‘better’ society would test the treatment of the weak 
and vulnerable during times of war.  The logic of appropriateness comports with 
cosmopolitanism logic. In the rights-based articulations, cosmopolitanism is a theory 
of a ‘better’ society.  Moral cosmopolitanism refers to accounts that retain a 
commitment to treating all human beings with equal concern within a global frame. 
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This is most cogently expressed in the idea of universal human rights, which 
underpin human freedom and are independent of legal or political status.443 
Cosmopolitanism ‘creates a larger community of states by providing a common 
vision and set of values; it is concerned with the global community of humans rather 
than states. Cosmopolitans posit that there should be an overriding universal moral 
code to which all states should adhere.444  A ‘legal cosmopolitanism’ would reinforce 
such rights and accountability. The rights of humanity and the individual should 
supersede those of the state. 
 
The view that states entirely act out of self-interest in disregard for international law 
seems, nonetheless, overstated. I conceive of the development of international law 
through the prism of cosmopolitanism developed through a constructivist framework 
of the ‘logic of appropriateness’ as both desirable and possible. Chayes and Chayes 
point out that full membership in the international community and regional 
institutions requires engagement in a network of multilateral commitments.445 The 
objective evidence suggests that states to subscribe to international norms and obey 
law. This, of course, does not mean that rationalism is no longer a feature of 
international relations. On occasions, states do act out of kilter with normative 
standards. However, we cannot ignore the collectivism that has increasingly and 
progressively resulted in internationally shared values. As this chapter will seek to 
demonstrate, numerous states have assented to international legal instruments 
protecting the rights of children. The chapter will also illustrate that states have also 
responded to public humiliation by demobilising child soldiers. The chapter seeks to 
highlight the developing pre-eminence of individual rights of children. The second 
objective of the chapter is to discuss the functions of law. The traditional focus of law 
has been on the protective and instrumental functions which stress the role of law as 
protecting individuals and as an instrument for social policies, respectively.446  
However, others note that this view is simplistic.447 The discussion of the legal 
framework that follows can thus be perceived through the prism of the humanistic 
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and collective premise of ‘constructivism’ and the ‘logic of appropriateness,’ the 
‘collective conscience’ under the overarching rubric of ‘cosmopolitanism.’ 
 
4.2 ‘Cosmopolitan law’ creation 
 
 Law consists of norms as meaning contents which form a normative system. 448 
There is ‘an unmistakable resurgence of interest in the social role of social norms and 
social meanings and also in the relationships among social norms, social meanings, 
and law.’449 A starting point for critical analysis may be found in the idea that the law 
should express ‘meanings’ on common values connected with a common political 
identity.450International law is a largely consensual system, consisting of norms that 
states in sovereign equality freely accept to govern themselves and other subjects of 
law.451 Since international law is ‘created’ by states, it is a discursive field. During 
treaty negotiations, for instance, drafters may advance several views, some of which 
they may abandon before adopting the final version of the treaty.452 In international 
law, negotiation and discussions precede the finalisation of treaties. Such discourses 
aim at creating coordination among multiple equilibria, making certain outcomes 
focal; the law can coordinate expectations around the ‘good’ equilibrium.453Because 
‘legislation expresses certain values and communicates them effectively, these values 
can be taken as a common point of reference in interpretation and communication 
processes.’454 This, it will be recalled, fits snugly into the idea of a common modus 
vivendi for multifarious cultures that cosmopolitanism posits. The discourse 
preceding norms is often reflected in travaux préparatoires.455  It is impossible, 
given the space here, to explore the travaux préparatoires of the relevant 
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international instruments relating to child soldiering. The significance of travaux 
préparatoires is that they offer the putative exemplars of competing and 
contradictory discourses or social meanings. The subsequent international statutes 
are considered as instruments for the regulation of global social meaning. The 
regulation of social meaning refers to ‘all of the ways in which the law creates and 
shapes information about the kinds of behaviour that members of the public hope for 
and value, as well as the kinds they expect and fear.’456  The negotiations and travaux 
préparatoires should be reflective of collective standards that guide behaviour. 
 
 
4.2.1 International humanitarian law (IHL) 
 
Law can provide a normative framework, a set of more abstract values and 
concepts.457 The development of IHL has been a result of the work of norm 
entrepreneurs to regularise behaviour during conflict after ‘norm emergence’. For 
example, the work of Henry Dunant, who published the horrors of warfare in 
Memories of Selferino, led to the establishment of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, which has been one of the most instrumental agents in the 
development of IHL.458 The development of IHL has been accompanied by the 
formulation of principles and the adoption of multilateral treaties intended to be 
universal and applicable to war crimes. 459 States sign and ratify treaties ‘to establish 
the identity of actors as ones who obey the law, and to develop the norms that 
become part of the fabric of emerging international society.’460  IHL is part of 
international law, designed to limit the effects of armed conflict. Universal 
codification of IHL began in the nineteenth century. Since then, States have agreed to 
a series of practical rules, based on the bitter experience of modern warfare 461 as 
those exposed by Dunant. Traditionally known as jus in bello, the law of war, or law 
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of armed conflict, covers the binding rules and customs that govern militarised 
conflict between nations, civil war combatants, and conflicts among states and non-
state belligerents.462  The primary aims of IHL are to protect persons who are not, or 
are no longer, directly engaged in hostilities-the wounded, shipwrecked, prisoners of 
war and civilians; and to limit the effects of violence in fighting to the attainment of 
the objectives of the conflict.463 Cosmopolitan just war principles ‘can guide the 
actions of all individuals, including ordinary citizens and leaders of non-state 
movements. In particular, individuals qua cosmopolitan citizens of the world should, 
when reasoning about the use of armed force, take into account the perspectives of 
non-members of their community’.464 This chapter focuses on the formulation of 
protective laws for children during armed conflict. 
 
 
4.2.1.1 Geneva Conventions (1949) 
 
The protection of children in military conflicts was one of the earliest concerns of 
international law; the standard of protection was, however, minimal. Customary 
international humanitarian law as it traditionally related to children centred on the 
two notions of the general protection of civilians in time of armed conflict, and the 
special protection of those groups regarded as particularly vulnerable to the effects of 
war.465 Although these concepts were well recognised in humanitarian law, they 
remained largely un-codified until the adoption of the Fourth Geneva Convention in 
1949.466 The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907467  did not make any reference to 
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the use of children in armed conflict; they focused principally on restrictions in the 
use of certain weapons and gases. The first three Geneva Conventions were intended 
to serve as an improvement and revision of selected previous conventions concerning 
the treatment of sick, wounded, or captured military personnel in the battlefield and 
at sea, and Convention IV was devoted exclusively to the protection of civilians. 
Notably, the Geneva Conventions were promulgated four years after widespread use 
of children in the Second World War.468It is ‘apparent that the use of children in the 
army of the Third Reich…, and the participation of children in some of the partisan 
campaigns against the Nazis, were seen as aberrations…’469 The Fourth Geneva 
Convention only protected various categories of civilians ‘who by definition take no 
part in the fighting.470 
 
‘These various categories among the civilian population are based on a very simple 
criterion: they are persons who are taking no part in the hostilities and whose 
weakness makes them incapable of contributing to the war potential of their country; 
they thus appear to be particularly deserving of protection.’471 
 
The Convention did not offer protection for children who participated in warfare. 
Notably, none of the four Conventions provides a direct definition regarding who was 
to fall within the category of ‘children.’472 It was not long before the Geneva 
Conventions were deemed to be insufficiently comprehensive.  In the 1950s and 
1960s, with inter-state wars on the decline, and conflicts related to independence 
movements and the new post-colonial states on the increase, the exigency existed for 
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the drafting of supplementary protocols to the Geneva Conventions.473Expressivists 
point out that in order to provide a normative framework that is open to further 
interpretation and supports the emergence of new norms, legislation should focus on 
expressing basic values and principles.474By ‘formulating a broad normative 
framework in which at least the basic values and principles are expressed the law 
may offer a point of orientation for this reflection.’475This ‘process of reflection and 
discussion may lead to the emergence of new norms, to a consensus on central values 
and their meaning or on more concrete principles and rules.’476By 1960, the 
assumption that children were affected by armed conflict only as’ civilians’ could no 
longer be sustained owing to the deployment of child soldiers in various wars of 
liberation and self-determination.477After several years of preparation and drafting, 
Geneva Protocols I and II were formally adopted in 1977. As the Protocols Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions, they were designed to serve as supplements to the 
Geneva Conventions, and covered both international and non-international armed 
conflicts. 
 
4.2.1.2 Additional Protocol I (API) 
 
The Additional Protocols of 1977 represented the first international legal documents 
to specifically address the subject of child combatants. API marked the first act of 
‘criminalising’ of child soldiering in international law. API478 relates to international 
conflicts. The most important articles in regard to recruitment of minors are found 
under Chapter II, Measures in Favour of Women and Children, Articles 77, 
Protection of Children. Paragraphs 2 and3 are especially relevant: 
77(2): The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that 
children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in 
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hostilities and in particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed 
forces. In recruiting among persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but 
who have not attained the age of eighteen years, the Parties to the conflict shall 
endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.479 
However, the provision does not offer much protection to children under fifteen and 
even less to those under eighteen. In fact, API clearly envisions that parties will 
continue to recruit children under fifteen as demonstrated by Article77 (3): ‘If, in 
exceptional cases, despite the provisions of paragraph 2, children who have not 
attained the age of fifteen years take a direct part in hostilities and fall into the power 
of an adverse Party, they shall continue to benefit from the special protection 
accorded by this Article, whether or not they are prisoners of war.’480In spite of the 
progress by API, Article 77 was regarded as disappointing as it was not as far-
reaching as some might have wished. The three main shortcomings with Article 77 
were: 1) a perpetuation of the Geneva Convention’s division of minors into an under 
18 and an under 15 age group; 2) the use of the term ‘all feasible measures’ rather 
than the stronger ‘all necessary measures.’ The choice of the term ‘all feasible 
measures’ has been a particular sticking point, since it puts a limited expectation on 
the state and; 3) limiting the prohibition to only those taking direct part in 
hostilities.481 
4.2.1.3 Additional Protocol II (APII) 
 
Influenced by the events of the Second World War, it is hardly surprising that the 
Geneva Conventions were promulgated on a general assumption that it was to be a 
body of rules addressing relations almost exclusively between states in armed 
conflict.  The weakness of the Geneva Conventions is that they applied to 
international (i.e. inter-state) and not national (i.e. intra-state) conflicts. Only 
perfunctory attention was given to ‘armed conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,’ in common Article 
3, found throughout all four Conventions. Legislation can stimulate continuous 
process of interpretation, reflection and discussion.482In the past years, open warfare 
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between States has given way to internal armed conflict.483 APII was a response to 
the need to establish or clarify the protection of victims in non-international armed 
conflicts.484As the Lubanga judgment noted,485 Article 4(3) (c) of Additional Protocol 
II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions includes an absolute prohibition against the 
recruitment and use of children under the age of 15 in hostilities (in the context of an 
armed conflict not of an international character): Children who have not attained the 
age of 15 years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to 
take part in hostilities.’ Article 4 (3) (d) also alludes to the ‘special protection’ for 
children. AP II, thus, provides an unequivocal and total prohibition on recruitment of 
under-15s into any type of armed forces (government or non-governmental) and any 
kind of participation by them in hostilities.  
APP II does not limit the government obligation to taking only ‘feasible measures’ to 
prevent them taking ‘a direct’ part in hostilities, nor does it limit the state’s 
responsibility to not recruiting under- 15s into their own armed forces only. In this, 
APII represents an improvement in the protection for all children under-15 
compared to previous treaties by not allowing states any room to manoeuvre away 
from prohibiting recruitment, whether it involved direct or indirect participation. 
Including even voluntary enlistment, all forms of participation in hostilities are 
proscribed by omitting the distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ participation. 
 
4.3 International human rights law (IHRL) 
 
Being designed primarily for peacetime, human rights apply to everyone while IHL 
applies specifically to military conflict. Both human rights and jus in bello norms are 
central logics to the cosmopolitan project.  While both IHRL and IHL have different 
historical and doctrinal foundations, both share the objective of protecting all 
persons and are grounded in the principles of respect for the life, well-being and 
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human dignity of the person.486International human rights norms are also expressed 
in numerous widely ratified treaties.487 Most of those norms also are embedded in 
customary international law.488 The number of binding human rights norms 
incorporated into international or regional law as well as the precision and 
delegation of those norms increased significantly between the mid-1970s and the 
mid-1990s.489Cosmopolitanism recognises the individual as the ontological 
centrepiece of human rights.490This section discusses both international and regional 
law instruments pertaining to the protection of children. 
 
 
4.3.1 The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
 
Following the seminal 1996 report by Graça Machel on the impact of armed conflict 
on children,491 the growing international concern for the welfare of children reached 
its climax in 1989 with the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).492The most 
quickly and widely ratified international treaty in history, the CRC strongly 
condemned the recruitment of child soldiers. The CRC, however, adopted a more 
flexible approach to age in the realm of child soldiery.493The CRC defines a child as a 
human being below the age of eighteen years.  But Article 38 of the CRC (one of the 
most controversial provisions in its drafting history) establishes fifteen as the 
minimum age for recruitment and ‘direct’ participation in hostilities.  The rest of the 
provisions of the CRC, however, protect children up to the age of eighteen. The 
commitments enshrined in Article 38 of the CRC are familiar: 
2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not 
attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities. 
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3. States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age 
of fifteen years into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have 
attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years, 
States Parties shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest... 
As can be noted, the above provision has the imprimatur of IHL. The CRC was, 
however, perceived as undermining existing standards contained in IHL, as it only 
prohibits ‘direct’ participation. It also contradicts the notion that children up to the 
age of eighteen years should not be used as child soldiers, and shown in 38 (3), 
recognises a State’s right to recruit or conscript children between the ages of fifteen 
and eighteen years.  
4.3.2 The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC) 
 
The concerns that were raised while drafting Article38 of the CRC prompted the 
revisitation to the issue of children’s rights and child soldiers by the international 
community as States were impelled to analyse further the provisions to protect the 
rights of the child soldier.494The drafting and subsequent adoption of the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict (OPAC)495 illustrates that while baseline standards may be set, such 
as with the CRC, these standards will act as platforms from which further rules and 
rights may be derived and teased out.496  As I have noted earlier, the ‘process of 
reflection and discussion may lead to the emergence of new norms, to a consensus on 
central values and their meaning or on more concrete principles and rules.’497 
 
During the negotiations on OPAC, the majority of state representatives backed a 
‘straight eighteen’ ban for both ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ participation but a few countries 
resisted the proposal resulting in compromise language.The minimum age for 
compulsory recruitment or direct participation in hostilities was established at 
eighteen years.  Article 2 stipulates that: ‘States Parties shall ensure that persons who 
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have not attained the age of 18 years are not compulsorily recruited into their armed 
forces.’498  This was an attempt to remedy the glaring problem inherent in the CRC in 
which the minimum age of recruitment was set at fifteen years. Under OPAC, armed 
groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State are not allowed, under any 
circumstances, to recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 
years.499States Parties shall raise the minimum age for the voluntary recruitment of 
persons into their national armed forces from that set out in Article 38 (3) of the 
CRC, taking account of the principles contained in that Article and recognising that 
under the Convention persons under the age of 18 years are entitled to special 
protection.500 
However, OPAC too has several weaknesses. While it pronounces that persons who 
have not attained the age of eighteen years are not compulsorily recruited into their 
armed forces, voluntary recruitment below the age of eighteen is still permitted.501It 
has been commented that Article 3 (voluntary recruitment) weakens the protection 
provided by Article 2 and the Protocol on the grounds that it may be difficult to 
determine whether child soldiers have been voluntarily recruited or not.502It also 
stipulates that States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that members 
of their armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct 
part in hostilities. While raising the age when members of the armed forces may take 
direct part in hostilities was welcomed, the obligations placed upon States Parties 
remains weak, given that they are required only to take ‘all feasible 
measures.’503OPAC also failed to cover the ‘indirect’ participation of children under 
eighteen in armed conflict and participation in hostilities.   
4.3.3 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 1999 
 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 504 (ACRWC) is an ideal 
exemplar of the success of, to deploy Lessig’s term, ‘offensive construction’ of the 
social meaning child soldiering. Under particularistic conceptions, childhood is 
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viewed as a malleable social construct contingent upon geography and cultural 
spaces.  In Africa and other places, rituals, initiations, marriage and childbearing are 
said to be more appropriate indicators of adulthood rather than age.505 These, 
according to this thesis, become determinants of whether one participates in war or 
not, because chronological age does not matter.  However, these notions have 
altered, perhaps as result of ‘offensive construction.’ In general, the ACRWC 
conforms to the logic of international legal instruments, and in some cases, provides 
even stronger protections for children, a notable development on a continent 
associated with particularistic notions of childhood.  The Charter is, therefore, an 
effort to universalise childhood and the protection of children, a precept of 
cosmopolitan ethos. Social structures are defined, in part, by the shared 
understandings, expectations, or knowledge. These structures constitute the actors in 
a situation and the nature of their relationships, whether cooperative or 
conflictual.506  Recognising that practicing influences outcomes, the social world is 
therefore seen as constantly constructed or reconstructed, not given.507 Expressivists 
point out that where multiple ‘equilibria’ exist, the law can coordinate expectations 
around ‘good’ equilibrium.508  The law can make certain outcomes focal, thereby 
creating expectations that others will conform to the strategies associated with the 
newly focal equilibrium.509 ‘Good’ is subjective but the fact that the ACRWC generally 
coheres with international legal instruments, suggests coalescence around widely-
accepted norms. The ACRWC recognises the ‘good’ ‘principles of the rights and 
welfare of the child contained in....other instruments of...the United Nations and in 
particular the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.’510It provides 
that state parties shall ensure the protection of the rights of the child as stipulated in 
international declarations and conventions.511 
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Remarkably, the ACRWCwas the first regional treaty in the world to address the 
issue of child combatants.  Where some international instruments have vacillated on 
the form of participation of children during armed conflict, the African charter states 
unequivocally that: ‘States Parties to the present Charter shall take all necessary 
measures to ensure that no child shall take a direct part in hostilities and refrain in 
particular, from recruiting any child.’512 Unlike the CRC513 the ACRWC defines a child 
as anyone below 18 years of age without exception.  While the CRC defines a child as 
a human being below the age of eighteen years, Article 38 establishes fifteen as the 
minimum age for recruitment and direct participation in hostilities.  As such, the 
CRC, rather unhelpfully, creates two categories of ‘children.’ Article 4 (1) of the 
ACRWC states that: ‘In all actions concerning the child undertaken by any person or 
authority the best interests of the child shall be the primary consideration.’ This 
article is almost analogous to the provision in the CRC.514 Neither the CRC nor the 
ACRWC offers a precise definition of ‘best interests.’ But it is a plausible assumption, 
given the provisions in both against the use of children in armed conflict, that child 
soldiery is not in the best interests of the child. The weakness of ACRWC is that it 
also does not cover indirect participation. Nonetheless, the ACRWC represents a 
major breakthrough in the universalisation and expression of the social meaning of 
child soldiering. Cosmopolitanism seeks out commonalities between such cultures, 
acknowledges differences, and embraces pluralism and the building of a modus 
vivendi.515The regard ‘for others does not stop at the boundaries of a given state; we 
are rightly concerned with the global community of humans;… emphasis is placed on 
humans rather than states…’.516 
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4.3.4 The Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (ILO Convention No. 182) 
 
The Convention against the Worst Forms of Child Labour517 is part of the ‘good’ and 
‘newly focal equilibrium.’ It runs against the idea that the involvement of children in 
warfare is part of acceptable routine labour. The language of the Convention and 
obligations impose stricter obligations upon State Parties.  Like OPAC and the 
ACRWC, it defines a child as any person under the age of 18 years.518 It invites special 
attention to the situation of girls.519 The Convention locates child soldiery within the 
context of ‘labour.’ Article 3 of the Convention defines ‘the worst forms of child 
labour’ as including ‘(a) ... forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in 
armed conflict;520...and ‘(d) ... any other work that by its nature is likely to harm the 
health, safety and morals of children.’521 
It is evident from the above that the formulation of a protective framework has been 
problematic. The framework evolved as patchwork developments, resulting 
inconsistencies, contradictions, legal gaps, and lack of clarity.522  According to 
Witteveen, ‘codified laws can be seen as imperfect articulations of common 
understandings, as more or less adequate responses to practical needs, or as 
embodiments of some relevant concern.’523Through ‘a broad normative framework in 
which basic values and principles are expressed, law may offer a point of orientation 
for reflection.’524  Such discourse may eventuate in new norms, a consensus and more 
concrete principles and rules.525 
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4.4 Treaties and ratification 
 
In international law, ratification defines and reflects that common identity; it is the 
international act whereby a state indicates its consent to be bound to a treaty if the 
parties intended to show their consent by such an act, thus subscribing to the ‘logic of 
appropriateness.’ Except for soft law instruments, both IHL and IHRL treaties have 
to be ratified by consenting states. To date, states have ratified the humanitarian and 
human rights laws protecting children during war.526 Treaties are instrumental in 
that they create law that binds ratifying countries, with the goal of modifying nations' 
practices in particular ways. A cascade of norms occurs with ‘a combination of 
pressure for conformity’ and ‘a desire to enhance international legitimation, and the 
desire of State leaders to enhance their self-esteem.’527 Treaties express to the 
international community the position of countries that have ratified. 528 For instance, 
governments that have ratified treaties above want to show that; ‘children in all 
societies have a symbolic value and add to the credibility of politicians,’ no 
government wishes to admit to their citizens and to the world it mistreats children.529 
The governments declare to the world that the principles outlined in the treaty are 
consistent with their commitment to human rights,530 as opposed to the ‘logic of 
consequences.’ Chayes and Chayes state that the impetus for compliance with 
international law is not so much a nation’s fear of sanction, as it is fear of diminution 
of status through loss of reputation.531 Guzman also views reputation as a major, if 
not the primary, cause of States’ decisions to follow international law in general.532 
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State actors are therefore to act in ways that ‘express appropriate attitudes toward 
various substantive values.’533The Geneva Conventions of 1949 received 195 
ratifications. Additional Protocol 1 was ratified by 173 state parties while Additional 
Protocol II has 167 ratifications. The CRC is the most widely ratified human rights 
with 194 ratifications. OPAC has been ratified by 158 states parties.534 Out of the 54 
members of the African Union, 41 have ratified the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child.535 Drumbl points out, however debatable, the ‘faultless passive 
victim image binds communities of conscience.’536 These developments present 
objective evidence of a ‘collective conscience’ rather than the individualistic and 
egoistic logic of consequences.  
 
Ratification of a treaty may influence domestic norms, which in turn can affect both 
citizen behaviour and domestic policy.537 Primary mechanisms include providing 
information (social meaning) that changes individual preference, which may 
ultimately affect perceptions of majority belief, and providing information that leads 
one to infer an increased likelihood that the international norm will be socially 
enforced at a domestic level.538 Both IHL and IHRL have affinities with 
cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitan ethos espouses universal rights, justice and positive 
and negative duties. Positive duties include aid to those who suffer during 
wartime.539 Held et al posit that the evolution of human rights law and rules of 
warfare are examples of a shift from state-centred law to supra-state law. While the 
notion of international law assumes a system of autonomous states, the concept of 
cosmopolitan law rests on the realisation that there exists a moral order and rights 
and duties that transcend state boundaries.540 The continuing ‘human rights 
revolutions’ at national and regional levels along with regional human rights and 
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535See ‘Ratification Table: African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/child/ratification/ 
536M. Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (Oxford University Press, 
2012), 8-9 
537A. Geisinger and M Stein, ‘A Theory of Expressive International Law’ (2007) 60 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 77 
538Ibid  
539 R. Shapcott,   ‘International ethics’ in J. Baylis, S. Smith and P. Owens (eds.), The Globalization of 
World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
2013) 
540 D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton Global Transformations: Politics, Economics 
and Culture. (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1999) Ch. 1, pp. 32-86 
110 
 
economic law regimes challenge state-centred ‘Westphalian traditions’ of power 
politics justifying treaties and international organisations by mere state consent.541 
The human rights obligations of all UN member states under the UN Charter, UN 
human rights conventions and under general international law continue to evolve 
and confirm that ‘(a)ll human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent 
and interrelated’; ‘it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and 
cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.’542 Neither national governments nor international governance 
institutions have legitimate powers to unduly restrict ‘inalienable’ and ‘indivisible’ 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of citizens, notwithstanding the 
diverse democratic preferences and scarcity of resources for fulfilling and ‘balancing’ 
these rights in national and international jurisdictions. 543 
4.5 Soft Law 
 
Apart from ‘hard law’ instruments discussed above, ‘soft law’ norms have gained 
increased significance in child law. Soft law is most commonly defined to include 
hortatory, rather than legally binding, obligations.544 These norms can emanate from 
state actors, governments, non-governmental organisations or international 
organizations.  In 1997, the NGO working group on the CRC and UNICEF convened a 
symposium in Cape Town which adopted Principles and Best Practices on the 
Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces and on Demobilization and Social 
Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa.545 The Cape Town Principles, inter alia, 
established 18 as the minimum age for any participation in hostilities and for all 
forms of recruitment into all armed forces and armed groups and urged governments 
to adopt and ratify OPAC raising the minimum ages from 15 to 18. Further, 
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governments should ratify and implement pertinent regional and international 
treaties and incorporate them into national law, namely:  the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child; the two Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and the CRC, which currently establish 15 as the minimum age for 
recruitment and participation. The Cape Town Principles urged governments to 
adopt national legislation on voluntary and compulsory recruitment with a minimum 
age of 18 years and should establish proper recruitment procedures and the means to 
enforce them. Those responsible for illegally recruiting children should be brought to 
justice. All persons under the age of 18 should be demobilised from any kind of 
regular or irregular armed force or armed group; direct and free access to all child 
soldiers should be granted to relevant authorities or organizations in charge of 
collecting information concerning their demobilisation and of implementing specific 
programmes. Children should be given priority in any demobilization process. 
Norms on child soldiering are progressively evolving. The Paris Commitment and 
Principles of 2007546 updated the Cape Town Principles. The Paris Commitments are 
generally about compliance with international law.547 Significantly, the Paris 
Principles improved on the initial Cape Town definitional effort, by broadening the 
conceptualisation of a ‘child soldier’ as: 
‘Any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an 
armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, 
boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual 
purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in 
hostilities.’548 
 As soft law, these principles have no legal force but show that the entire legal 
concept of the ‘child soldier’ has evolved to encompass a greater number of children 
engaged in a wider variety of activities than was previously the case.’549 This 
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expanded conception of child soldiering, beyond just direct involvement in combat, 
is now reflected in jurisprudence. A common understanding is emerging for 
protection of children from those under 15 to those under 18.  What began as ‘a 
relatively narrow concern with protecting children under 15 years old who served as 
combatants in armed forces and armed groups has evolved into an international 
effort to serve a broad range of connections between all persons under 18 years old 
and the military.’550 In essence, the ‘Straight 18’ position attempts to define 
‘childhood’ chronologically to broaden the scope of protection. As Drumbl points out, 
however, the global international humanitarian movement has been more receptive 
to this shift than international criminal law.551 International criminal law has 
generally protected those under 15.   The NGOs behind the soft law norms urge states 
to sign OPAC, which prohibits recruitment of children under the age of 18.’552 ‘Soft 
law’ instruments ‘often attract the wider participation of states and introduce new 
international norms through broad approval.’553 At least 105 states had endorsed the 
Paris Principles by 2011.554 This would reflect broad acceptance (diffusion) and norm 
cascades. The wide endorsement frequently exerts social pressure upon policymakers 
to comply with the norms included in these instruments.555  
4.6 Naming and shaming 
 
The Machel Report556 triggered a panoply of UN resolutions, the proposed 
appointment of a special representative on children and armed conflict and reports 
on abuses of children during armed conflict. As part of the drive to combat child 
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soldiering, the UN devised a plan to ‘name and shame’ the ‘offenders.’ The UN 
Secretary-General would list parties to armed conflict that recruit or use children in 
violation of their relevant international obligations.  The philosophical objective of 
the strategy is to inflict stigmatisation through public exposure. Because of the 
attendant reputational costs, the offenders would presumably, desist from violation 
of children’s rights during warfare. One longstanding notion, emphasized in the early 
anthropological literature is that shame is a public emotion. From this perspective, a 
disapproving audience – for example the ‘international’ or ‘moral community’ - is a 
key component of the shame experience.557 Shame is an affective reaction that 
follows public exposure (and disapproval) of some impropriety or shortcoming.558 As 
the label suggests, naming and shaming is a policy of punishment by publicity 
designed to inflict ‘reputational damage on moral grounds.’559 Public naming has the 
purpose of humiliation, social condemnation and punishment against those who 
have transgressed social norms.  In domestic law, the system has been invoked to 
also provide a societal alert signal against potential recidivists. Like retribution and 
deterrence, the UN shaming strategy has its philosophical foundations, in part, in 
domestic practice. However, as the UN practice illustrates, the strategy of ‘naming 
and shaming’ is not applied as an alternative sanction on convicted offenders or to 
reduce costs of imprisonment. Naming and shaming has, in the international arena, 
been invoked against ‘unconvicted’ persons, fugitives or entities on the basis of 
reasonable suspicion of commission of offences. Naming and shaming is designed to 
‘shine a spotlight on bad behaviour’560 in order to help sway abusers, in this case 
child abusers during armed conflict, to reform. Looked at from another angle, the 
resort to ‘naming and shaming’ is testament to the impotence of international law in 
some situations. In the absence of an international police force, international law 
depends on the co-operation of states. However, some state actors suspected of 
committing international crimes have not co-operated with international criminal 
justice systems. Further, some states are not parties to international treaties.  Unable 
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to ‘name and arrest’, international law has turned to ‘naming and shaming’ parties 
suspected of abusing children during warfare.   
The naming and shaming of child soldier abusers during armed conflict was 
catalysed by Resolution 1379.561 Secretary-General Kofi Annan submitted the first 
‘list of shame’ in his report of 2002.562 Since then, the UN has produced such lists, 
containing mainly armed non-state groups (ANSAs.)  Following the calls for a 
monitoring mechanism, the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed 
Conflict was established in July 2005 pursuant to Security Council resolution 1612.563 
A Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) would report on six grave violations 
against children, including their recruitment or use in armed conflict.  
It has been suggested that the rise in advocacy of shaming punishments has gone 
‘hand in hand with an increased interest in the expressive dimension of the law.’564 
The law ‘does not exist merely to allocate benefits and burdens; it also says things 
through its actions.’565 Some researchers, however, doubt that the strategy of 
shaming has any effect on armed groups, paramilitaries or warlords.566 It has also 
been argued that ‘naming and shaming’ may not deter because most offenders do not 
always value their self-esteem enough to be influenced by the threat of 
humiliation.567 Hamberg concludes that ‘most rebels fighting civil wars have nothing 
to lose. After all, they are willing to risk their lives for some more or less specific 
purpose. Thus being threatened with sanctions or moral shaming has limited effects 
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on their cost-benefit calculations.’ 568  UN shaming sanctions target both State and 
non-State transgressors. Researchers suggest that States appear sensitive to 
shaming. Murdie and Davis conclude that States targeted by human rights 
organizations often do improve their human rights practices.569 Hafner-Burton, who 
examined the effects of campaigns on the human rights practices of 145 countries 
between 1975 and 2000, also finds that States’ political rights generally improve after 
being publicly shamed. Such studies find that it ameliorates subsequent physical 
integrity abuse.570 The idea that states always act under the ‘logic of consequences’ 
seem to be overstated. Jo Becker, child rights advocacy director of Human Rights 
(HRW), noted that ‘naming and shaming’ had some impact, but mostly on 
governments.571 Such conclusions seem to be supported by the fact the governments 
of Afghanistan, Uganda, Chad, and Myanmar, which had been ‘named and shamed’ 
for some time, have since signed UN action plans stopping the use of children in 
armed conflict. Parties to the conflicts in Nepal and Sri Lanka were delisted after 
their successful completion of Security Council-mandated action plans to end the 
recruitment and use of children.572 Rhadika Coomaraswamy, former Special 
Representative for the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, also 
concluded after the Afghanistan agreement that ‘States tend to move much quicker - 
they move with a purpose and usually they want to fall in line with international 
standards.’573 
 
Scholars point to a number of motivations for State compliance.  States cannot 
blithely ignore international norms because ‘there are too many audiences, foreign 
and domestic, too many relationships present and potential, too many linkages to 
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other issues to be ignored.’574 Franklin shows that human rights criticism leads to 
decreased repression in States that have strong economic ties with other countries, 
though this finding is time bound.575 Publicizing poor behaviour casts States as 
pariahs in the international community, leading to decreased aid and decreased 
foreign direct investment.576 A number of international relations theorists and 
international lawyers argue that States’ reputational concerns are the principal 
motivational factor for high levels of international law and treaty compliance.  The 
impetus for compliance with international law is fear of diminution of status through 
reputational loss.577 Guzman also views reputation as a major, if not the primary, 
cause of States’ decisions to follow international law in general.578 
 
However, while States appear to comply more, there has been, comparatively, little 
progress with getting ‘named and shamed’ ANSAs to agree to UN action plans 
towards ending recruitment and use of children.579UNICEF realized, as did the 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (now Child Soldiers International), that 
while progress was being made on State compliance with international standards to 
prevent the recruitment and use of children in hostilities, the news with respect to 
ANSAs is ‘far less positive.’580  Some researchers doubt that the strategy of shaming 
has any effect on armed groups, paramilitaries or warlords.581 Of the 32 parties 
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branded as ‘persistent violators’ in the report of the Secretary- General of 2012,582 the 
overwhelming majority is comprised of ANSAs.583 It has also been argued that 
naming and shaming may not deter because most offenders do not always value their 
self-esteem enough to be influenced by the threat of humiliation.584 Hamberg 
concludes that,  
‘...most rebels fighting civil wars have nothing to lose. After all, they are willing to 
risk their lives for some more or less specific purpose. Thus being threatened 
with sanctions or moral shaming has limited effects on their cost-benefit 
calculations.’585 
 
Such claims seem to find traction in the (non) response of, for instance, Joseph 
Kony, Ugandan rebel leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). He was issued 
with a warrant of arrest by the ICC in 2004586; warrants of arrest, by their public 
nature, are, of course, a form of ‘naming and shaming’. Further, Kony was the subject 
of a viral video, produced by a human rights organisation, which attracted 100 
million views on the internet.587 However, Kony remained at large (at the time of 
writing.) One commentator concluded: ‘Kony’s name was already muddy and could 
hardly get any worse.’588 DRC rebel commander Bosco Ntaganda had been ‘named 
and shamed’ for, among other reasons, the use of child soldiers. Public attention on 
him was heightened after the ICC also issued a first warrant for his arrest in 2006.589 
Gert Rosenthal, a representative of Guatemala, argued at a UN meeting that ‘naming 
and shaming’ ‘had not affected the armed groups, nor were those groups accountable 
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for their acts or in compliance with human rights or humanitarian law. In fact, they 
did not seem to care about their image or reputation.’590  Singer puts it more bluntly: 
‘One cannot shame the shameless.’591 Elsewhere, I have argued that the 
‘confrontational’ approach which underpins the strategy of naming and shaming 
many not be efficacious.592 Specialized NGOs can engage ANSAs, can facilitate 
contact with non-state actors, help reduce the violence and instability and promote 
adherence to international law. In the event of failure to achieve peace agreements, 
humanitarian engagement may aid norm internalisation, thus helping reduce 
atrocities against children.593 
4.7 Expressivism and international child law 
 
The body of children’s rights law carries symbolic meaning premised on the message 
that children are in need of special care and protection.594‘Naming and shaming’ is 
based on the symbolic rather than the instrumental value of law. Some authors have 
argued that reposing instrumental value to law alone is simplistic.595 We ‘need to 
understand other ways in which the law can function in society in order to be able to 
deal with legislation on moral issues.’596 In fields where moral dimensions are more 
explicit, and where citizens’ voluntary co-operation is necessary, instrumental 
function becomes inadequate.597 If ‘one focuses on the protective and instrumental 
functions, the reasons for wanting a law usually largely involve the content of that 
law. However, the expressive function of law is central here. It is important for our 
identity…’598 A statute is an authoritative text with a normative meaning.’599 
Expressivists view law as a regulator of social meanings. An expressivist’s normative 
agenda includes both crafting law to express valued social messages and employing 
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law as a mechanism for altering social norms600 as discussed in this chapter. Hence, 
another view is that law is considered to have both expressive and communicative 
functions.601Over time, beliefs or preferences may be altered in some way that 
diminishes desire for undesirable conduct.602 So ‘even international human rights 
law that is not highly legalized may be important for expressing and communicating 
international norms.’603 Legislation ‘is a form of communication which needs to be 
interpreted to serve as a point of orientation for responsible behaviour by citizens.’604 
Expressivists assert that laws have an expressive function because they ‘make a 
statement’ about how much, and how, a good or bad should be valued’ and are efforts 
to change behaviour by constituting and affecting social norms.605Unenforced law 
may have an ‘expressive effect’, if people act in accord with its understood 
message.606 Smith notes that a good deal of expressivist scholarship emphasizes that 
law works not only, or perhaps not even primarily, through direct coercion; rather, 
law affects and alters ‘social norms,’ which in turn influence the way people 
behave.607 On this account, IHL and IHLR discussed in this chapter would have 
expressive effect, unenforced.  Expressive law examines law’s potential for changing 
the social meaning of particular behaviour by altering the social cost of undertaking 
that behaviour.608 When designed appropriately, law can cause individuals to alter 
their own behaviour because it either induces them to change their tastes, or it 
creates a fear of bearing social sanctions.609 Sunstein also observes that: ‘the function 
of law in expressing social values and in encouraging social norms to move in 
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particular directions’ and to influence behaviour in that fashion.610  McAdams posits 
that the expressive effect of law, specifically, that legislation changes behaviour by 
signalling the underlying attitudes of a community or society.611 Rules that state 
standards of behaviour and command categorically imply that actions violating them 
are wrong, and that such actions are to be condemned, denounced, and 
repudiated.612Such values would symbolically express the humanistic values against 
child soldiering – ‘a concern for human beings that extends beyond borders’613that 
cosmopolitanism expounds.  
4.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed the legal framework for child soldiering. Due the work of 
transnational agencies, a body of international law to protect children has been 
evolved over the years. Conceptually, how do we conceive of the development of laws 
against child soldiering? An analysis of the legal framework on child soldiering will, 
firstly, help us understand the processes and conceptual underpinnings of law 
creation. The chapter began by addressing the philosophical questions about 
international relations. Different ‘logics’ guide international interaction. However, a 
logic than envisions a ‘better’ society cannot leave protection of individual rights to 
states. Perhaps, the need for such oversight is that states do respond to chastisement 
and humiliation from supranational entities. The objective of the chapter was to 
illustrate the development of the social meaning of the practice in law. The evolution 
of these laws would suggest, in constructivist terms, broad acceptance and norm 
cascades or acceptance of the ‘logic of appropriateness.’ The traditional view 
perceives legal instruments as protective. However, this instrumental view of such 
statutes, according to expressivists, is much too simple; law is considered to have 
both expressive and communicative functions. The same philosophy frames the 
strategy of naming and shaming. Through the expressive value of law, perpetrators’ 
beliefs or preferences may be altered in some way that diminishes desire for 
undesirable conduct. As such, unenforced law can have an expressive value. 
However, critics of the effect of unenforced law are sceptical about these claims. The 
                                                          
610 C. Sunstein, ‘Social Norms and Social Roles’ (1996) 96 Columbia Law Review, 903, 953 
611 R. McAdams, ‘An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law’ (2000) 79 Oregon Law Review 339 
612 I. Primoratz,  ‘Punishment as Language’ (1989) 64 Philosophy 187 
613 D. Robinson, ‘International criminal courts and tribunals: A cosmopolitan liberal account of 
international criminal law’ (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International Law  127 
121 
 
response to ‘naming and shaming’ for instance has been mixed. What is apparent, 
nonetheless, is that, for anything, the development of laws expresses emerging and 
cresting cosmopolitan values against child soldiering. Despite it being a patchwork, 
the evolution of the architecture evinces a convergence on a universal sentiment that 
abhors the use children during armed conflict. Expressivists perceive the symbolic 
function of such statutes and public humiliation strategies, at least, as ‘community-
creating.’ As noted in this chapter, cosmopolitanism seeks to build commonalities 
among various cultures and establish a modus vivendi. International law provides 
such a method. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND CHILD 
SOLDIERING 
 
Introduction 
 
The ‘idea that action by individuals, organizations, or states is driven by calculation 
of its consequences as measured against prior preferences has been subject to 
numerous criticisms.’614 The ‘presumptions of anticipating consequences seem far 
from descriptive of actual human behaviour in actual organized systems.’615And 
‘presumptions of stable, consistent, and exogenous preferences seem to exclude from 
consideration the many ways in which interests are changing, inconsistent, and 
endogenous.’616The objective of preceding chapters was to establish a foundational 
and conceptual understanding of the emergence and existing normative framework 
on child soldiering. States do submit to shared standards and norms. As the last 
chapter has shown, numerous states have assented to international legal instruments 
protecting the rights of children which they have obeyed. This, of course, does not 
make rationalism a redundant theoretical feature of international relations. On 
occasion, states do flout normative standards for individual interests. But compliance 
seems a more dominant trend than non-compliance. 
 
Some research at domestic level has shown support for the expressive function of law 
(statutes), even where such laws remain unenforced.617 For Scott, law can clearly 
work with norms to inform or to sanction; he is, however, unconvinced that it 
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transforms beliefs. 618 Other scholars have also described the ascription of messaging 
powers to both hard law and soft law instruments as placing too much faith in ‘paper 
protection.’619 Similarly, ‘naming and shaming’ has produced mixed results. Rebels 
or non-state actors in particular have often disregarded international law. A ‘plethora 
of global protocols, agreements and declarations attempting to protect children from 
both forced and voluntary recruitment has been flagrantly ignored since the end of 
the Cold War.’620 Critics of the presumed efficacy of unenforced law suggest, for 
example, that because of the continued use of child combatants, the framework 
around child soldiery alone has failed in its expressive function.621 Singer argues that 
the crux of the problem is that groups deciding to use child soldiers have never been 
ignorant about whether it was the ethical thing to do or confused as to what exactly 
was allowed under international law or norms of proper behaviour. 622 The ‘shaming’ 
should thus manifest itself through punishment. Those who abduct children, send 
them into battle, and force them to commit rape and murder are unlikely to be 
persuaded by moral appeals.623 In other words, child combatant recruiters wilfully 
offend without due regard to the law or norms. Hamilton and Abu El-Haj concluded 
that neither humanitarian law nor human rights law had managed to reduce the 
suffering or involvement of children in armed conflict.624 Despite international law’s 
strong opposition to the practice, the child soldier doctrine spread widely in the 
1990s.625  Exact statistics of child soldiers are difficult to establish; estimates, as 
reflected in the Machel Report, put them at 300 000. However, Achvarina and Reich, 
argue this rough approximation is now clearly outdated and potentially 
underestimates the gravity of the problem.626Evidence drawn from individual 
conflicts since 2002 suggests that new wars are often characterised by an extreme 
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use of child soldiers.627 They also conclude that the growing use of child soldiers flies 
in the face of the claim that international norms and laws are exerting an increasing 
influence on the behaviour of state and non-state actors.628 
 
Further, statutes and ‘naming and shaming’ lack the spectacle and dramaturgical 
effect that come with penal processes. It is perhaps plausible to conclude that legal 
texts, and perhaps ‘naming and shaming’ do have an expressive role but are 
inadequate as expressions of the function of law and norms. Some individuals do 
take social meanings into account when deciding what actions to take.629 Others do 
not.  The effect of unenforced law, thus, remains contestable. But more significantly, 
‘if a law expresses and effectively communicates common or shared values and 
identities, it may have what might be called a positive symbolic function.’630Kelsen 
reminds us that the statement that a norm prescribing, permitting, or authorizing a 
certain behaviour is valid does not mean that this behaviour takes place or that it will 
take place in the future; it means that it ought to take place, that man ought to 
behave as the norm prescribes, permits or authorizes them to behave.631 Norms can, 
therefore, be violated. Having discussed the legal framework, primarily statutes, this 
chapter now turns to ‘law in action’. 
 
The principal objective of the chapter is to assess the approaches of international 
criminal justice towards ‘mass crimes’ and the conscription, enlistment and use of 
children as military combatants. An analysis of penal approaches on child soldiering 
can, firstly, help us locate the criminological and penal approaches towards the use of 
children for war ends. The universality of rights would prescribe respect for life and 
dignity. David Held, one of the most enthusiastic writers on cosmopolitanism, points 
out that recognition of ‘equal moral worth’ is important a precept of 
cosmopolitanism.632 Mass crime, because of its diffusion, provides fertile ground for 
violation of such ‘moral worthiness’ on grand scales. It often involves multiple agents 
and widespread communal engagement. As discussed in Chapter 3, child soldiering 
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is a mass crime. This chapter tests the legal cosmopolitanism or ‘collective 
conscience’ that has so far been established on child soldiering. The aim of the 
chapter is to analyse jurisprudential approaches to children in armed conflict visa-a-
vis other norms against mass criminality. The chapter is organised as follows. The 
first part focuses on the concept of ‘cosmopolitan justice.’ The second part discusses 
international criminal justice and mass crime, examining firstly approaches of the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals to conflict after the Second World War. The third 
section analyses the post-Cold War Tribunals. With the establishment of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the United Nations opened a 
new chapter in the development of international criminal justice which had stalled 
since the Nuremberg tribunals. The last section discusses hybrid tribunals. Following 
the perceived inadequacies of the ICTY and ICTR, a ‘third-generation’ of 
international criminal tribunals emerged, blending international and domestic law 
elements.  
 
5.1 ‘Cosmopolitan justice’ 
 
Contemporary global politics is increasingly marked by conflicts that have 
occasioned violation of the ‘international society’s collective standards. As noted 
previously, a regime of standards protection the rights of children has emerged. This 
‘logic of appropriateness’ has resulted in states ratifying treaties. While expressivists 
posit the value of these standards, they do not deny the value of prosecution633or that 
sanctions have independent force; it simply adds another way that law can affect 
behaviour.634The crucial test of a norm’s existence is not that members of the 
community never violate it. Rather, a norm’s strength is measured by the level of 
opprobrium community members attract from their peers for engaging in behaviour 
that violates the norm. 635Society responds through criminalisation of undesirable 
behavior that violates those norms. Therefore, international criminal justice has an 
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expressive function. Lacey posits that criminalisation should be seen as the overall 
framework for the study of criminal law and of criminal justice and penal 
processes.636 It is one of many ways of constructing social reality.637 ‘International 
criminalisation’ is quintessentially a related set of ‘intentional activities of attempting 
to control, order or influence the behaviour of others.’638 For Kant, the most 
important philosophical and political problem facing humankind was the eradication 
of war and realisation of a universal community governed by cosmopolitan law.639 
The measure of his ‘categorical imperative’ was, not whether an action aligned with 
national or local law but whether it was universalisable.640 ‘The logic of cosmopolitan 
law,’ Hirsh states, ‘is to tie the idea of universal human rights to a legal structure that 
can give those rights some concrete reality independently of the 
state…[C]osmopolitan law is one strategy that aims to give the appeal to human 
rights some muscle.’641 To recall Durkheim: the criminal process is, fundamentally, a 
manifestation of the ‘collective conscience.’642 The specificity of modern criminal 
justice systems is that this collective reaction is exercised ‘through the medium of 
body acting upon those of its members who have violated certain rules of conduct.’643 
Kant argued that a voluntary federation of nations, based on mutual co-operation 
and voluntary consent, would create the conditions necessary for the realisation of 
cosmopolitan order.644 One condition for such order is prosecution of egregious 
crimes particularly after the horrendous Nazi exploits. In the words of Arendt, in 
such order: 
 
‘...human beings would assume responsibility for all crimes committed by human 
beings, in which no one people are assigned a monopoly of guilt and none considers 
itself superior, in which good citizens would not shrink back in horror at German 
crimes and declare ‘Thank God, I am not like that’, but rather recognise in fear and 
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trembling the incalculable evil which humanity is capable of and fight fearlessly, 
uncompromisingly, everywhere against it.’645 
 
 
Several international tribunals or ‘mediums’ have been set up since Nuremberg. All, 
except for the Nuremberg tribunals, were set up at the instigation of or with the co-
operation of the UN, no less a ‘federation of nations.’ The prosecution of 
international crimes ‘is often given pride of place within the new cosmopolitanism as 
the marker not only of the transition from classical international law to cosmopolitan 
law but of the emergence more broadly of a cosmopolitan consciousness that 
stretches across national boundaries.’646 Since Nuremberg, realpolitik has been 
replaced by a global legalism. As Amann states, ‘ad hoc tribunals are adjudicating 
international crimes - crimes that, even if they occur within one state’s borders, 
offend the international community.’647 Hirsh has described the prosecutions at 
these tribunals as ‘cosmopolitan trials,’648 for their preoccupation with universally 
condemned crimes.  Since ‘these offences are constructed as being of concern to 
humanity as a whole, international institutions putatively representative of the global 
community become legitimated as appropriate conduits to dispense justice and 
inflict punishment.’649 While cosmopolitanism is not necessarily aimed at the 
elimination of States, the realisation of a cosmopolitan community implies at a 
minimum a fundamental transformation in the international order, which currently 
privileges the State as the unit of normative concern.650 
5.2 International tribunals and mass crime 
 
A preoccupation of contemporary international criminal justice has been the 
criminalisation of such ‘mass atrocity.’ The popular conception of mass atrocity has 
often denoted extensive human exterminations. The adjudication of atrocities at 
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Nuremberg and Tokyo after the Nazi atrocities during the Second World War marked 
the birth of an international criminal law regime.651 The proceedings represented a 
substantial step forward in the development of the law of war crimes.652 These post-
Second World War tribunals served as an example to be imitated by the courts that 
came later.653 The modern international criminal tribunals have since indicted and 
prosecuted a number of high-level political and military figures – including former 
Heads of State – for egregious crimes, eroding the prospect of impunity for such 
offences.654These modern tribunals set some ground-breaking legal precedents and 
have played an educational role in focusing world attention on fundamental rules of 
international law prohibiting genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.655 
5.2.1 Post-Second World War Tribunals 
5.2.1.1 Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals 
 
The Nuremberg Tribunal was the first international criminal tribunal in modern 
times. Its Charter and Judgment are among the most significant developments in 
international law.656 The international community was outraged at the extent of the 
cruelties of the Nazi regime during World War II. The Nazi regime was responsible 
for the destruction of approximately six million Jews in the worst genocide in 
history.657 The Holocaust was systematic and state-sponsored persecution and 
murder.658 Although no international framework existed for prosecuting these 
crimes, most international observers felt that Nazi leaders should be punished.659 On 
January 13, 1942, nine Nazi-occupied states came together at the St. James Palace in 
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London, to discuss retribution against Germany for invading their countries.660 
These states affirmed their intentions to bring Nazi war criminals to justice through a 
judicial process. The United Nations War Crimes Commission was established the 
following year on October 20, 1943.661On August 8, 1945, the four major Allied 
powers in World War II signed the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment 
of Major War Criminals of the European Axis and The Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal. 662 
The Nuremberg trials represented the first official twentieth-century model of 
imposing international injustice.663 There was debate among the leaders of the Allied 
Powers as to whether the trials should be conducted.664 Winston Churchill insisted 
on summary execution of the Nazi perpetrators, while Josef Stalin advocated’ show 
trials’ followed by automatic sentences of execution, a common practice in Stalin’s 
regime.665 The United States, however, insisted on a legalised modality, contending 
that conducting trials in accordance with international criminal law (ICL) would 
offer an important precedent for upholding the rule of law at the international 
level.666 But the Allied Powers agreed that, because of the extreme gravity of Nazi 
crimes, only Nazi perpetrators could be tried.667 The Nuremberg Tribunal proceeded 
under the relevant Hague668 and early Geneva Conventions, 669even though neither 
‘contained explicit penal provisions.’670 According to the charter, only three 
categories of crimes were to be punished:  Crimes against Peace (planning, preparing 
and waging aggressive war; War Crimes (condemned in Hague Conventions of 1899 
and 1907) and Crimes Against Humanity (such as genocide) which shock the 
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conscience of humankind.671 The International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMTFE) was established in Tokyo ‘for the just and prompt trial and punishment of 
the major war criminals in the Far East.’672 On October 18, 1945, twenty-four major 
Nazi war criminals were accused of conspiracy to commit Crimes against Peace, War 
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.673The ‘crime’ of using child soldiers did not 
feature in the statutes of the courts. The engagement of children by the Third Reich 
and underground movements fighting the Nazis in the Second World War were the 
first widespread uses of children in combat in modern conflicts.674 The use of 
children most notably the Hitler Jugend (Hitler Youth) became rampant in the 
closing weeks of the Second World War.675 It is apparent that the use of children 
during the military hostilities did not induce any sense of ‘shock’ to consciences to 
prompt criminalisation. This is despite the considerably large numbers of children 
involved in the Second World War. It has been suggested that approximately 
200,000 German children aged 9–17years were recruited as soldiers by the Nazi 
government; most of them were deployed as anti-aircraft auxiliaries at air force or 
marine bases.676 Ironically, almost a similar number of children now cited as 
involved in current armed conflicts today prompts international opprobrium. The 
crafters of the charters did not appear to regard the use of child soldiering during the 
Second World War as a crime worthy of judicialisation and punishment. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, the social meaning of child soldiering derived from discursive registers 
of heroism, patriotism and bravery. 
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5.3 Post-Cold War Tribunals 
5.3.1 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
 
Since Nuremberg, two international criminal tribunals as well as the hybrid courts 
and mixed tribunals677 have been established. The International Criminal Tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda reflected an increasing criminalization of 
international law.678The horrendous atrocities committed by the Serbian forces after 
the breakup of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the Serbian forces 
associated with ethnic cleansing propelled humanitarian concern to the fore.679 In 
February 1993, the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution requesting 
the Secretary General to submit for its consideration a report on the way in which to 
establish a tribunal, accompanied by specific proposals.680 On May 25, 1993, the 
ICTY came into existence in The Hague, Netherlands. The International Tribunal was 
empowered to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, 
genocide and crimes against humanity.681 Several leaders were charged with these 
crimes, including the Sebrenica massacre. The concern of international lawmakers 
was the large scale human exterminations. Herman characterises the ‘fixation on the 
mass murders’ thus: ‘The Srebrenica massacre has taken on both symbolic and 
mythical properties, all in the service of political agendas. The symbol is of Serb evil, 
manifested in an alleged cold-blooded and unprovoked massacre of innocents 
reminiscent of Nazi behavior during World War II.’682 Sebrenica has become the 
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emblem of the genocide in the former Yugoslavia. It is estimated that 7 000 to 8 000 
Bosnian Muslims were murdered.  
 
Under the ‘violation of the laws and customs of war’683, the statute does not mention 
the crime of child soldiering although children were used in the conflict. Serb 
paramilitaries had a reputation for using children as young as 10 during the wars in 
Bosnia and Croatia.684 Although it is difficult to put a figure on the number of 
children involved in the 1991-1995 Balkan wars, Croatia’s Association of Underage 
War Volunteers of the Homeland War estimates that some 3,000 boys fought in the 
conflict.685 The UN and other sources quote almost a similar figure: some 3,000 to 
4,000 children participated in hostilities the vast majority in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Croatia.686 One source estimated that more than 20,000 children 
between 13 and 16 were involved in the conflict.687 The Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) also enlisted child soldiers. The participation of children in the KLA was 
confirmed in October 2000 when details of the registration of 16,024 KLA soldiers by 
the International Organisation for Migration in Kosovo became known.688 Ten per 
cent of these were children. The majority of them were 16 and 17 years old. Around 
two per cent were below the age of 16.689 
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5.3.2 The International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
 
Like the ICTY, the ICTR did not recognise criminality of child soldiering. On April 6, 
1994, a plane carrying Rwandan President Habyarimana, a Hutu, was shot down. 
Violence broke out almost immediately after that. Hutu extremists launched their 
plans to destroy the entire Tutsi civilian population. In the weeks after April 6, 1994, 
800,000 men, women, and children perished in the Rwandan genocide. Acting 
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council created the 
ICTR690 for the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and other serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda 
between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. Article 4 of the Statute establishing 
the court addresses Violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of 
Additional Protocol II.691 However, the ICTR statute is silent on the conscription, 
enlistment and use of child soldiers. 
As in the previous conflicts, child combatants were involved in the Rwandan conflict. 
Some children participated actively in the genocide as members of the Rwandan 
army and the Interahamwe while others did so as part of the general mobilisation of 
the civilian population.692 Children, because of their emotional and mental 
immaturity, were seen to have been more susceptible to manipulation by the same 
propaganda that moved adults. In a survey, Rwandans questioned for a 1995 study 
carried out in eight communes described the crimes they saw children commit in 
1994.693 Almost all the participants said that children were involved in the crimes 
associated with the genocide: they committed murder, raped women and young girls, 
burned and destroyed houses, stole property, and pointed out people in hiding to the 
militias.694  Some groups also said children kept an eye on the people that were 
marked for death so they could not escape. In another group, participants said that 
some children worked as informers, posing as orphans and asking people in hiding 
for refuge. A few days later, the children would return to the militias and give them 
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the names and locations of those in hiding.695 Thirty-five per cent of the children 
interviewed for a 1995 UNICEF study said they saw children killing or injuring other 
children.696 
Some who perpetrated these offences followed the example of their elders.697  Many 
children in detention interviewed by Human Rights Watch researchers said they had 
parents and older siblings in prison as well.698 Some simply joined in looting in 
hopes of profiting or because others were doing so.699Still others acted under 
extreme duress and participated in the violence only in order to save themselves or 
family members from slaughter.700In 1994, the Rwandan Ministry of Defence agreed 
to demobilise all child combatants – commonly referred to as kadogo or ‘little ones’ 
in Kiswahili. 701 A 1996 Rwandan government study identified 5,000 children who 
had been part of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) guerrilla forces, 2,600 of whom 
were under fifteen years of age at the time of their military service.702 Other sources 
vary considerably, estimating the true number of former child soldiers to be 15,000-
20,000.703 The government was also reported to have used child combatants. The 
government initially claimed kadogos were used primarily for menial work and did 
not go to the front lines during the genocide. However, a 1997 survey found that 725 
children associated with the military had an army number, indicating that they were 
soldiers.704 While Rwanda addressed the integration of former child soldiers705, the 
ICTR did not punish the enlisters and recruiters. Cohen described the ‘Rwanda 
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genocide as one of humanity’s greatest failures…’706 while Lemarchand points out 
that Rwanda ‘has become a synonym for one of the worst genocides of the 20th 
century.’707 However, it was the mass eliminationism, branded the ‘crime of crimes,’ 
that seemed to eclipse any other immoral acts that occurred during the conflict. 
5.4 Hybrid Tribunals 
 
From above, it is evident that child soldiering did not capture the attention of 
drafters of penal codes.  The ‘cosmopolitan trials’ seemed fixated on murder crimes. 
It is hardly surprising that, despite their considerable achievements, the ICTY and 
the ICTR did not provide a definitive institutional model for the implementation of 
international justice.708 The UN Security Council and the international community 
noted a number of features of the ICTY and the ICTR that militated against using 
them as a model for further ad hoc international criminal courts.709 To address these, 
the UN responded to subsequent demands for accountability for war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide by developing a series of new ‘experimental’ courts. 
This ‘third generation’ of courts are the so-called ‘hybrid’ or ‘mixed’ tribunals.710 
There is no precise definition of what constitutes a ‘hybrid’ tribunal, but ‘hybridity’ 
has been explained as existing when ‘both the institutional apparatus and the 
applicable law [used in a judicial process] consist of a blend of the international and 
the domestic.’711 The following section discusses three hybrid tribunals: the Special 
Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC) in Dili, East Timor; the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) in Phnom Penh and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone in Freetown. The main purpose here is again to assess the approaches of 
‘international’ criminal justice to child soldiering. 
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5.4.1 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
 
Cambodia, which gained its independence from France in 1954, was ruled by King 
Norodom Sihanouk until 1970 when he was topped by a US backed coup.  Between 
1970 and 1975 multiple rebel groups battled against one another and the military 
government.712 The most prominent group was the Khmer Rouge, which vehemently 
opposed Cambodia’s support of the US in Vietnam. 713In 1975, the Khmer Rouge took 
control. Once the Khmer Rouge rose to power, there was no individual freedom, little 
or no social mobility, and a population that was undernourished and overworked.714 
In the mass-killings, disease, and famine that were to follow, more than 1.5 million of 
Cambodia’s eight million people perished.715 
 
After nearly twenty years of international paralysis in the face of impunity, on 21 
June 1997 the Cambodian government sought the assistance of the UN in dealing 
with the atrocities committed during the rule of the Khmer Rouge.716 The UN Group 
of Experts travelled through Cambodia from July 1998 until February 1999, 
interviewing government and non-governmental officials, current Cambodian 
citizens and some survivors of the Khmer Rouge regime.717The Experts concluded 
that the Khmer Rouge had committed, inter alia, the international crime of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.718Faced with Cambodia’s refusal to accept 
an international tribunal, the UN eventually agreed to the establishment of a tribunal 
under Cambodian law controlled by Cambodians, but with international 
participation.719 The Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the 
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Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of 
Democratic Cambodia (Law on ECCC) was initially passed by Cambodia’s National 
Assembly on 2 January 2001 but amended later.720 The ECCC, also known as the 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal, only began its work in 2006 with a mandate to try those 
most responsible for the crimes and violations of Cambodian laws related to crimes, 
international humanitarian law and during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 
January 1979,721 a period when the Additional Protocols came into force. The Law 
establishing the ECCC outlines its focus on genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
grave breaches against the Geneva Conventions.722 Genocide as defined in Article 4 
derives from Articles 2 and 3 of the 1948 Genocide Convention. The definition of 
crimes against humanity in Article 5 is taken from the Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 
 
Although the relevant humanitarian laws were in place, it was clear that the primary 
motivational factor for the establishment of the tribunal was mass deaths that had 
been occasioned by the Khmer Rouge. There is, however, evidence of widespread use 
of children, including girls, in combat by both the governmental armed forces and 
the Khmer Rouge during Cambodia’s civil war.723 Tens of thousands724of Cambodian 
children were indoctrinated and trained by the Khmer Rouge to serve as child 
soldiers.725 The children of that period make up Cambodia’s current adult 
population, and the legacy of the armed conflict, particularly the widespread Pol 
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Pot’s Khmer Rouge turned to the youngest members of the poorest levels of 
Cambodian society.726A Khmer Rouge member was quoted saying: ‘It usually takes a 
little time but eventually the younger ones become the most efficient soldiers of them 
all.’727 Once they were enlisted in the revolutionary army, the children were separated 
from their families, removed from their villages to Pol Pot’s indoctrination camps. 
They began their military careers at the age of 12.728 These young soldiers, were 
trained in ‘cruel games’ with the goal that ‘they would end up as soldiers with a love 
of killing and consequently of war...’729 Evidence gathered by a human rights 
organisation from defectors in 1995 showed that cases of children being recruited as 
soldiers was particularly prevalent among the Khmer Rouge, who continued over a 
long period to recruit children under 15.730 Many young boys carried weapons to the 
front. Some were made to take part in the fighting, and there were cases of young 
boys (aged 13-15) being killed or wounded.731Cambodians interviewed in a survey 
conducted for a project of the International Committee of the Red Cross, explained 
why young children were sought out as armed combatants: ‘It is…easy for the 
commanders to give orders [to young soldiers] because the children did not have a 
conscience and are illiterate…they do not know what is good, what is bad. So they 
will simply follow the orders the commanders give them.’732 Very little research has 
focused on what happened to former child soldiers after they left the service of the 
Khmer Rouge. 733Child soldiers did not receive demobilization and reintegration 
services designed to meet their particular needs.734 Notably again, child soldiering 
did not feature in the statute of the tribunal. 
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5.4.2 The Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor 
 
The Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC) in East Timor, established by the UN, 
acting as the transitional authority between the end of the Indonesian occupation in 
1999 and the independence of East Timor in 2002, did not adopt any radically 
different approach; it drew from the Cambodian model.735After the announcement of 
the victory of the pro-independence movement, pro-Indonesian Timorese militias 
ran amok killing hundreds, destroying about eighty percent of the buildings in the 
capital, Dili, and drove more than a third of the population from their homes.736 The 
UN established an Investigative Commission, which reported that hundreds of 
civilian had been killed, property had been destroyed on a large scale, and thousands 
of people had been driven from their homes. The report also alleged that the militias 
were financed and equipped by the Indonesian military and civilian authorities in 
East Timor.737 In particular, the Commission focused on violence during 1999, 
especially the brutal rampage by Indonesian military and pro-Indonesian militias, 
following a referendum result in September 1999 in favour of East Timorese 
independence. While some crimes were committed by pro-independence forces as 
well, the overwhelming majority of the violence was perpetrated by pro-Indonesian 
forces.738 
 
Like with the ECCC, a proposal by the Investigative Commission of Inquiry to 
establish an international tribunal, similar to those seen after the Yugoslav and 
Rwandan conflicts, was rejected in favour of courts established within the national 
legal system of East Timor. The UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) 
established the Special Panels under its mandate to establish law and order after the 
end of the hostilities. The UNTAET Regulation 2000/15, approved in July 2000, 
described the operation of the new Special Panels.739 Section 4 of Regulation 
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2000/15 replicates definition of genocide as codified by the 1948 Genocide 
Convention. Section 5.1 adopts the definition of crimes against humanity in the ICC 
Statute, with the subtle distinction that both the punishable act and the widespread 
or systematic attack must be directed against the civilian population. Section 6.1 
stipulates the prosecution of war crimes, including child soldiering. Both pro-
independence and pro-integration armed groups in East Timor recruited children.740 
The age range on both sides was 10 to 18 although most children involved tended to 
be between 15 and 18. Accurate figures for both sides are impossible to obtain.741 The 
regulation establishing the court proscribes the conscripting or enlisting of children 
under the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to 
participate actively in hostilities.742 The tribunal had jurisdiction over genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, murder, sexual offences and torture.743 In October 
2005 the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste 
submitted its final report to the Timor-Leste president.744 It contained a detailed 
account of human rights violations in Timor-Leste between 1974 and 1999, including 
abuses against children. It found that during Indonesia’s occupation of Timor-Leste 
(1975–99) children, some as young as six years old, were used by the Indonesian 
armed forces, Indonesian-backed militia and, to a lesser extent, by the pro-
independence armed group, Falintil, and its clandestine front.745 According to the 
report, children associated with Falintil were the victims of extrajudicial execution, 
arbitrary detention, torture and other human rights violations by the Indonesian 
occupying forces.746 Child members of the pro-Indonesian militias responsible for 
much of the violence that took place both before and after the August 1999 Popular 
Consultation on independence were reported to be among those who had suffered 
the greatest impact since Indonesia’s withdrawal from the territory and its 
subsequent independence.747  No trials or convictions on the use of child soldiers 
were conducted. Following independence in May 2002, the Special Panels continued 
under the authority of the East Timor government, but in May 2005, with the 
                                                          
740See ‘Child Soldiers Global Report 2001 - East Timor’ Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 
(now Child Soldiers International) 
741ibid 
742 See UNTAET Regulation 2000/15,6 June 2000 Section 6.1 (b) (xxvi) 
743See UNTAET Regulation 2000/15,6 June 2000 
744See ‘Child Soldiers Global Report 2001 - East Timor’ Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 
(now Child Soldiers International) 
745Ibid 
746Ibid 
747Ibid 
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withdrawal of much of the United Nations infrastructure748, the Special Panels 
suspended operations indefinitely.  
 
As can be noticed from the jurisprudence of the tribunals, the criminological culture 
of the ‘cosmopolitan justice’ disregarded the use of children in armed conflict. It 
would appear the principal concern was on the mass human exterminations. The 
trials for child soldiering were only first conducted by the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone established in 2002, after the crime had been introduced in the Rome Statute 
of 1998 establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
5.4.3 The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
 
The Special Court for the Sierra Leone (SCSL) was set up jointly by the Government 
of Sierra Leone and the United Nations, mandated to prosecute those who bear the 
greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 
1996.749 The SCSL marked a shift in jurisprudence. It was the first international or 
internationalised tribunal court to convict defendants for the crimes against 
humanity of sexual slavery and forced marriage (as an inhumane act).750 The SCSL 
also broke new ground when in 2007 it convicted three rebel leaders for, among 
other crimes, conscripting, enlisting and using children in armed conflict.751  The 
legal ground had been laid for the SCSL by the Rome Statute of 1998 establishing the 
ICC. The Sierra Leone conflict is known for the widespread use of child soldiers in 
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
                                                          
748See Security Council Resolution 1543 (2004), May 14, 2004, para. 8. The Security Council resolved 
that the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) should complete all investigations by November 2004 and that it 
should conclude all other activities no later than 20 May, 2005. 
749See Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone. 2178 UNTS 138, 145; 97 AJIL 295; UN Doc. 
S/2002/246, appendix II [16 January 2002] The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2000) 
is annexed to this Agreement, available at http://www.scsl. 
org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClnd1MJeEw%3d&tabid=176 [hereinafter ‘SCSL Statute’] 
750See Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone Office of the Prosecutor, Special Court Prosecutor 
Hails RUF Convictions (25 February 2009), available at http://www.sc-sl. 
org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=dupqs76CgyU%3d&tabid=196; Press Release, Special 
Court for Sierra Leone Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutor Welcomes Convictions in RUF Appeals 
Judgment (26 October 2009), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/ 
LinkClick.aspx?fileticketUGDfogLfQ%3d&tabid=196 (last accessed 16 February 2014) 
751Sentencing in the trial of Prosecutor v Brima, Kanu and Kamara (SCSL-2004-16-T). The Trial 
Chamber imposed single ‘global’ sentences of 50 years for Brima, 45 years for Kamara, and 50 years 
for Kanu. On 22 February 2008, the Appeals Chamber dismissed appeals and upheld the sentences 
handed down by the Trial Chamber. 
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and Civil Defence Forces (CDF). The mass and organic nature of child soldiering was 
reflected by the large numbers of recruits. NGOs estimated between 5 000 and 10 
000 child combatants were involved.752Article 4 (c) of the SCSL statute proscribes 
the ‘conscripting or enlisting of children under the age of 15 years into armed forces 
or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities.’ It mirrors Article 8(2) 
(e) (vi) of the Rome Statute, (under which Lubanga was charged) ‘so as to conform it 
to the statement of the law existing in 1996 and as currently accepted by the 
international community.’753 
 
One of the cases involved Norman Hinga, the Deputy Minister of Defence in the 
Government of Sierra Leone and National Co-ordinator of the CDF (‘Norman 
case’).754The CDF came into existence largely because the government and the 
civilians of Sierra Leone did not have faith in the Sierra Leone Army to defend them 
against the rebel RUF.755  However, the CDF committed atrocities against its 
opponents, and recruited child combatants. The defence had invoked the doctrine of 
nullum crimen sine lege 756(no crime without law) arguing that the recruitment of 
child soldiers was not a crime when the crimes were committed – before 1996 - until 
the Rome Statute of 1998 establishing the ICC, ratified in 2002. In May 2004, the 
SCSL, nonetheless, issued a landmark decision affirming that an individual may be 
held criminally responsible for the recruitment of child soldiers.  Norman died in 
custody in 2007.In June 2007, the court issued its first trial judgment in the case of 
Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu (AFRC case).The Appeals Chamber upheld 
sentences of 50 years for Brima, 45 years for Kamara, and 50 years for Kanu. It was 
                                                          
752 The exact number of child soldiers within the ranks of the fighting forces in Sierra Leone is/was 
impossible to calculate. Based on approximate numbers submitted by the factions, the National 
Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) estimated there would be 
45,000 combatants to disarm. Of these 12 percent or 5400 were forecast to be children.  UNICEF 
Sierra Leone estimated 7000, and the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers estimates 10,000.   
753 Letter dated 22 December , 2000 from the President of the Security Council addressed 
to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1234, 2 (22 December 2000)  
cited in M. Happold Child soldiers: Victims or perpetrators 29 (2008) University of La Verne Law 
Review  56  
754See SCSL Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of 
Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), Case No SCSL-2004-14-AR72 (E) (Special Court for Sierra Leone 
[31 May 2004] [hereinafter Norman Decision on Child Recruitment) Sam Hinga Norman was indicted 
on 7 March 2003. On 28 February 2004 the Trial Chamber ordered the joint trial of Norman, Fofana 
and Kondewa, and on 5 March prosecutors issued a consolidated indictment. The CDF trial began on 
3 June 2004. On 14 July 2005, the Prosecution concluded its case. On 22 February 2007, Norman 
died of natural causes while in Dakar for medical treatment and the case against him was closed. 
755See Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, 27 October 2004, Vol. 2, ch. 2, para 
331 
756Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman Case No.  SCSL–2003–08–PT nullum crimen sine lege (‘no 
crime without law’) 
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followed in August 2007 by the judgment in the case of Norman’s co-accused 
Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa (CDF case). Fofana and Kondewa  were 
sentenced to 15 and 20 years’ imprisonment, respectively, with the Appeals Chamber 
determining that the original sentences of six- and eight-years’ imprisonment757 were  
manifestly inadequate.758 The judgment in Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, 
(RUF case)759 was issued in March 2009. The Appeals Chamber also upheld the 
sentences imposed by the Trial Chamber of 52 years for Sesay; 40 years for Kallon; 
and 25 years for Gbao.760 All their crimes included the use of children in military 
conflict. Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia, was indicted on 7 March 
2003 for his role in the Sierra Leone conflict.761He faced eleven counts of aiding and 
abetting the RUF and the AFRC, including rape, murder, sexual slavery, enlisting 
children under the age of 15 into the armed forces, and pillage.Taylor was convicted 
and sentenced in 2012 to 50 years in prison.762 The sentence was upheld by the 
Appeals Chamber.  
While some of the sentencing took an expressivist tone about sending a strong 
message about the international norm being upheld,763  the judgments held that the 
most important goals for sentencing were retribution and deterrence.764 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Legal scholars agree that without specific criminal statutes, then acts are not crimes.  
The Nuremberg Tribunals did not include child soldiering. The recruitment of 
children for purposes of armed conflict was proscribed by the Additional Protocols to 
the Geneva Conventions in 1977. Several legal instruments and soft laws were 
promulgated since. Over the years several tribunals of different kinds have been set 
up. This chapter analysed the approaches of this international criminal justice 
regime towards child soldiering. An analysis of penal approaches to child soldiering 
can, firstly, help us locate perceptions of penology towards the practice. Secondly, it 
will also assist us contextualize Lubanga.It is evident from the jurisprudence that, 
                                                          
757 Trial Chamber 1 Special Court of the Sierra Leone Judgment on the sentencing of Prosecutor v 
Fofana and Kondewa, SCSL-04-14-T [9 October 2007] 
758Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment [May 28 2008] 
759Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgment [2 March 2009] 
760 Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, SCSL-04-15-A [26 October 2009] 
761 See Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor SCSL 03-01-T [ 29 May 2007] 
762See Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor SCSL 03-01-T [30 May 2012] 
763 CDF Appeals para 530-33  
764 ibid para 532 
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despite the triumphalism about the establishment of tribunals, child soldiering has 
historically been under-criminalised and under-judicialised. The criminological and 
penal practices did not reflect the cosmopolitanism or collective conscience that had 
built around the abhorrence of child militarisation. It would seem the culture was 
influenced by a ‘fixation on the massacre’ that has resulted in the predominant 
adjudication of mass violence or atrocities, relegating or ignoring other wide-scale 
phenomena like child soldiering. The SCSL broke new jurisprudential ground with 
prosecutions for the conscription, enlistment and use of children in armed conflict. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN CONTEXT 
 
Introduction 
 
Assuredly, the emergence of international tribunals as a response to cataclysmic 
conflicts has been a remarkable development in international criminal law. The 
proliferation of these international criminal courts ‘inspired human rights activists 
and votaries of international criminal justice to make triumphant gestures.’765 As 
Koller noted: ‘The Nuremberg precedent addressed the worst that man can do to 
man, but it is also about the possibility of hope for a better future through law. It is, 
in its essence, the manifestation of the idea that we can and we should respond to 
mass atrocity through law. It is a moment pregnant with belief in the need for justice, 
and also in the possibilities and prospects of law.’766 Several defendants were 
prosecuted and punished for mass crimes by subsequent tribunals.  Perhaps, the 
triumphalism of ‘cosmopolitan justice’ is expressed emphatically by Hirsh: 
 
‘Against those who argue that international relations are only determined by power, I 
have argued that processes of decision making that rely on the authority and due 
process of law can also have an influence. Against those who argue that the only 
legitimate sovereign is the national state, I have argued that crimes against humanity 
have been recognized as the business of all human beings and therefore global 
institutions may develop that have jurisdiction within all states to prosecute such 
crimes. Against those who argue that individual responsibility for these crimes is just 
a legal fiction, I have argued that those who perpetrate crimes against humanity have 
had alternatives and that, while their alternatives may have been severely 
constrained, they still made free choices. Against those who argue that cosmopolitan 
law is utopian, I have shown that in the ICTY and the ICTR, as well as in national 
courts, it is coming into being. Against those who argue that the practical difficulties 
of organizing fair trials for such crimes are insurmountable, I have presented 
evidence that fair trials are indeed being held. Against those who argue that 
cosmopolitanism cannot hope to pull people away from their own sacred myths of 
nationhood, I have shown one mechanism by which a cosmopolitan social memory is 
being forged.’767 
 
 
                                                          
765 M. Damaska, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ (2008) 83 Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 329, 329  
766D. Koller, ‘The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer’,(2008) 40 New York University Journal 
of International Law and Politics 1019, 1059 
767 D. Hirsh, Law against Genocide: Cosmopolitan Trials,(London: Cavendish/Glasshouse 2003) 159 
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The International Criminal Court (ICC) was the first treaty-based putative 
international criminal court.  Procedurally, ‘the Rome Conference which established 
the court can be considered as a cosmopolitan performance. After all, 160 countries 
came together to establish a mechanism to adjudicate grave crimes.768 There were 
conversations across cultures, languages and jurisdictions.’769 In the Preamble of the 
Statute, States Parties affirm that they are ‘conscious that all peoples are united by 
common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage, and (are) 
concerned that this delicate mosaic may be shattered at any time.’770The Court has 
jurisdiction over the nationals and territories of the 122 States Parties to the Rome 
Statute and other States accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction, as well as over situations 
referred by the UN Security Council. We have learnt from Durkheim that the 
criminal process is, fundamentally, a manifestation of the ‘collective conscience.’771 
UN secretary general Kofi Annan used a similar term describing the judges of the 
newly-formed court as the embodiment of our ‘collective conscience.’772 The 
President of the International Criminal Court,  Sang-Hyun Song, referred to the 
Court as a ‘moral imperative for humankind,’773 perhaps borrowing from Kant’s 
‘categorical imperative’ (on moral obligations that are universally and 
unconditionally binding).  The Statute of the Court outlawed child soldiering as a 
binding obligation. It has been suggested that the true test for the ICC’s success will 
depend on whether it helps to combat impunity and deter future human rights 
atrocities across the globe.774 Certainly, the ‘millions of children, women and men 
[that] have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience 
of humanity motivated the many academics and advocates who spent years dedicated 
                                                          
768 G. Simpson, Law, War & Crime: War Crimes, Trials and the Reinvention of International 
Law (Google eBook) (John Wiley & Sons 2013) 
769 Ibid  
770See Rome Statute, Preamble 
771E. Durkheim, The Division of Labour  In  Society, 70–108 cited in F. Mégret, ‘Practices Of 
Stigmatization’ (2014) 76 Law and Contemporary Problems 287 
772 Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s  to the inaugural meeting of judges of the International Criminal 
Court in The Hague on 11 March 2003http://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sgsm8628.doc.htm-0 (last 
accessed 20 November 2013) 
773See S. Song ‘Keynote remarks at Human Rights Council side event ‘The International Criminal 
Court after 15 Years: Prospects for the Future,’ 4 www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/presidency/130910-
President-Speech-Eng.pdf.,  
774L. Laplante, ‘The Domestication of International Criminal Law: A Proposal for Expanding the 
International Criminal Court’s Sphere of Influence’ (2010) 43 J. Marshall Law Review 635  
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to realising the dream of creating an international forum to assure that the ‘enemies 
of mankind’ would not escape justice.’775 
 
This thesis attempts to rationalise the work of the ICC with reference to the case of 
Lubanga as an examplar for mass crimes the court adjudicates. What can the ICC 
realistically achieve with regards to such crimes? Despite ‘the justified glee of 
devotees of international justice, however, it would be wrong to close our eyes to the 
shortcomings of international criminal courts. Some of these shortcomings are, at 
present, inevitable.’776  International criminal justice has weaknesses.  For purposes 
of this discussion, I will divide international criminal justice’s challenges into two 
categories of: a) ‘practical/institutional’ and b) ‘idealistic/goal-related.’ For purposes 
of theorisation, the two are not mutually exclusive. The effects of both reinforce the 
theoretical proposition advanced in this thesis. ICL idealism manifests itself in the 
belief that international criminal prosecutions can achieve a wide range of 
aspirations and goals.777As a permanent court, the ICC was created with the lofty 
aspirations to achieve justice for all, end impunity, help end conflicts, remedy the 
deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals, take over when national criminal justice institutions 
are unwilling or unable to act, and deter future war criminals.778  The idealism of ICC 
seems to replicate the domestic penal traditions of its predecessors. Supporters of the 
Rome Statute routinely urge ratification on deterrence grounds.779 According to the 
Preamble of the Rome Statute and Articles 1 and 5, its objectives are the prosecution 
and punishment of the most serious crimes of international concern.780 The Statute 
describes and seeks to end ‘unimaginable atrocities’, and ‘grave crimes’ that ‘deeply 
shock the conscience of humanity.’781 These provisions have been interpreted as 
meaning that retribution and deterrence are primary goals of the ICC.782 As noted, 
the ICC referred to the principles of retribution and deterrence as principal goals in 
                                                          
775See Rome Statute, Preamble 
776 M. Damaska, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ (2008) 83 Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 329 
777S. Dana, ‘The Limits of Judicial Idealism: Should the International Criminal Court Engage with 
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778See ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Overview ’ 
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781See Rome Statute, Preamble 
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the prosecution of Lubanga.783 International criminal courts pursue other goals: 
these other objectives, such as reconciliation and peace, have tended to be extra-
judicial and socio-politically motivated, departing from the core functions of courts. I 
discuss the ‘idealistic/goal-related problems in the next chapter. 
 
The second weakness to which I devote this chapter relates to practical and 
institutional difficulties. The ICC ‘is caught between the cosmopolitanism that its 
constitutive offences posit, and the reality in the legal international legal system in 
which it operates.’784 Plausible theorisation or rationales should consider what the 
ICC can realistically achieve. Several authors have argued that context effects are so 
central to an understanding of organizational phenomena that contextual analysis 
should become a distinctive feature of organizational scholarship.785 I consider here 
‘context effects’ as the positive or negative impact that results from an organisation’s 
special context. The sui generis character of the ICC means it operates within a mix 
of complex social, political, economic and other factors. If ‘…we aren’t looking for 
context effects, we won’t seek out context sensitive theoretical perspectives.’786  
Sensitive theorisation would take cognisance of the ICC’s dependency on the 
‘largesse’ of states in its work. The court is funded by contributions from states 
parties.  However, the funding has not matched the workload of the court. The ICC 
does not have a coercive mechanism such as a police force. It also relies on states for 
effecting warrants of arrest. However, such co-operation is not always guaranteed. 
The reliance on state co-operation has led the court to focus on non-state actors or 
rebels. The principal objective of this chapter is to highlight these constraints of the 
ICC and ultimately advance a working rationale sensitive to these ‘context effects.’ 
For purposes of the rationale that this thesis ultimately proposes, the 
practical/institutional challenges are not exclusive to the ‘idealistic/goal-related’ 
weaknesses. This chapter unfolds as follows. The first part discusses the ICC and its 
                                                          
783Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Sentencing Judgment ICC-01/04-01/06 [10 July 2006]  para 
16  
784 F. Megret ‘International Criminal Justice: A Critical Research Agenda’ in C. Schwöbel  (ed), Critical 
Approaches to International Criminal Law: An Introduction (Routledge 2014) 31 
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(1985) 7 Research in Organizational Behaviour 1; G. Johns, ‘The essential impact of context on 
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financial resources. The second section examines the political factors, focusing on the 
‘constraints’ associated with self-referrals. The last part discusses the ICC’s lack of an 
enforcement mechanism.  
 
6.1 Resource limitations 
 
The term ‘context effects’ is broadly defined as the set of factors surrounding a 
phenomenon that exert some direct or indirect influence on it.787 The performance of 
an organisation depends on a number of factors, including the availability of 
resources for it to achieve its goals. Secondly, the efficiency will depend on the 
environment in which the institution operates. Situational constraints are 
hypothesized to directly affect performance.788  The ICC is dependent on the 
cooperation of states. The court ‘has no policing power or enforcement agencies and 
cannot seize evidentiary material, execute arrests, make searches or compel 
witnesses to give testimony without the co-operation of national authorities.’789 
Further, states created the ICC to adjudicate ‘the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole.’790 However, the court does not receive 
enough financial support to conduct its operations.  The Rome Statute includes a 
provision for the establishment of an Assembly of States Parties (ASP). According to 
the treaty, ‘each State Party shall have one representative in the Assembly who may 
be accompanied by alternates and advisers’ and each State Party shall have one vote. 
All other States which have signed the Rome Statute or the Final Act of the Rome 
Conference may attend as an observer. Currently, 122 countries are States Parties to 
the Rome Statute. Out of them 34 are African States, 18 are Asia-Pacific States, 18 are 
from Eastern Europe, 27 are from Latin American and Caribbean States, and 25 are 
from Western European and other States,791 reflecting a cosmopolitan outlook. States 
parties are responsible for funding the court apart from voluntary contributions by 
                                                          
787 P. Cappelli, and Sherer, ‘The missing role of context in OB: The need for a meso-level approach’ 
(1991) 13 Research in Organizational Behavior 55, 56 
788 L. Peters and E. O’Connor, ‘Situational Constraints and Work Outcomes: The Influences of a 
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789 M. Brubacher, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion within the International Criminal Court’ 2 Journal of 
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other organisations. However, some states have been unable to meet their financial 
obligations. The only available sanction for defaulters is suspension of their voting 
rights. According to Article 112, paragraph 8 of the Rome Statute, ‘a State Party 
which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions toward the costs of 
the Court shall have no vote in the Assembly and in the Bureau if the amount of its 
arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the 
preceding two full years.’ This would appear a light sanction to deter defaulters.  
 
In December 2011, the states parties allocated the court €108 million with possible 
access to a contingency fund of up to €7 million. The ICC had requested a budget of 
approximately €117 million for 2012.  The ICC’s budget has hardly increased in 
recent years, even though the addition of new cases in more countries has given it a 
much heavier workload. Four years ago, the ICC was investigating just four 
situations, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Darfur and the Central 
African Republic. Since then, it has added four more investigations, in Kenya, the 
Ivory Coast, Libya, and Mali.792 However, the funding has not matched this 
increasing workload. Prosecutor Bensouda pointed out that the ICC was struggling to 
work with zero nominal growth imposed on the court.  She stated that: 
 
‘[W]e have been very clear to explain to the states… that we have tried always to work 
within the budget but we have the cut it as near as possible to the bone and we cannot 
go any further; this has to be very clear. And if the state parties want the court to be 
as effective and to do things it was set out to do, we need to have a sufficient budget. 
We need to remember or recall why this institution was set up; are we now thinking 
of a resource-driven court or a case-driven court?...if we have go to the extent of 
deciding whether to open a case or not because of the budget, that will not be 
good.’793 
 
States parties had such high expectations of the ICC, yet a few major contributors 
were not willing to fully fund it.794 Some of the court’s funders see the court as a 
                                                          
792See ‘ICC Secures Budget Increase’ Institute for Peace and War Reporting http://iwpr.net/report-
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793  See ‘The International Criminal Court: A New Approach to International Relations’ Council of 
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wasteful and expensive project.795 The ICC concluded a single case (Lubanga) after 
10 years in existence, spending $900 million during the period.796 With only one 
completed trial in a decade of effort and expenditure, the ICC has faced regular 
criticism that it fritters away investment with few results to show for it.797 By the end 
of 2013, the ICC was focusing on 18 cases, most of them incomplete and carried over 
from previous years (See Table 1, below). To be sure, the cases presented before the  
 
ICC are often complex, and in most instances, necessitate lengthy negotiations with  
national governments. The handful of cases that the ICC handles takes years to  
                                                          
795See J. Silverman, ‘Ten years, $900m, one verdict: Does the ICC cost too much?’ BBC News 
Magazine; 14 March 2012 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-17351946 
796 Ibid  
797Ibid   
Budget in 
thousands euros 
(#cases) 
 
Operational 
Support 
Uganda DRC Darfur CAR Kenya Libya Côte 
D'Ivoire 
2009 approved 16, 198.9 3.233.4 17.475.4 7.575.6 7,390.5 0.0 0.0 N/A 
(9 cases) (1 case) (4 cases) (3 cases)  N/A N/A  
2010 approved 18,158.3 3,057.8 17.506.1 6.719.1 7,485.9 0.0 0.0 N/A 
(11 cases) (1 case) (5-6 
cases) 
(3 cases) (1-2 
cases) 
N/A N/A  
2011 approved 21,972.0 2,269.7 13.499.6 4.728.9 5,653.3 7,740.8 4,072.6 N/A 
(13 cases + 
2) 
(1 case) (5 cases) (4 cases) (1 case) (2 cases) (2 cases) N/A 
2012 approved 19,940.08 1,496.87 9,728.31 3,175.03 2,985.81 7,412.13 2,322.57 3,165.92 
(17 cases) (1 case) (6 cases) (4 cases) (1 case) (2 cases) (2 cases) (1 case) 
2013 proposed 25,127.40 970.70 7,779.00 1777.30 3,412.50 7,721.20 1,710.50 4,583.70 
(18 cases) (1 case) (6 cases) (4 cases) (1 case) (2 cases) (2 cases) (2 cases) 
(1) Includes 2,616 contingency fund notification for possible use of extra resource for Kenya situation for period June to 
December 2011. 
(2) Contingency Fund notification for possible use of extra resource for Libya situation for period May to December 2011. 
Note: the term ‘case’ is used in the present table in a generic sense and encompasses not only all cases that are in the Pre-Trial, 
Trial or Appeals stage but also cases that are being investigated by the OTP where no application for an arrest warrant/or 
summons to appear has been made.(extracted from International Criminal Court ICC-ASP/11/10 Assembly of State Parties, 
Eleventh session, The Hague, 14-22 November 2012, p.11) 
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conclude.798 
The budget of just under €122 million (166 million US dollars) approved for 2014 
represented a significant increase on the €115 million allocated for the previous year, 
particularly given the fact that in some years, the governments that contribute funds 
have refused to sanction any growth.799 But the funding approved still falls short of 
the €126 million the court asked for when it submitted its 2014 budget proposal the 
previous year.800 Over that period, the court’s budget crept up from €101 million in 
2009 to €115 million in 2013. Under these circumstances, the work of the ICC has 
been described as conducting ‘international justice on the cheap.’801Without a 
substantial increase in resources, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) ‘is unable to 
perform high-quality preliminary examinations, investigations and prosecutions.’802 
6.2 Selectivity of situations and cases 
 
International criminal tribunals and courts cannot prosecute all offenders. Part of 
the reason is, as discussed above, financial constraints. The ICC Prosecutor must 
exercise prosecutorial selection of ‘situations’ and ‘cases’ due to this limited 
capacity.803  With regards to cases, the Prosecutor has made clear that, given the 
‘global character of the ICC, its statutory provisions and logistical constraints,’ the 
OTP will generally focus on those who bear the greatest responsibility for 
crimes.804The ICC would encourage domestic jurisdictions to help close any potential 
‘impunity gap’ left by the ICC’s focus on a minority of suspects.805 
 
                                                          
798W.Burke-White, ‘Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National 
Courts in the Rome System of International Justice’ (2008) 49Harvard International Law Journal 
53,54  
799See ‘ICC Secures Budget Increase’ Institute for Peace and War Reporting http://iwpr.net/report-
news/icc-secures-budget-increase (20 January 2014) 
800 ibid 
801See L.Ocheing and S Jennings, ‘ICC secures budget increase’ Institute for  War and Peace 
Reporting, 20 January 2014, quoting Professor Phil Clark   of the London School of African and 
Oriental Studies (SOAS)https://iwpr.net/global-voices/icc-secures-budget-increase (last accessed 10 
November 2014) 
802 Ibid  
803 I. Stegmiller, ‘The Gravity Threshold under the ICC Statute: Gravity Back and Forth in Lubanga 
and Ntaganda’ (2009) 9 International Criminal Law Review  547 
804See ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, 
7, September 2003,http://www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_PolicyPaper.pdf; also, 
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60aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf 
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The thesis focuses here on ‘gravity’; other factors influencing prosecutorial selection 
will be discussed in Chapter 7. The ‘gravity threshold’ has played a critical role in 
guiding the Prosecutor’s selection of both situations and cases.806 The OTP applies 
the concept of gravity twice, first with regard to situations as noted above, and 
secondly, once inside the situation.807 In general, the prosecutorial determination at 
the ICC hinges primarily on whether a given situation within which ‘the most serious 
crimes of international concern’ have been allegedly committed is of ‘sufficient 
gravity to justify further action by the Court’, and whether or not its investigation 
would serve the ‘interests of justice.’808 The concept of gravity or seriousness resides 
at the epicentre of the legal regime of the ICC.809 However, gravity is not defined. All 
crimes brought before the ICC are, of course, of a ‘grave’ nature. The Statute implies 
that genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression are ‘the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community.’810 The court, however, 
still has to determine the threshold. Theoretically, it is meant to be the yardstick to 
assess the role played by ‘State entities, organisations or armed groups in the overall 
commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court in the relevant situation 
(those suspected of being most responsible.)’811 
 
 The OTP has outlined that its assessment of gravity would consider: the scale of the 
crimes, the severity of the crimes, and the systematic nature of the crimes, the 
manner in which they were committed, and the impact on victims.812 The Chamber 
                                                          
806 S. SáCouto and K Cleary, ‘The Gravity Threshold of the International Criminal Court’ (2008) 23(5) 
American Journal of International Law 807-854. 
807 See Prosecutor v Dyilo Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Concerning Pre- ‘Trial Chamber I's 
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(June 2003-June 2006)’ The Hague, 12 September  2006  http://www.icc-
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725747378AB2/143680/OTP_3yearreport20060914_English.pdf  (12 September, 2006), 8 
808 See Rome Statute Article 53(1) (a)‐(c)  
809 M. deGuzman ‘Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court’ (2009) 32 Fordham 
International Law Journal 1400  
810Rome Statute: Preamble 
811Prosecutor v Lubanga, Decision on the Prosecutor’s application for warrant of arrest under Article 
58 (10 February 2006) (ICC-01/04-01/06-8-US-Corr); See also Prosecutor v Ntaganda, Annex II 
ICC-01/04-520 (21 July 2008) (ICC-01-04-02-06-20-Anx2) para 52. 
812See ‘ICC Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2013,’ November 2013 http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Documents/OTP%20Preliminary
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also approved the Prosecutor’s Policy Paper statement of 2003 that as a general rule 
the OTP should focus its investigative and prosecutorial resources on those who bear 
the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organization allegedly 
responsible for those crimes.813 The Appeals Chamber in Lubanga, however, rejected 
this approach, noting that the imposition of rigid standards on top seniority and 
excluding non-leaders would hamper the Court’s deterrent potential.814 Nonetheless, 
it is impossible for the ICC to prosecute all offenders. Because of situational 
constraints, the ICC will, in the end, prosecute only small numbers of defendants.  
 
6.3 Political factors 
  
In general, there are three mechanisms that can trigger the ICC jurisdiction in 
‘situations’ (1) referral to the Prosecutor by a State Party to the treaty (self-
referrals)815 (2) referral to the Prosecutor by the UN Security Council816, or (3) 
investigation initiated by the Prosecutor proprio motu.817Of the nine situations that 
came before the court, the Security Council had referred the situations in Darfur, 
Sudan and Libya – both non-States Parties. The prosecutor has exercised his proprio 
motu powers on the cases in Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast). Charges against 
Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta were eventually dropped. Four situations - 
Uganda, DRC, Central African Republic (CAR) (two referrals) and Mali - were self-
referrals. Much of the debate has centred on the ICC’s selection of defendants, with 
criticism that the OTP is improperly impelled by political motivations.818 Former 
prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo argued, however, that his ‘duty is to apply the law 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
%20Examinations/OTP%20%20Report%20%20Preliminary%20Examination%20Activities%202013.
PDF 
813 Prosecutor v Lubanga Decision on the Prosecutor’s application for warrant of arrest under Article 
58 [10 February 2006] para 61; See ‘Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor’ 
ICC-OTP (September 2003), 7 http://www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_PolicyPaper.pdf;  
814Prosecutor v. Ntaganda and Lubanga Dyilo, Case No ICC-01/04-169, Judgment on the 
Prosecutor’s Appeal, para 75 (see also paras 73—75) [13 July, 2006], http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc183559.pdf.  
http://wwwold.icc‐cpi.int/library/organs/otp/draft_policy_paper.pdf; at p. 6; See also W Schabas An 
Introduction to the International Criminal Court (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2007) 32-
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815 See Rome Statute, Arts. 13(a) and 14  
816ibid Art.13(b) 
817ibid Art. 15 
818 M. deGuzman,  ‘Choosing to prosecute: Expressive selection at the International Criminal Court’ 
(2012) Michigan Journal of International Law 265  
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without political considerations. Other actors have to adjust to the law.’819 However, 
an analysis of prosecutorial selection seems to show political and pragmatic 
considerations at play. The purpose of the following examination is to show the ICC’s 
political ‘constraints’ in self-referrals.  
 
6.3.1 Self-referrals 
 
The ICC allows states to refer situations in their countries for investigations. Self-
referrals have not been expressly provided for in the Rome Statute. Some authors 
hold that ‘self-referrals’ are a ‘creative interpretation’ of Article 14.820 However, self-
referrals have not always been entirely ‘voluntary.’ It appears that the Prosecutor 
pursues a policy of encouraging states to self-refer situations.821 Soliciting self-
referrals has practical advantages. In an annex to the paper on the management of 
referrals and communications by the OTP, it was stated: 
 
‘Where the Prosecutor receives a referral from the State in which a crime has been 
committed, the Prosecutor has the advantage of knowing that the State has the political will 
to provide his Office with all the cooperation within the country that it is required to give 
under the Statute. Because the State, of its own volition, has requested the exercise of the 
Court’s jurisdiction, the Prosecutor can be confident that the national authorities will assist 
the investigation, will accord the privileges and immunities necessary for the investigation, 
and will be anxious to provide if possible and appropriate the necessary level of protection to 
investigators and witnesses.’822 
 
 
The self-referral scheme can work effectively only if its intervention is triggered, or at 
least strongly supported, by the state on whose territory the crimes were perpetrated. 
Because of the need for co-operation of state actors, the self-referral mechanism thus 
far has tended to be exonerative of self-referring states. A common factor of all self-
referrals is that governments claim they are unable to conduct fair and effective 
                                                          
819See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, ‘Prosecutor for the International  Criminal Court, Keynote Address at the 
Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, D.C.’ (4 February 4, 2010), 6  
820See eg M. Arsanjani and W. Reisman, ‘Law-in-Action of the International Criminal Court’, 99 
American Journal of International Law (2005), 385, pp.389-39, noting ‘(…) before and during the 
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investigate and prosecute crimes that occurred in their territory’. 
821 See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, ‘Report of the Prosecutor of the 
ICC’ (Report, Second Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 2003) 4 <http://www.un.org/law/icc/asp/2ndsession/ocampo_statement_ 
8sep(e).pdf>(accessed 13 April 2013).  
822 See ICC-OTP, Annex to the ‘Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor’: 
Referrals and Communications (Policy Paper, September 2003) 5 <http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
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criminal proceedings against non-state actors over whom they do not have control 
and that they therefore seek the assistance of the ICC. Uganda’s president Yoweri 
Museveni set the trend in motion by referring the situation concerning the Lord’s 
Resistance Army to the ICC.823  After the referral, arrest warrants were issued for 
Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Vincent Otti, his deputy, 
and two other key commanders, Dominic Ongwen and Okot Odhiambo.824 The DRC 
soon followed suit.825 In March 2005, Lubanga was arrested by the Congolese 
authorities and charged with conscription, enlistment and use of child soldiers. 
Others arrested in the DRC case afterwards include Germain Katanga, commander of 
the Force de Résistance Patriotique en Ituri (FRPI), and Mathieu Ngudjolo, former 
leader of the Front des Nationalisteset des Intégrationnistes (FNI). In April 2008, 
an arrest warrant was unsealed for Ntaganda, a former associate of Lubanga. Despite 
the warrant, Ntaganda joined the DRC armed forces and was promoted to general.  
 
The CAR also took its case to the ICC.826 On 30 May 2014, the ICC Prosecutor 
received yet another self-referral from the CAR authorities regarding crimes allegedly 
committed on CAR territory since 1 August 2012. On 24 September 2014, following 
an independent and comprehensive preliminary examination, the OTP announced 
the opening of open a second investigation in the CAR with respect to crimes 
allegedly committed since 2012.827 On 13 July 2012, Mali’s Minister of Justice 
referred the situation in the Republic of Mali asserting that grave and massive 
violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law had been 
committed, especially in the northern parts of its territory. After conducting a 
preliminary examination of the situation, including an assessment of admissibility of 
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potential cases, the OTP determined that there was a reasonable basis to proceed 
with an investigation.828 
 
A discernible trend of self-referrals is that they have targeted rebels or non-state 
actors. Having referred only the ‘situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army’, 
the Ugandan government has always been convinced that the ICC would prosecute 
exclusively the LRA.829  The Prosecutor’s decision to hold a press conference jointly 
with President Museveni to announce the referral immediately gave rise to 
suspicions830 which were subsequently exacerbated by his failure to charge any 
members of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF).831 It has been asserted that 
the crimes alleged against the LRA are more serious than those attributed to the 
UPDF.832 Olara Otunnu, the former UN Undersecretary-General and Special 
Representative for Children and Armed Conflict argued, however, that government 
operations against the Acholi833as a group had led to tens, or even hundreds, of 
thousands of deaths and to the slow destruction of an entire ethnic group, amounted 
to genocide.834 In dominant international discourse of the conflict, government 
violence has tended to be downplayed, if not entirely ignored.835  This ‘official 
discourse’ limits its focus to the LRA’s brutality, in particular its violence against 
children.836 Some scholars conclude the Ugandan government decided to refer the 
LRA to the ICC as part of a military strategy and international reputation campaign, 
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rather than out of a conviction about law and justice.837 The Prosecutor stated that 
the OTP had not closed its investigations in Uganda: it had simply made an 
affirmative decision to seek arrest warrants against certain LRA leaders, which did 
not exclude subsequent decisions to charge members of other parties to the 
conflict.838 However, so far the prosecutor has neither investigated nor brought 
charges against members of the UPDF. 
 
Similar concerns were raised in the DRC. The OTP has been criticised for failing to 
pursue government actors complicit in serious crimes – preferring to go after 
relatively ‘small fish’ such as Lubanga, Katanga, Ngudjolo and Ntaganda.839 There is 
less clear evidence to connect Kabila to atrocities committed in Ituri. It has, however, 
been stated that ‘there were kadogo [child soldiers] in Kabila’s forces as well.’840 The 
fact that former militia leaders testified in the Katanga and Ngudjolo trial and have 
highlighted the role of the government of the DRC in the attack on Bogoro, which is 
the centrepiece of that case, was a cause for frustration. Many saw this testimony as a 
vivid reminder of the evidence that is available of government participation in crimes 
in Ituri.841  In CAR, coup leader General Francois Bozizé’s first action was to refer 
alleged atrocities by the former president Ange-Félix Patassé and Jean-Pierre 
Bemba.842 The ICC did not bring any charges or conduct investigation against Bozizé, 
for his actions during the coup or the serious human rights and humanitarian failings 
of his government.843 In the course of the intense fighting between Patassé and 
Bozizé, both sides allegedly committed atrocities such as rape, killing, and looting, 
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against the civilian population.844  Similarly, the Mali self-referral was made by the 
interim government, and like the three other ‘self-referrals’, implicitly asked the 
Court to prosecute rebel groups rather than itself. Some have argued that because of 
this trend (state actors’ exoneration) ‘the ICC can indeed prove an effective tool 
against political opponents.’845 
 
The prosecutor has argued he is guided by the ‘gravity’ of offences in determining 
prosecutions. However, ‘assessing the gravity of one party’s or individual’s crimes 
relative to their opponents is ethically and politically problematic. This approach 
ultimately results in the ICC’s de facto support of one side of the conflict over 
another and perpetuates impunity gaps at the international and domestic level.’846 
Clark, extrapolating from the trend of self-referrals, highlights the dilemma between 
politics and law.847 One the one hand, the Prosecutor needs the co-operation of 
national authorities, privileges and immunities protection to investigators and 
witnesses.848 On the other, the fact that the prosecutor encourages a state referral 
and then pursues rebels makes it less difficult to conclude that the ICC is being 
manipulated.849 The ICC is constrained from pursuing state actors because of 
pragmatic objectives. The court had been dormant since the Rome Statute came into 
force in 2002.  As ‘a new global institution, it needed ‘to get legal runs on the board 
in order to build support among its states parties and to be perceived as an 
established global actor in the fight against impunity.’850 Self-referrals were, 
therefore, a way of ‘getting things going.’851However,  the effect of  the ‘political 
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instrumentalisation’852 of the ICC has been the preclusion of self-referring state 
actors from investigations resulting in the ICC only prosecuting a small number of 
rebels. Nouwen and Werner conclude that the ICC is inherently political by making a 
distinction between the friends and enemies of the international community which it 
purports to represent.853 This, they note, does not amount to criticism of the ICC ‘but 
is meant to underline that a sound normative evaluation of the Court’s activities can 
be made only when its political dimensions are acknowledged and understood.’854As 
‘with deterrence and retribution, the expressive value of law and punishment is 
weakened by selectivity and indeterminacy in the operationalisation of law and 
punishment, as well as the political contingency of the entire enterprise.’855The 
indictments of President Gbagbo (Ivory Coast), President Uhuru Kenyatta (Kenya- 
charges dropped) and President Al-Bashir (Sudan) and Saif Gaddafi and others 
(Libya), however, suggest an encouraging paradigm shift through the pursuit of state 
actors. It can be argued that the prosecution of such state actors could have more 
expressive mileage.  A cosmopolitan ethos would require the court to prosecute 
violations of international law committed by all sides to the conflict.  Prosecutions 
targeting one side risk encouraging impunity and denting the legitimacy of the court. 
The ‘community of the accused is particularly susceptible to perceptions of victor’s 
justice because of its natural scepticism of the accuser, who is usually somehow 
linked to the conflict’s winner. In the face of that scepticism, any international law 
violations by the accuser undermines the standing of the prosecutor.’856 The biased 
selectivity of self-referrals corrodes the ICC’s own objectives of retribution and 
deterrence because culpable individuals (state actors) will evade accountability. 
6.4 Lack of enforcement mechanism 
 
However, the dilemma is that the ICC depends on these state actors. A major political 
constraint arises from the court’s lack of an enforcement mechanism. The court relies 
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on states for enforcement on its warrants. Notably, some states are not parties to 
ICC. For example, countries like Sudan and Libya are not parties to the Rome 
Statute, apart from the fact that state actors may be offenders themselves. States 
parties to the ICC can simply decline to co-operate with the court. For instance, 
despite a warrant of arrest against him, Al-Bashir has managed to travel to states that 
are parties to the Rome Statute without arrest. On 10 July, 2010 Al-Bashir arrived in 
Chad to a warm embrace from Chadian leader Idris Deby.857On August 27, 2010, the 
ICC reported Al-Bashir’s visit to Kenya and directed that country to take any actions 
deemed necessary to apprehend him.858 However, the Kenya authorities failed to 
arrest Al-Bashir, effectively failing to meet Kenya’s international obligations as a 
party to the Rome Statute. While the Sudan is not a state party, and therefore not 
obligated to take action in regard to the investigation, Kenya is legally bound to act as 
a signatory to the statute.859 Chad and Kenya’s inaction can also be explained from 
the standpoint of the African Union (AU) which has refused to co-operate with the 
ICC on the case of Al-Bashir. 
 
One of the reasons for the lack of cooperation results from the perception of the ICC. 
All of the cases that the ICC has and is prosecuting emanate from crimes allegedly 
committed in countries in Africa. This ‘has raised questions as to whether this is an 
example of the selectivity of international criminal law.’860 African political leaders 
have accused the ICC of exclusive focus on and bias against them. There are, 
however, ‘good reasons to pursue the cases that are under investigation or 
prosecution before the ICC. Africa has experienced a large number of atrocities and, 
statistically speaking, the rate of atrocity crimes committed on the continent would 
make it a natural focus for the court.’861 Most child soldiers have been used in 
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hostilities in these conflicts. The victims of those crimes want justice.862 Despite the 
resistance, as noted above, the CAR made a second self-referral to the ICC in 2014.863 
Further, more than two-thirds of the members of the AU are states parties to the 
Rome Statute. Senegal was the first country to sign the Rome Statute. The ideals of 
the court seemed to resonate with a significant number of African countries. 
Nonetheless, on 21 July, 2008, the AU Peace and Security Council requested that the 
UN Security Council defer the prosecution against Al-Bashir for twelve months 
pursuant to Article 16 of the Rome Statute.864 The communiqué stated that the ICC 
arrest warrant may reflect ‘double standards’ and may amount to a ‘misuse of 
indictments against African leaders.’865 The Security Council did not respond to the 
request. Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo proceeded with the case. On 3 July 2009, the 
AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government (Summit) adopted a decision on the 
ICC’s indictment of Al-Bashir, stating its refusal to cooperate with the court in his 
arrest.866 In 2010, the AU reaffirmed the decision, also rejecting ‘for now’ the 
opening of an ICC liaison office in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa; and criticising 
the conduct of the ICC prosecutor on the basis that he ‘has been making egregiously 
unacceptable, rude and condescending statements’ in the case against Al-Bashir and 
‘other situations in Africa.’867 The decisions have placed African states parties to the 
Rome Statute in the invidious position of having to choose between their obligations 
as member states of the AU on the one hand, and their obligations as states party to 
the Rome Statute, on the other.868 Under the Rome Statute, member states are 
required to cooperate with the ICC in its investigations and prosecutions.869 Al-
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Bashir is charged with crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.870 As 
noted here, the complaints about bias have tended to be pronounced by ‘African 
political elites, not the victims, who appear to be almost universally relieved that 
somebody – anybody – is paying attention to their plight.’871 
 
In DRC, Ntaganda - Lubanga’s deputy and co-accused - had an ICC arrest warrant, 
also for the recruitment of child soldiers, among other crimes.872 President Kabila, 
nonetheless, drafted him into the Congolese army. Furthermore, Kabila promoted 
him within the army.873 Kabila’s government reportedly signed a peace agreement 
with Ntaganda, culminating in the reward with an army job; hence the warrant was 
deemed to have the potential to derail the peace process.874 However, in April 2012 
he defected from the Congolese army to resume insurgency. Ntaganda led a mutiny 
and became one of the main leaders of a new Rwanda-backed rebel group, the 
M23.875 M23 fighters have been responsible for widespread war crimes, including 
summary executions, rapes, and forced recruitment of children.876 In March 2013, 
following infighting between two M23 factions, Ntaganda turned himself in to the 
United States embassy in Rwanda and was flown to The Hague where he awaits trial 
before the ICC.877 The effect of these political constraints is that the ICC will 
ultimately prosecute only a few individuals often handed over by states. It cannot be 
an honest argument that the ‘international society’ is a perfect society. The 
implementation of cosmopolitan justice will be challenging.  
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6.5 Conclusion 
 
The creation of international justice institutions, culminating in the establishment of 
the ICC, has triggered ceremony about cosmopolitan justice. Despite this glee, these 
institutions have several weaknesses. I have divided these into ‘idealist/goal-related’ 
and ‘practical/institutional’. This chapter discussed the latter, focusing on the ICC. 
Studies on organisation behaviour note the dearth in analysis of contexts and their 
effects on the operations of institutions. The ICC operates in a unique context. 
‘Context effects’, as the set of factors exerting some direct or indirect influence on it, 
have brought some constraints on the ICC. The major constraints facing the 
international criminal justice system is its dependence on national systems in its 
operation and implementation. The purpose of this chapter was to highlight the 
limitations of the ICC. A reflection on the context effects and situational constraints 
can assist the formulation of plausible theories for international criminal justice. The 
ICC operations are funded by states. However, over the years, the funding has proved 
inadequate for the duties imposed on it. Unlike domestic systems, international 
courts and tribunals do not have detective divisions, police forces or armies at their 
disposal to investigate crimes and capture perpetrators and indictees.  Given the lack 
of coercive authority of international courts and tribunals international criminal 
institutions are dependent on the states where crimes took place, as well as third 
party states, to ensure effective utilisation of jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce. 
The overall effect is that international courts are, as a result, largely symbolic. They 
can prosecute only a handful of cases.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
LUBANGA: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis has thus far attempted to elucidate normative developments in child law 
relating to soldiering and international criminal justice. The overall objective of the 
previous chapters was to highlight socio-historical and normative developments on 
child soldiering in international law and international criminal justice and establish a 
philosophical framework for analysis. International law has emerged as a thriving 
arena of philosophical inquiry.878 The study has concluded that, through 
constructivist processes, substantive norms have emerged and been adopted in 
international law since the glorified participation of children in early wars.  The 
thesis chose to interpret this ‘logic of appropriateness’ through philosophical prism 
of ‘cosmopolitanism’ that perceives the protection of the rights of children as a 
universal duty, as the explanatory framework for these developments.  As noted in 
the previous chapter regarding reliance on states, the cosmopolitan agenda 
encounters hurdles. The ‘sense of cosmopolitan identity has grown gradually through 
individuals advocating for a cosmopolitan approach within whatever cracks and 
fissures have appeared in the Statist system of international law.’879 
Cosmopolitanism postulates justice for all, individual rights, setting minimum 
standards for all citizens apart from imposing duties towards one another. According 
to Hirsh, tribunals have been established since Nuremberg to conduct ‘cosmopolitan 
trials,’880 for universally condemned crimes.  As noted, however, until the 
establishment of the SCSL in 2002, child soldiering had not appeared in the criminal 
law statutes of the tribunals. Children were, however, involved in almost all the 
conflicts that gave rise to the international tribunals. UNICEF observed that the 
‘crimes committed against children have not received due attention in current and 
previous international justice and truth-seeking mechanisms, most often being 
mentioned only as part of atrocities committed against the civilian population in 
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general.’881 I have concluded that the criminological and penal culture of the 
‘cosmopolitan trials’ has, for a long time, been fixated on human massacres. 
Prosecutors would select defendants suspected to have been responsible for mass 
deaths.Child soldiering was criminalised by the SCSL, drawing its provisions from 
the Rome Statute of 1998. Because of its status, the ICC has generated high 
expectations.The objective of the study is to establish which and how a plausible 
penological justification for the prosecution of Lubanga can fit into the global 
philosophical framework that has emerged. According to the Preamble of the ICC 
Statute and Articles 1 and 5, its objectives are the prosecution and punishment of the 
most serious crimes of international concern.882 The Statute describes crimes 
prosecuted by the ICC as ‘unimaginable atrocities’, and ‘grave crimes’ that ‘deeply 
shock the conscience of humanity.’883 The ICC was established ‘to these ends and for 
the sake of present and future generations.’884 These provisions have been 
interpreted as meaning that retribution and deterrence are primary goals of the 
ICC.885 However, these are not the only aims that international criminal justice has 
imposed on itself. The previous chapter discussed the ‘practical/institutional’ 
weaknesses of international criminal justice. The conclusion is that because of these 
constraints or context effects, the ICC can prosecute only a miniscule of defendants. 
This chapter focuses on the ‘idealist/goal-related’ weaknesses. Formulation of 
plausible theory for international criminal justice requires consideration of these 
deficiencies. The objective of the chapter is, firstly, to assess how retribution and 
deterrence rationales have played out in Lubanga and whether they are the best aims 
for the mass crimes that the court adjudicates. The chapter also assesses some of the 
penological goals that international criminal justice seeks to achieve. The chapter is 
organised as follows. The first part provides a brief background to the conflict in the 
DRC and the case of Lubanga.  The second part conceptualises child soldiering in the 
DRC as a mass crime and contextualises the case of Lubanga as such. Unlike 
genocide, the conscription, enlistment and use of children in armed conflict has 
barely been characterised in its mass form. We cannot establish plausible rationales 
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for penology without its appropriate characterisation. This section analyses the 
debate on individual guilt for collective crimes. It discusses the legal issues around 
Lubanga’s charge as a co-perpetrator. A criticism of international criminal justice is 
that its modalities of individuating guilt and penological goals (retribution and 
deterrence) are unsuitable for mass criminality. The third part discusses retribution 
and deterrence in the context of Lubanga. To have a more informative conception of 
the project of international criminal justice, the last part concludes with some 
theoretical reflections on the other penal rationales often invoked in penology. A 
further criticism of international criminal justice is that it invokes extra-judicial goals 
removed from its core functions and hardly achievable. 
7.1 Lubanga background 
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), formerly Zaire, has been blighted by 
political conflict and instability for decades. The war is extraordinarily complex with 
huge numbers of rebel groups fighting each other, with many swapping sides. 
Lubanga was a founding member and President of the Union des Patriotes Congolais 
(UPC) created in September 2000 and Commander-in Chief of the UPC’s military 
wing, the Force Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC) in the DRC. Between 
September 2002 and 13 August 2003, the UPC/FPLC was involved in an armed 
conflict for control over the Ituri region of the DRC which resulted in the deaths of 
many civilians. The DRC became a State party to the Rome Statute establishing the 
ICC on 11 April 2002 and, pursuant to Article 14, President Kabila referred the 
‘situation’ in the DRC to the Prosecutor in March 2004.886The ‘self-referral’ was not 
spontaneous; the ICC requested it, even though he had declared that - absent a 
referral by the DRC - he was ready to use his proprio motu powers and start an 
investigation after being authorized by the Pre-Trial Chamber.887On 23 June 2004, 
the Prosecutor opened an investigation into the situation. On 19 March 2005, 
Lubanga was arrested and detained by the DRC authorities for other charges relating 
to an attack on UN peacekeepers. On 10 February 2006, the ICC issued an arrest 
warrant against Lubanga charging him with the war crime of recruiting and enlisting 
children under the age of 15 and using them in hostilities. On 17 March 2006, 
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Lubanga was surrendered to the Court by the DRC. The prosecution submitted that 
the accused, jointly with his co-perpetrators, committed the crimes of conscription, 
enlistment and use of children under the age of 15, from 1 September 2002 to 13 
August 2003.888 The court also issued a warrant against Lubanga’s co-accused, 
Ntaganda. 
 
Article 61 of the Rome Statute provides that the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) must 
confirm the charges brought by the Prosecutor against an arrested person before 
going to trial. The PTC confirmed the charges against Lubanga on 29 January 2007, 
considering that there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to 
believe that he is responsible, as a co-perpetrator under Article 25(3) (a) of the Rome 
Statute, for the charges of: 
 Enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen years into the 
FPLC and using them to participate actively in hostilities within the meaning 
of article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Statute from September 2002 to June 2003 in 
the context of an international armed conflict and;  
 Enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen years into the 
FPLC and using them to participate actively in hostilities within the meaning 
of article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Statute from 2 June to 13 August 2003 in the 
context of a non-international armed conflict.889 
The Pre-Trial Chamber held that there were substantial grounds to believe that the 
relevant conflict was of an international character in the period in which Uganda was 
an occupying power in the Ituri region and a non-international armed conflict 
thereafter. However, the Trial Chamber changed the classification of the conflict and 
held that the relevant conflict was non-international throughout.890 
After three years of proceedings, Lubanga was found guilty on 14 March 2012. As the 
leader of the UPC and the commander-in-chief of its military wing, the FPLC, 
Lubanga was  found guilty of ‘enlisting’, ‘conscripting’ children under the age of 
fifteen and ‘using’ them to participate actively in hostilities, from September 2002 to 
13 August 2003 as set out in Article 8(2) (e) (vii). Lubanga was sentenced to 14 years 
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in prison on 10 July 2012.891 He appealed against the decision. On 1 December 2014, 
the Appeals Court upheld Lubanga’s conviction and sentence. 
7.2 Lubanga and mass crime 
 
Mass crime has often been discussed in terms of widespread killings.892 The mass 
nature of child soldiering has often been under-expressed because it does not always 
result in mass fatalities, depriving it of the gravity associated with other international 
crimes. However, the group dynamics of mass crimes are not dissimilar. ICL ‘crimes 
involve extraordinary collective dimensions and extensive communal 
engagement.’893Trainin observes that ‘as distinct from common crimes, international 
crimes are almost always committed not by one person but by several or many 
persons-a group, a band, a clique.’894 However, the organic nature of child soldiering 
has barely been explained. This is important because child soldiering ought to be 
‘theorised’ within the same category of egregious crimes.  It has been estimated that 
one in ten child soldiers - or 30,000 children - are found in the DRC.895 The UN 
believes that 15-30 percent of all newly-recruited combatants in the DRC army are 
under 18 years old.896 As noted earlier about the sinister motives behind the 
deployment of children - the reason the army and the rebels use child soldiers is 
partly that the enemy cannot find it in themselves to kill children.897 Therefore, the 
number of recruits remains high as fewer of them are lost in battle. During the course 
of Lubanga’s UPC/FPLC organised recruitment drives, commanders oversaw 
awareness-raising campaigns to persuade villagers to send their children for 
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training.898 They provided information to parents about sending their children, and 
others, to be trained as soldiers.899 There were consultations between the elders of 
the UPC from various villages, and their role was to support the UPC and to mobilise 
young people and enlist them in the army. Children were made available following 
these meetings, and the new recruits were driven to the training camps. The elders or 
‘wise men’, along with others referred to as the ‘cadres’ or senior officials of the party, 
raised awareness in the villages and explained the purpose of the UPC, so as to 
ensure the civilian population’s support. Elder Gegere ‘wise men’ persuaded the 
population to make young people available to the UPC, for enlistment in the armed 
forces in order to contribute to the protection of their ethnic group against the rival 
Lendu.900 Parents were threatened that if they did not assist, when war came to their 
town ‘we would not come to rescue them’.901 There were ‘several types of kadogos’902, 
but those used in the army, including those who were young, were able to bear 
weapons.903 Children of 13 and 14 years old were used in battle, acting as 
bodyguards, escorts and as front-line soldiers.904A former member of UPC claimed, 
however, that child combatants as young as ten years old bore arms.905 Child 
soldiers, both girls and boys, were ‘more used’ as body guards (acting as escorts for 
several of the commanders), because children were ‘fearless’ – in contrast with 
adults– and they did not ask a great deal of their commanders.906 There was no 
particular criteria applied when assigning children, save that some commanders 
preferred to have young children as they were ‘more desirable.’907 The younger 
children followed their orders more diligently than older children.908 
 
Child soldiering, as illustrated above, is a mass crime which involves mass communal 
engagement. The distinction of its mass nature from mass deaths has often diluted 
its gravity. The prosecution submitted that Lubanga jointly with his co-perpetrators 
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committed the crimes of conscription, enlistment and use of children under the age 
of 15, from 1 September 2002 to 13 August 2003.909 The diffuse nature of the crime 
was recognised by the court. The Chamber in Lubanga concluded in the Judgment 
that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that during the period of the 
charges, recruitment by the UPC/FPLC of young people, including children under 15, 
was widespread, that a significant number of children were used as military guards 
and as escorts or bodyguards for the main staff commanders, and that children 
under 15 years of age were used by the UPC/FPLC in hostilities.910 
7.2.1 Collective crime, individual responsibility 
 
Drumbl notes that the law academy has distinguished normative differences between 
extraordinary crimes against the world community and ordinary crimes against the 
local community.911 Despite the extraordinary nature of mass criminality, ‘its 
modality of punishment, theory of sentencing, and process of determining guilt or 
innocence each remains disappointingly ordinary.’912 Lubanga was found guilty of co-
perpetrating the crimes of enlisting and conscripting child soldiers and using them to 
participate actively in hostilities under Article 8(2) (e) (vii) of the Rome Statute. 913 
The Chamber found that Lubanga and others came together with the intent of 
‘build[ing] an army for the purpose of establishing and maintaining political and 
military control over Ituri’, which ‘resulted, in the ordinary course of events, in the 
conscription and enlistment of boys and girls under the age of 15, and their use to 
participate actively in hostilities.’914 
 
The Prosecutor had charged Lubanga with criminal responsibility under Article 25(3) 
(a).915Under the Rome Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: 
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through 
another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible; 
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(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or 
is attempted; 
 
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or 
otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including 
providing the means for its commission; 
 
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such 
a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution 
shall be intentional and shall either: 
 
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal 
purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission 
of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or 
 
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the 
crime . . . .916 
 
The mens rea for co-perpetration is determined by ‘the existence of an agreement or 
common plan between two or more persons.’917The PTC in Lubanga stated that the 
concept of co-perpetration as set out in Article 25(3) (a) was: 
 
[R]ooted in the idea that when the sum of co-ordinated individual contributions of a 
plurality of persons results in the realisation of all the objective elements of a crime, 
any person making a contribution can be held vicariously responsible for the 
contributions of all the others and, as a result, can be considered as a principal to the 
whole crime.918 
 
The PTC found that co-perpetration under Article 25(3) corresponded to ‘control 
theory of co-perpetration’ pioneered in the 1960s by Claude Roxin, a leading German 
criminal-law theorist, and not the ICTY’s Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) concept.919 
The difference is that under the JCE doctrine, any contribution to the common plan 
satisfies the actus reus requirement,920 while the control theory demands an 
‘essential contribution.’921 A crime would not have eventuated without such 
contribution.922 This determination of culpability resorts to the characterization of 
principals versus accomplices, on the nature of complicity, on aiding and abetting, 
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and on whether one is a co-perpetrator.923 It also focuses the weight to be accorded 
the actus reus versus the mens rea of the crime.924 An assessment of mens rea for co-
perpetration involves analysis of an objective element of this concept, namely the 
requirement of ‘the existence of an agreement or common plan between two or more 
persons that, if implemented, will result in the commission of a crime.’925 The Trial 
Chamber adopted the PTC’s interpretation.926 Lubanga was found to have made an 
‘essential contribution’ to implementing the common plan and to have done so with 
the requisite mens rea.927 
 
As noted in the previous section, mass crime involves organic group dimensions. 
Such crimes could not occur without the organized cooperation of many, often 
numbering in the several thousands.928 However, as noted above, only Lubanga was 
arrested and charged as a co-perpetrator. Only one of his accomplices, Ntaganda, has 
since surrendered to the court. Some authors have argued that the penal approach to 
mass crime that international courts adjudicate is flawed. The ‘collective nature of 
crimes of war escapes the bounds of the individualist paradigm of Western criminal 
law.’929 And ‘the most common objections to liberal accounts include: that they insist 
on a legalistic criminal law response and exclude other alternatives; that they are 
fixated on the individual and cannot process collective dimensions’;930  and that ‘they 
conceive of persons as socially unencumbered individuals and fail to account for 
communitarian values and duties and social meaning; and that they impose Western 
constructs.’931 English law, for instance, does not ‘capture the distinctive aspects of 
mass criminality: its collective nature and the climate of moral permissiveness that 
encourages or endorses this conduct. The reason for this paucity is partly that much 
greater emphasis given to the doctrines of joint criminal enterprise and conspiracy as 
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modes of accounting for collective action. These are inchoate and accessorial forms 
of liability though, and themselves rest on questionable foundations.’932 On the other 
hand, German law, influenced by ‘Roxin’s criterion of detachedness from the law’,933 
is ‘sensitive to the perversion of norms which makes these crimes possible.’934 To be 
sure, the ICC, which, as noted above, drew from Roxin’s ‘control theory,’ recognised 
the widespread nature of Lubanga’s crimes. The prosecution insisted that the extent 
and widespread nature of the crimes should be taken into account by the Chamber in 
setting the sentence.’935 The chamber concluded that ‘the evidence established 
beyond a reasonable doubt that during the period of the charges, recruitment by the 
UPC/FPLC of young people, including children under 15, was widespread, that a 
significant number of children were used as military guards and as escorts or 
bodyguards for the main staff commanders, and that children under 15 years of age 
were used by the UPC/FPLC in hostilities.’936 
 
However, Jain argues that the shortcomings of Roxin’s doctrine upon which the ICC 
relied ‘lie in its treatment of the character of the physical perpetrator as a soulless 
automaton. It also oversimplifies to the point of caricature, the conditions under 
which mass atrocity occurs: a vertical, tautly-structured hierarchical organization is 
simply non-existent in most cases of international crimes.…’937Drumbl points out 
that there is a need to appreciate the fundamental differences between perpetrators 
of extraordinary international crimes such as mass atrocity and perpetrators of 
ordinary domestic crimes in ordinary times.938The perpetrator of mass atrocity 
fundamentally differs from the perpetrator of ordinary crime.939Drumbl contends 
that the paradigm of individual culpability may be suitable for deviant isolated 
crimes but not for mass crimes, which involve organic group dimensions.940 
 
                                                          
932 N. Jain ‘Individual Responsibility for Mass Atrocity: In Search of a Concept of Perpetration’ (2013) 
61 The American Journal of Comparative Law 831, 864 
933 Ibid 865 
934 Ibid 865 
935 Lubanga sentencing judgment para 45 
936 Ibid para 49 
937 Ibid 865 
938 M.Dumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge University Press 2007) 11 
939 Ibid  
940Ibid 24; see also A. Sepinwall, ‘Citizen Responsibility and the Reactive Attitudes: Blaming 
Americans for War Crimes in Iraq’, in T. Isaacs and R. Vernon (eds.), Accountability for Collective 
Wrongdoing (Cambridge University Press 2011) 233, ‘the collective nature of crimes of war escapes 
the bounds of the individualist paradigm of Western criminal law’. 
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However, other authors argue that ‘we can advance a liberal criminal law theory 
without necessarily subscribing to an empirically unsound worldview in which we 
were all atomistic, self-created individuals who entered into a social contract to 
advance our personal aims.’941Contrary ‘to a common belief, a liberal theory of penal 
justice is not necessarily one that conceives the individual as an abstract subject or 
person uprooted from its social and ethical environment.’942 Without denying the 
affiliation between ‘liberalism’ and Western thought, one could question whether 
basic principles such as fair warning or personal culpability are truly only values of 
the West.943 In the negotiation of the Rome Statute, for example, delegates from all 
regions and legal traditions exhibited a shared commitment to the fundamental 
principles of legality and personal culpability.944 One could respond that the 
delegates were subject to Western pressure or reflected a Westernised elite.945 
However, a survey of domestic systems would indicate that the principles seem to 
attract global recognition and support.946 Robinson posits thus: 
 
‘A liberal theory can acknowledge that we are social and political animals, that we 
were born in society, and that our identities and our realities are richly socially 
constructed. A liberal criminal law theory does not have to ignore the importance of 
society. It simply requires that we justify our actions against the individual on behalf 
of society.’947 
7.3 ICC: penal objectives 
 
The most common and dominant penal justifications in jurisprudence have been 
retribution and deterrence. And international criminal law (ICL) has by and large 
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transposed these Western penal principles to international institutions to address 
mass crime.948 Judge Sang-Hyun Song, President of the ICC stated that the Lubanga 
judgment ‘sets a crucial precedent in the fight against impunity and reinforces the 
Rome Statute’s growing deterrent effect against perpetrators of heinous crimes 
against children.’949 The verdict also shored up retribution and deterrence as primary 
objectives.950The rhetoric about ‘sending a message’ that followed was predicated on 
these traditional penal rationales. The Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on Children and Armed Conflict, Rhadika Coomaraswamy, pronounced: ‘… 
today’s verdict will reach warlords and commanders across the world and serve as a 
strong deterrent.’951The UN Secretary-General’s Office stated: ‘Mr. Lubanga’s 
conviction for the war crimes of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 
15 is an important step forward in realising the international community’s 
commitment to ensuring that perpetrators of crimes against children in situations of 
armed conflict are brought to justice.’952Ambassador Wittig, Chair of the UN Security 
Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict stated: ‘This is a message 
well beyond Lubanga’s case: all those who perpetrate acts of grave violations against 
children’s rights won’t go unpunished.’953 Graça Machel, member of The Elders and 
former UN independent expert on the impact of armed conflict on children, 
pronounced: ‘…the decision of the ICC must be commended and supported 
unequivocally and without reservation to ensure that the global voice of humanity as 
a whole sends a clear message to both State and non‐State actors, not just in Africa 
but throughout the world where children have often been used as soldiers, that war is 
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no place for a child…’954 Anthony Lake, UNICEF Executive Director, declared: ‘The 
conviction of Thomas Lubanga by the ICC sends a clear message to all armed groups 
that enslave and brutalize children: Impunity will not be tolerated.’955 The idea of 
‘sending a message’ is common in law. However, there is less clarity on what 
appropriate message to send. 
7.3.1Lubanga and retribution 
 
Retributive justice is a system by which offenders, or those who disturb social order, 
are punished in proportion to the moral magnitude of their intentionally committed 
harms.956  Punishment can either be deserved on retributive grounds or it can be 
useful as an instrument of social protection.957 Like in most societies ravaged by 
human-sponsored calamity, residents of Ituri – the centre of Lubanga’s crimes - 
anticipated retribution for crimes perpetrated during the conflict. Prosecutions are 
perceived as transmitting a message to individuals who commit crimes, warning 
them that they are not above the law.958 The trial and punishment of Lubanga was 
viewed as a way to effectuate retribution and sending a message to him. Research 
conducted in Ituri suggests that retribution was an expectation. Retributivists also 
suggest, and as stated in Lubanga by the Trial Chamber, sentence should always be 
proportionate to the crime.959The principle of proportionality - that penalties be 
proportionate in their severity to the gravity of the defendant’s criminal conduct- 
seems to be a basic requirement of fairness.960 The sentencing judgment in Lubanga 
noted that the ‘gravity of the crime’, as set out in Article 78(1) of the Statute and in 
Rule 145 of the Rules, is one of the principal factors to be considered in the 
determination of the sentence, which should be in proportion to the crime (Article 
81(2) (a) of the Statute), and it should reflect the culpability of the convicted 
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person.961The Chamber, in passing sentence, reflected its determination that the 
involvement of children was widespread.962 The court noted that crimes of 
conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen and using them to 
participate actively in hostilities are undoubtedly very serious crimes that affect the 
international community as a whole.963 Additionally, the crime of conscription is 
distinguished by the added element of compulsion.964 The court asserted that the 
vulnerability of children meant that they need to be afforded particular protection 
that does not apply to the general population, as recognised in various international 
treaties.965 
 
Pursuant to Article 77(1) of the Statute and Rule 145(3) of the Rules, the Chamber 
may impose a sentence of imprisonment that does not exceed 30 years, unless ‘the 
extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted 
person’ warrant a term of life imprisonment.966 The Court considered the crimes of 
‘conscripting’, ‘enlistment’ and ‘using’ child soldiers separately, the latter regarded 
most grave. Lubanga was sentenced to 14 years in prison. The Chamber articulated 
the sentencing as follows: 1) for having committed, jointly with other persons, the 
crime of conscripting children under the age of 15 into the UPC to 13 years’ 
imprisonment; 2) for having committed, jointly with other persons, the crime of 
enlisting children under the age of 15 into the UPC to 12 years’ imprisonment; and 3) 
for having committed, jointly with other persons, the crime of using children under 
the age of 15 to participate actively in hostilities to 14 years’ imprisonment.967 
Pursuant to Article 78(3) of the Statute, the total period of imprisonment on the basis 
of the joint sentence is 14 years’ imprisonment.968 Having been in prison for six years 
before the trial, Lubanga will serve eight years from the date of sentence. The ICC 
appeared to replicate the dominant rationales for punishment. Passing sentence, the 
Court declared: 
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‘In considering the purposes of punishment at the ICC, the Chamber has taken into 
account the Preamble of the Statute, which provides that ‘the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished.’ The 
Preamble further provides that the States Parties are ‘[d]etermined to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention 
of such crimes.’ The ICC was established ‘to these ends and for the sake of present 
and future generations.’969 
 
These objectives have been interpreted as meaning retribution and deterrence are 
the court’s principal objectives. The goal of ending impunity through punishment 
denotes a retributive motive. The regard for future generations is rooted in the desire 
to deter such crimes in the future. While the conscription, enlistment and use of child 
combatants constitute(s) a grave crime, it is also notoriously problematic to match 
gravity and punishment.970 Some found Lubanga’s sentence lenient, not least the 
prosecutor.971 The prosecutor had sought a 30-year prison term. The Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) lodged an appeal to have the 14-year sentence revised upwards. 
However, the conviction and sentence were upheld in December 2014.  The 
assumption of proportionality of punishments is untenable in most pluralistic 
societies because there is often widespread public disagreement on the severity of 
particular offences.972 Under these conditions, ‘a retributive sentencing system that 
espouses proportional sanctions would be based on the erroneous assumption that 
there is public consensus in the rankings of the moral gravity of particular types of 
crime.’973 In Ituri, Lubanga’s sentence drew diverse responses.974A Congolese activist 
fighting for the rights of children pointed out that the sentence gave him hope.975 
Some felt the sentence was too harsh. 976 Others, including victims, argued the 
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punishment was too lenient.977 Also, the ‘massive nature of atrocity cannot be 
reflected in retributive punishment owing to human rights standards, which cabin 
the range of sanction.’978 These ‘standards limit the amount of pain institutions can 
inflict upon convicts.’979 To some, external imprisonment in Western countries 
provided comforts and a place of refuge inimical to deterrent punishment. The 
relatively comfortable conditions of jail in The Hague were deemed to undermine the 
deterrent effect of the Court, one remarking: ‘everyone can see Lubanga on TV, and 
we can see that he is getting fat.’980 Compared with the conditions of detention in the 
DRC, the perception of Lubanga’s luxurious confinement in The Hague eviscerated 
the severity of the punishment981 particularly in the eyes of the afflicted community. 
7.3.2 Lubanga and deterrence 
 
Deterrence is based on the general utilitarian moral philosophy framework according 
to which the moral value of an act is based on its socially useful consequences.982  
Utilitarian accounts of punishment typically try to show that judicial and punitive 
practices are justified by considering the net benefits of the practice.983 Against the 
backdrop of the generalised impunity in the DRC, the fact that trials eventuated at 
the ICC at all was deemed as no small feat.984 The prosecutions were perceived as 
having contributed to deterring further crimes and to fostering better security in the 
region. In other words, Lubanga’s prosecution and punishment had sent a message 
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to potential child soldier recruiters and enlisters. While it is difficult to determine 
causality between decreased crime and the particular efforts of the ICC, most people 
interviewed noted an improvement in the security situation over the past several 
years.985 It was also acknowledged that the security situation had improved 
significantly since the Court first became involved, attributed in part to the ICC’s 
engagement.986However, the persistent conflict and continued recruitment of 
children in the DRC rebels groups fail to support the deterrent effect of Lubanga. 
Further, ICC’s ability to effectuate deterrence is hindered by the lack of an 
enforcement mechanism to account for suspects, thus limiting the number of 
defendants the court can prosecute. The Court will only ever be able to try a very 
small number of cases. Lubanga is only one of at least seven individuals in two 
situations (DRC and Uganda) who faced charges of the use of children in armed 
hostilities brought before the ICC.987 Both situations were the subject of the 
controversial self-referrals that have, almost systemically, excluded state actors.  
Only three cases988 had been concluded at the time of writing. Considering the 
estimated number of 300 000 child soldiers worldwide, the number of defendants is 
negligible.  The DRC failed to account for Lubanga’s co-accused, Ntaganda, after a 
warrant against him was issued. Not only was he not been arrested, he was 
integrated into the national army at the rank of general after the warrant was issued. 
Ntaganda’s promotion not only undermined the credibility of the Court generally, 
but also led to speculations about bias. As one Ituri activist put it:  ‘justice is working 
at two speeds... the fact that Bosco (Ntaganda) is protected when Lubanga has been 
handed over shows that political expediency overshadows justice.’989The DRC 
Minister of Information, Lambert Mende argued:  
‘As soon as he agreed to take part in the disarmament of the rebel group CNDP, the 
government used him (Ntaganda) for the operation and continues to do so. Therefore 
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the government did not find it opportune to open the case against him. It is really a 
question of timing.’990 
The consequence of this deliberate inaction was that Ntaganda was allowed to keep 
committing the same type of abuses committed in Ituri.991  Ntaganda eventually 
submitted to the ICC of his own accord. Self-referrals have resulted in apparent 
trade-offs between the ICC and states, resulting in the exemption of state actors. In 
Ituri, some believe that the interests of victims were subjugated to pragmatism: it 
was suggested, that the decision of the OTP to focus on militia rather than 
government crimes was aimed at ensuring continuing state cooperation rather than 
on an objective assessment of the gravity of the crimes committed and the views of 
affected communities.992 Of particular concern was the failure of the Court to go after 
individuals in the Kinshasa government. 993 Similar crimes committed by 
government forces were not equally pursued. As one commentator put it: ‘...there 
were kadogo [child soldiers] in Kabila’s forces as well.’994 
7.4 Lubanga: theoretical reflections 
 
Deterrence theorists depict the punishment of criminal offenders as morally justified 
because it deters other people from committing crime and thereby produces a net 
gain to society, with the suffering inflicted by criminals outweighed by the larger 
quantity of suffering that potential crime victims are spared.995However, deterrence 
is difficult to prove. Wippman notes that the connection between international 
prosecutions and the actual deterrence of future atrocities is at best a plausible but 
largely untested assumption.996 In any event, any anecdotal research must take into 
account the reality that atrocity persists in many places following the creation of 
criminal tribunals to punish perpetrators.997 Deterrence, transposed to mass crimes, 
ignores the unique environments that foster such criminal behavior. A critique of the 
liberal model points to the fixation on ‘individualistic and abstract that they miss out 
on communitarian values and duties, or on social meaning. The concern is that 
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liberal theory misconceives of the individual as completely separate from 
society.’998Often, offenders subscribe to group codes and are impelled, not by evil – 
not ‘radical’ evil in Arendt’s words - but a belief in a genuine cause.  If the ‘rational-
actor model of deterrence is suspect in the national context, it is exponentially so in 
the international, where war, large scale violence, and collective pathologies, as well 
as the institutional and resource limitations of ICL can be expected to distort the 
viability of the familiar cost-benefit calculus on which that model depends.’999The 
hostilities ‘with which international criminal justice is concerned often engage 
powerful passions - even self-transcending behavioural motives - and tend to involve 
individuals who are ready to accept the risk of punishment.’1000 These passions 
cannot be dissociated from child soldiering. The recruitment enlistment and use of 
children for purposes of armed conflict arises from the passion around triumphalism 
in war. Klabbers contends ICL will not play a significant deterrent role because the 
cost-benefit analysis underlying the rationale cannot be applied to human rights 
violators because they are mainly motivated by political reasons.1001 The recruitment 
of children continued, according to testimony in Lubanga,’...because the UPC was 
striving to consolidate its position as a strong political movement in the Ituri 
region.’1002 Lubanga urged ‘Iturians’ ‘to wake up, they had to rise, and team up with 
him to chase out’1003 a rival. Subsequently, some boys and girls ‘volunteered.’1004 And 
‘a lot of recruits came to get revenge for their families who had been killed’ and so 
they were ‘very keen volunteers’.1005 Beneath this political carapace was crucible of 
ethnic tension. Lubanga, of the Hema ethnic group, accused his rival of ethnic 
discrimination.1006 The clashes between Hema and Lendu have sucked in other 
ethnic groups in the region. The strong emotions associated with such conflict make 
the deterrence objective difficult to accomplish. Perpetrators are ‘overcast with 
ideology, fanaticism or religious fundamentalism, and who conceive themselves to be 
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over and above the law anyhow’ and system criminality, which is characterized by a 
state or state-like entity facilitating or encouraging such acts.1007 
 
In the DRC, the rise of a new rebel group, M23 – also recruiting children - during 
Lubanga’s trial seemed to confound assumptions that the prosecution would ‘send a 
message’ and thus cultivate general deterrence.  The fact that the elusive Ugandan 
rebel leader Kony and his LRA continue to use child soldiers after Lubanga also 
denudes the claims about the deterrent effect of the ICC and Lubanga.Further, there 
are practical concerns. There ‘is a very low chance’ that if accused, suspected 
offenders ‘are ever taken into the custody of international criminal justice 
institutions.’1008 Kony is a case in point. Ntaganda only handed himself to the ICC. 
International criminal justice requires the co-operation of states. In some cases, the 
state actors are the offenders.  Furthermore, as illustrated in the case of the DRC and 
Ntaganda, the objectives of peace can supersede those of justice. State actors can 
collude with suspected offenders, for example rebels, to end internal conflicts, thus 
evading justice. 
 
International criminal justice transposes the goals of municipal law to the 
international sphere. But as Bass concludes: ‘[T]he application of national law to war 
crimes is in many ways the legal equivalent of a bad analogy.’1009 On the international 
plane, the objectives are not only incongruous but overstated. Context insensitive 
research and context insensitive theory form a self-reinforcing pattern of context 
insensitive scholarship.1010 For, ‘[I]f ‘we aren’t looking for context effects, we won’t 
seek out context sensitive theoretical perspectives.’1011 We ‘cannot simply project 
familiar national principles onto ICL. We must inspect and re-articulate those 
principles to take into account the special contexts encountered by ICL, which 
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include massively collective action…’1012In ‘theorising’ the ICC, it is also important to 
take cognisance of its contextual environment as discussed in the previous chapter. 
For, when situational constraints are high, organisations realise weaker or lower 
outcomes.1013 
7.4.1 Beyond ‘retribution’ and ‘deterrence’ 
 
The idealism of ICL is far broader. It includes among other aims: reconciliation, 
rehabilitation, incapacitation, restoration, access to victims, historical recording 
building, preventing revisionism, crystallizing international norms, general 
affirmative prevention, establishing peace, preventing war, vindicating international 
law prohibitions, setting standards for fair trials, ending impunity, and expressive 
functions.1014 The Secretary General of the UN, outlined some these, stating 
international criminal tribunals pursue a number of aims including ‘bringing to 
justice those responsible for serious violations of human rights and humanitarian 
law, putting an end to such violations and preventing their recurrence, securing 
justice and dignity for victims, establishing a record of past events, promoting 
national reconciliation, re-establishing the rule of law and contributing to restoration 
of peace.’1015 
 
While this thesis does not concentrate on this particular mosaic of penal aims, it is 
worth noting them. These ‘idealist/goal’ related issues do not all necessarily apply to 
Lubanga but have been cited at one time or another in international jurisprudence.  
There has been debate1016 about the need, plausibility and operability of the 
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expansive ‘idealism’1017 of international courts which now includes ‘socio-political’1018 
or ‘extra-judicial’ goals.  Some scholars are agnostic about, for instance, the objective 
of ‘rehabilitation’ aimed at ‘reintegrating the guilty accused into society.’1019 The 
viability of this goal is ordinarily dependent on other factors, not least age; 
rehabilitation usually has a role to play ‘when younger, or less educated, members of 
society are found guilty of offences… to re-integrate them into society so that they 
can become useful members of it and enable them to lead normal and productive 
lives upon their release from imprisonment.’1020 However, international courts, 
despite acknowledging it as a guiding principle for sentence, barely implement it. 
The 45-year sentence in Blaskic,1021 when he was as young as 40, does not give 
credence to ‘rehabilitation as serious consideration by international courts.1022 Such a 
sentence would have been based, instead, on motives of perhaps retribution and 
deterrence. The prudence of implementing rehabilitation for such serious crimes is 
also questionable. The ICTY noted that, because of the grave nature of the crimes 
adjudicated by the tribunal, which were not comparable to national criminal cases, 
rehabilitation cannot ‘play a predominant role in the decision-making process of a 
Trial Chamber of the Tribunal’ and ‘cannot be given undue weight.’1023 
 
For Mulgrew, objectives such as reconciliation and the maintenance of peace should 
be actively pursued by the tribunals in their penal regimes, to facilitate reconciliation 
by convicted persons towards victims.1024 Some authors have, however, expressed 
‘doubts about whether extra-judicial motives could be part of the legitimate or 
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primary goals of criminal justice.’1025 Damaska, for instance, has argued that ‘[s]ome 
of the presently accepted objectives of international criminal courts should be altered 
- that is, scaled down, or even abandoned, and left to other mechanisms of public 
response to massive human rights violations.’1026 This situation (multiplicity of aims) 
‘[h]as several disquieting consequences, one of which is that the performance of 
international criminal courts cannot be assessed reliably.’1027 For Shany,  ‘[t]he 
general nature of some abstract goals renders them imprecise and leaves 
considerable interpretive discretion as to translating such goals into concrete judicial 
policies and operative or intermediate judicial goals.’1028 Dana argues that 
‘reconciliation’, for instance, should be abandoned as a rationale for sentencing 
purposes.1029 In the words of Dana, 
 
‘...when international judges give undue weight to utilitarian aspirations in their 
sentencing judgments, they distort and diminish the culpability and just distribution 
of punishment among the various actors' responsibility for atrocity crimes in a 
situation. Moreover, the goals they seek to achieve with their sentencing reductions, 
like reconciliation, are beyond the immediate capacity of criminal courts. 
International prosecutions should assume a more modest posture regarding its 
capabilities, lest it damages its core responsibility of punishing perpetrators of 
atrocities crimes.’1030 
 
Successful reconciliation, he points out, requires the mobilisation of diverse elements 
of social and legal order.1031 The very nature of mass atrocities, Dana notes, 
problematises achieving grand ambitions like reconciliation because the widespread 
participation in atrocity crimes creates deep complicity that is not easily overcome 
through the narrow lens of judicially constructed narratives via international 
criminal justice mechanisms.1032 Dana concludes that: 
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Ambitious social engineering in the wake of mass atrocities is wisely left to other 
social processes and institutions. Legalism has its limits, and those limits should be 
respected. Its formality, rigidity, and obligation to protect the rights of parties make it 
a limited agent of social change. These meta-juridical goals require a matrix of social 
and spiritual institutions working together to rebuild the fabric of society post-
atrocity. When other institutions and agents of society share this responsibility, 
international criminal justice can play a modest but important role.1033 
 
Koller suggests, for instance, that ‘a civil reparations mechanism could provide 
financial remedies to victims, a fact-finding commission could establish a historical 
record, or a truth and reconciliation commission could achieve both goals.1034 The  
ICC established a Trust Fund for Victims (TFV).1035The court may award reparations 
to be effected through the TFV. The governing legal texts prescribe that Fund restrict 
its projects to the victims of crimes that fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction. The Fund 
should direct its activities to situations in which the prosecutor has issued 
indictments. Rule 85 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence states: 
 
 (a) ‘Victims’ means natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of the 
commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; (b) Victims may include 
organisations or institutions that have sustained direct harm to any of their property 
which is dedicated to religion, education, art or science or charitable purposes, and to 
their historic monuments, hospitals and other places and objects for humanitarian 
purposes.1036 
 
As an objective, compensating victims does not seem too extraneous to the project of 
justice. Restitution and compensation for losses have been hallmarks of both 
criminal and civil law. The court orders forfeitures and fines from convicted persons. 
The basic right to reparation is recognised by international law through the 
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights.1037 However, convicted persons 
may not hold sufficient funds and assets to compensate victims. Further, historically, 
funding for international criminal courts has been inadequate. The TFV has very 
limited resources, far too insufficient to provide anything more than nominal sums to 
individual victims, considering the often large numbers of victims of mass crime.1038 
The TFV sources donations. It has been suggested that collective reparations, such as 
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the construction of schools or hospitals, may be more viable than paying individual 
victims for the harm they suffered.1039 The reparations project does appear to creep 
out of the bounds of the court’s core functions. But significantly, reparations have a 
symbolic associational value; recipient victims are imparted with a sense of 
belonging to a broader normative community.  The mandate for compensations falls 
under the TFV as a separate body, with its own board of directors.1040 
 
However, objectives such as ‘establishing peace’ may be illusory and burdensome.  
Instead, the UN Security Council ‘can specifically contemplate and take actions to 
restore or maintain peace and security, whereas a court or tribunal—bound to follow 
its limited legal mandate—can only have ancillary and unpredictable effects on peace 
and security.’1041 Attempting to combine these different functions with a criminal 
trial could interfere with the conduct of the trial.1042 In DRC, there have been peace 
agreements of 2002, negotiated in Sun City, South Africa, and the agreement of 
2008, concluded in Goma, Eastern Congo, the Ituri Agreements of 2006 and the 
Nairobi Communiqué of 2007.1043 The UN is also conducting peace efforts in the 
DRC through MONUSCO.1044 Nothing so far suggests a direct correlation between 
Lubanga and peace in the DRC. The objective of ending impunity does not seem to 
carry sufficient weight. The leader of the M23 rebels warned in November 2014 of 
the possibility of renewed conflict in the DRC.  The rebels’ 18-month war had only 
been brought the year before by government troops and UN peacekeepers.1045 The 
ICC needs to set modest goals for its work. An ‘overly ambitious, or otherwise 
inappropriate, selection of goals generates disparities between declaration and 
achievement, and uncertainty about their relative importance produces 
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disorientation.’1046 As Damaska aptly concludes: ‘Disillusionment stemming from 
unfulfilled expectations and inconsistencies that spring from disorientation are 
harmful to any system of justice, and especially to an evolving one whose legitimacy 
in the communities affected by international crime is still as delicate as the wings of a 
butterfly.’1047 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
The ICC appears to predicate its work primarily on principles of retribution and 
deterrence. Studies in DRC suggest that these were also the expectations of the 
affected community in the case of Lubanga. However, the prosecution of a few 
individuals for a mass crime like child soldiering barely serves these twin objectives. 
In general, critics of retributive justifications for international trials note the inability 
of international courts to prosecute all or even most of the crimes committed in a 
given situation and the difficulty of inflicting retributively proportionate 
punishments for such crimes as genocide.1048 Lubanga was one of many perpetrators 
of the mass crimes, unaccounted for. Retribution ‘assumes that prosecution is always 
a necessary response to wrongdoing and deterrence would be undermined whenever 
an offender walks free.’1049 Further, it is inevitable that dissonance arises on the 
quantum of sentence. Some find sentences either lenient or harsh. On deterrence, the 
mass nature of the crimes and passions associated with them make this a difficult 
objective to achieve. Also, proof of a counter-factual – that but for the actions of 
international courts more crimes would have occurred – is elusive.1050However, it is 
equally difficult to demonstrate that deterrence does not work; people rarely admit 
that they were considering committing crimes but were deterred by the threat of 
punishment.1051 In the absence of conclusive proof on either side, therefore, it is 
reasonable to continue to invoke deterrence as at least a partial justification for 
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punishment.1052 In the DRC, some claim that Lubanga resulted in the decline in 
hostilities. It is, however, difficult to state with certainty that the lull was occasioned 
by his prosecution. Further, the persistent hostilities and recruitment of child 
soldiers in the DRC conflict with pronouncements of deterrence. Retribution and 
deterrence are not the only objectives. International criminal justice has arrogated 
itself manifold goals. As observed in this chapter, however, these other objectives of 
international criminal justice tend to go beyond the core functions of courts. Apart 
from the costs associated with this idealism, socio-political functions may be left to 
other institutions. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
PROSECUTORIAL SELECTION AND THEMATIC 
PROSECUTIONS 
 
Introduction 
 
A plausible theory of international criminal justice would recognise the unique 
features of mass crime and limitations of the ICC. Because of the history of under-
criminalisation and under-judicialisation of child soldiering, it is unsurprising that 
the ICC’s groundbreaking trial and punishment of Lubanga elicited expectations of 
the court’s retributive and deterrent effect. However, it is completely unrealistic that 
the ICC can achieve these ambitious objectives. Because of the 
‘practical/institutional’ constraints, the ICC is largely a symbolic court.  Because ‘no 
cluster of effective supranational institutions yet exists to enforce international 
criminal law, the effective operation of international criminal courts must depend on 
the unstable reserve of political will, especially in world capitals.’1053 The overall 
effect of the context effects and situational limitations is that the ICC can only 
prosecute a handful of defendants. The focus on high-level offenders, exemption of 
state actors, the lack of resources and an enforcement mechanism means the ICC can 
prosecute a small number of defendants, rendering retributive and deterrence 
objectives tenuous. The crimes that form the subject of prosecutions under ICL 
‘dwarf ordinary conceptions of wrongdoing and punishment.’1054 The perpetrator of 
international crimes, like Lubanga, is considered a different type of perpetrator 
compared with the perpetrator of ordinary crime. While criminal law, distinguishes 
extraordinary crimes against the world community and ordinary crimes against the 
local community, ICL nevertheless is modelled, philosophically, on national criminal 
law systems which have been developed to deal with ordinary, common crime.1055 
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A deterrence-based framework for selecting situations and cases for prosecution 
‘would be at least highly impracticable, if not impossible, to develop.’1056 The 
inconsistencies in sentencing make retribution less plausible as a rationale for 
international penality. As such, there seems to be a lack of coherent rationalisations 
for prosecution and punishment of international criminals. The main objective of 
this thesis is to respond to this paucity. As Dana points out about punishment: 
 
‘Under-theorization and the absence of scholarly examination of the sentencing 
jurisprudence of international criminal courts has left us with an ad hoc approach to 
sentencing for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. In the absence of 
a guiding theory, the wide discretion given to international judges in sentencing has 
failed to produce a rational and consistent international sentencing practice.’1057 
 
 
International criminal justice lacks a credible theory suitable for its own context. 
Damaska notes that one of the weaknesses of international courts springs from the 
array of goals international criminal courts have set for themselves.1058 The 
miscellany of goals that international criminal justice has imposed upon itself 
transcends core functions of the court, are not viable and expensive. As has been 
illustrated in the previous chapter, retribution and deterrence in Lubanga do not 
seem viable objectives. The other ‘idealist/goal-related’ problem is that the objectives 
are numerous and extend beyond the core functions of the court. But this ‘weakness’ 
of the ICC can be reduced, or eliminated…’1059 The ICC ought to have a modest, 
realistic an imaginative rationale upon which it premises its work. The selective 
practices can achieve modest but important objectives. This thesis argues that the 
most plausible justification for the prosecution and punishment of Lubanga is the 
expressive function of law (expressivism). The basic proposition of expressivism is 
that the principal selection criteria and animus for prosecution is to disseminate 
global norms and identify construction. The ICC does not have to prosecute 
multitudes to achieve this objective.  A handful of cases will suffice. The objective is 
to reinforce global norms. The key to expressivist discourse is the selection of cases. 
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The cases that prosecutors select determine themes and narratives for crimes to be 
prosecuted. This chapter discusses the selection criteria of the ICC. One of the 
selection precepts proposed in recent literature rests on choosing cases around 
particular themes of criminality in order to reinforce norms. Such prioritisation 
would derive from the status of the international crimes such as historical under-
enforcement. This chapter discusses ‘thematic prosecutions’ as the expressive 
function of law. As has already been argued, child soldiering has historically been 
under-recognised. The assumption of thematic prosecutions is that the selection for 
prosecution of child militarisation crimes would shore up the previously under-
recognised norms against the use of children in armed conflict. Such selection would 
be motivated by a cosmopolitan sense of duty and ethos of equality for all, not least 
the vulnerable. This chapter is organised as follows. The first section discusses the 
discretion of the prosecutor in the selection of situations and cases. It examines the 
factors that influence the prosecutor’s selection decisions. The second discusses 
theoretical perspectives on thematic penology. A new body of scholarship has 
emerged agitating for prioritisation of certain crimes for prosecution at international 
courts or specifically, the ICC.  The third part places child soldiering within the 
context of ‘thematic prosecutions.’ The sub-sections outline justificatory grounds for 
a thematic approach to child soldiering: historical under-enforcement of the norm, 
gravity and the discriminatory nature of the crime. The last part attempts to place 
thematic prosecutions within the purview of ‘cosmopolitan justice.’ 
8.1 Prosecutorial selection of ‘situations’ and ‘cases’ 
 
Prosecutorial discretion has been a feature of international criminal justice since 
Nuremberg.1060However, the prosecutors were not ‘independent’ ‘but rather 
representatives of their own governments, and their role, at least in part, was surely 
to ensure that the interests of their respective states were protected.’1061 The 
‘conception of an independent ICC prosecutor provoked bitter debate during the 
negotiation of the Rome Statute, with the United States demanding that the 
prosecutorial function be dependent always upon the UN Security Council’s decision 
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to trigger investigation of any ‘situation’ of alleged crimes.’1062The ‘defeat of that 
proposal in favour of a more independent prosecutor may have ended one debate, 
but it has failed to resolve the more profound question of how the ICC Prosecutor 
should and will employ the authority afforded by the Rome Statute.’1063 
Article 25 of Rome Statute states the Court shall have jurisdiction over natural 
persons pursuant to this Statute. A person who commits a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment 
in accordance with this Statute. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be 
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court if that person: a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, 
jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other 
person is criminally.  The prosecutor has to make selection decisions, firstly, because 
of limited resources and secondly, based on jurisdictional and admissibility criteria. 
While not entirely unrestrained, the ICC Prosecutor remains the most crucial arbiter 
of where, and against whom, the ICC directs its efforts.1064The ICC Prosecutor must 
exercise prosecutorial selection of ‘situations’ and ‘cases’ due to his/her limited 
capacity.1065The concepts of ‘situations’ and ‘cases’ are not defined in the Rome 
Statute. Former ICC Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo defined a ‘case’ as comprising one 
or more alleged suspects and one or more alleged crimes within the Court’s 
jurisdiction, while ‘situation’ is a broader concept referring to a territorial and 
temporal context in which such crimes have allegedly been committed.1066 For 
example, the DRC constitutes a ‘situation’ and Lubanga is a ‘case.’  
 
The ICC prosecutor can proceed from, as noted earlier, self-referrals; cases referred 
by the UN Security Council and cases of his own instigation. The inclusion of 
prosecutorial discretion within the Statute of the ICC was intended to bring a degree 
of independence and pragmatism to the world’s first permanent international 
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criminal court.1067 By providing the Prosecutor with the power to initiate criminal 
proceedings proprio motu, advocates of a more equitable and uniformly applied 
international legal system believed that the ICC could begin to distance itself from 
the influences of power politics that pervaded the Nuremberg and Tokyo military 
tribunals.1068In Article 53, sections 1 and 2 establish the discretion of the prosecutor 
to decide whether or not he will proceed with a case in various circumstances. 
Section2 provides that ‘if the prosecutor concludes that there is not sufficient basis 
for a prosecution ... ‘he shall inform the Security Council in a case under Article 13, 
subparagraph (b) of his or her conclusion and the reasons for the conclusion.’ 
Moreover, section 3 (a) provides that ‘at the request of the Security Council,’ 
concerning a referral under Article 13(b), ‘the Pre-Trial Chamber may review a 
decision of the prosecutor not to proceed and may request the prosecutor to 
reconsider that decision.’ He will also be guided by Article 17 on whether a state is 
unwilling or unable to prosecute. Before he proceeds, the prosecutor has to make a 
number of evaluations. I discuss these below. 
 
8.1.1 Jurisdiction and Admissibility 
 
The ICC may exercise jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes.  These crimes are defined in detail in the Rome Statute.  In addition, the 
ratione materiae is supplemented by the text of the ‘Elements of Crimes’ which 
provides a breakdown of the elements of each crime. The ratione personae includes 
individuals directly responsible for committing the crimes as well as others who may 
be liable for the crimes, for example by aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting in the 
commission of a crime. The latter group also includes military commanders or other 
superiors whose responsibility is defined in the Statute. The Court may only exercise 
jurisdiction if: 
 
 The accused is a national of a State Party or a State otherwise accepting the 
jurisdiction of the Court;  
 The crime took place on the territory of a State Party or a State otherwise 
accepting the jurisdiction of the Court; or  
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 The UN Security Council has referred the situation to the Prosecutor, 
irrespective of the nationality of the accused or the location of the crime. 
 
The ICC’s ratione temporis is limited to events taking place since 1 July 2002.  In 
addition, if a State joins the Court after 1 July 2002, the Court only has jurisdiction 
after the Statute entered into force for that State.  Such a State may nonetheless 
accept the jurisdiction of the Court for the period before the Statute’s entry into 
force.  However, in no case can the Court exercise jurisdiction over events before 1 
July 2002. 
 
Even where the Court has jurisdiction, it will not necessarily act. The principle of 
‘complementarity’ provides that certain cases will be inadmissible even though the 
Court has jurisdiction.  In general, a case will be inadmissible if it has been or is 
being investigated or prosecuted by a State with jurisdiction.  However, a case may 
be admissible if the investigating or prosecuting State is unwilling or unable to 
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution. The OTP has relied largely on 
two strategies to justify selection decisions: (1) the gravity of the crimes selected; and 
(2) and portraying decisions as reached impartially, objectively, independently, and 
transparently.1069 In general, the prosecutorial determination at the ICC hinges 
primarily on whether a given situation within which ‘the most serious crimes of 
international concern’ have been allegedly committed is of ‘sufficient gravity to 
justify further action by the Court’, and whether or not its investigation would serve 
the ‘interests of justice.’ Article 53(1) (a)‐(c) of the Statute provides that, in order to 
determine whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation into 
the situation the Prosecutor shall consider: jurisdiction (temporal, material, and 
either territorial or personal jurisdiction); admissibility (complementarity and 
gravity); and the ‘interests of justice.’  
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8.1.2 The Concept of ‘Gravity’ 
 
The concept of gravity or seriousness resides at the epicentre of the legal regime of 
the ICC.1070 All crimes brought before the ICC are, of course, of a ‘grave’ nature. The 
Statute implies that genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression 
are ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.’1071 However, 
the court has to determine the threshold for gravity. Article 17(1) (d) of the Rome 
Statute provides that the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where the 
case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court. The OTP applies 
the concept of gravity twice, first with regard to ‘situations’, and secondly, once 
inside the situation.1072 However, like a number of concepts in the Rome Statute, 
‘gravity’ is not defined. The OTP, according to its own guidelines, assesses this 
criterion having regard to both quantitative and qualitative considerations, 
including: (a) the scale of the crimes number of victims, the extent of the damage), 
(b) nature of the crimes (specific elements of each offence such as killings, rapes, and 
other crimes involving sexual or gender violence and crimes committed against 
children, or the imposition of conditions of life on a community calculated to bring 
about its destruction), (c) manner of commission of the crimes (means employed to 
execute the crime, elements of particular cruelty, systematic or organized nature of 
the crimes resulting from the abuse of power or official capacity etc.) and (d) their 
impact (consequences on the local or international community, including the long 
term social, economic and environmental damage).1073Gravity is invoked ‘not so 
much as a justification for the selection of cases on which to proceed as a justification 
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725747378AB2/143680/OTP_3yearreport20060914_English.pdf>  (accessed 20 April 2013), 8. 
1073 See ‘Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor’ (ICC-BD/05-01-09), Regulation 29 para 2; Draft 
Policy Paper, 13, paras 67, 68 and 70. 
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for refusing to undertake other cases.1074 The Prosecutor decided not to proceed with 
investigations in Iraq, on the grounds that there were more victims in Uganda and 
the DRC. As Schabas notes, the Prosecutor did not, however, compare the situation 
in Iraq or for that matter the situations in the central African countries, with those 
elsewhere in the 106 states over which he has territorial jurisdiction.1075These 
approaches have spawned accusations of bias.  
 
In deciding the admissibility of the Lubanga and Ntaganda cases, the judges of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber held that the gravity threshold requires widespread or systematic 
crimes and high-level defendants with the greatest responsibility for those crimes.1076 
Therefore, the guidelines do not distinguish between state and non-state actor but 
only determines the scale of offences, ranking of offenders and level of responsibility. 
The concept of gravity and jurisprudence do not render distinctions in the treatment 
of state and non-state actors. In assessing gravity in Lubanga, the chamber noted 
that the role played by ‘State entities, organisations or armed groups in the overall 
commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court in the relevant situation 
(those suspected of being most responsible)’1077 should be considered. The Pre-Trial 
Chamber also approved the Prosecutor’s Policy Paper statement of 2003 that as a 
general rule the OTP should focus its investigative and prosecutorial resources on 
those who bear the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or 
organization allegedly responsible for those crimes.1078 However, a noticeable 
pattern, as discussed previously regarding self-referrals, is that the prosecutor has 
focused on rebels or non-state actors. 
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According to the conclusion of the Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga, the ‘gravity 
threshold is a key tool provided by the drafters to maximise the Court’s deterrent 
effect.’1079 While the relationship remains debatable, ‘gravity’ has also been used to 
assess or match the ‘degree of retribution’ (proportionality) to be inflicted on an 
offender. ‘Gravity’ as a tool to deter widespread and systemic crimes and 
proportionate punishment naturally presumes open-minded and impartial 
investigation. In other words, such a fair approach would determine the gravity of, 
and degree of punishment for, crimes committed by both state and non-state actors 
during conflict.  The exemption of state actors brings into question fair assessment of 
gravity. 
 
8.1.3 ‘Interests of Justice’ 
 
While international criminal law has, among other objectives, the infliction 
retribution and deterrence, penal processes also seek to serve the ‘interests of 
justice’. The phrase ‘in the interests of justice’ potentially has a broad scope. It 
includes the right to a fair trial, legal representation, the interests of victims and so 
on. The phrase appears in several places in the ICC Statute and Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence1080  but it is never defined. Article 53(1) of the Statute addresses the 
initiation of an investigation. If the Prosecutor is satisfied that there is a reasonable 
basis to believe that the case is within the jurisdiction of the Court and is or would be 
admissible under Article 17 of the Statute, he or she must determine whether, taking 
into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of the victims, there are 
nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the 
‘interests of justice.’ Article 53(2) addresses the initiation of a prosecution. It 
indicates that, upon investigation, the Prosecutor may conclude that there is not a 
sufficient basis to proceed because it ‘is not in the ‘interests of justice’, taking into 
account all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of 
victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrators, and his or her role in the 
alleged crime.’ 
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In the absence of definition, it has been argued Article 53 practically gives to the 
Prosecutor the broadest possible scope of political discretion in order to decide 
whether or not to proceed with a prosecution.1081  The OTP attempts to elucidate the 
premises of the test in its Policy Paper on the Interest of Justice.1082  The ‘interests of 
justice’ tests, according to the paper, need only be considered where positive 
determinations have been made on both jurisdiction and admissibility.  While the 
other two tests (jurisdiction and admissibility) are positive requirements that must 
be satisfied, the interests of justice’ is not. According to the OTP, like gravity, the 
‘interests of justice’ test is a potential countervailing consideration that might 
produce a reason not to proceed even where the first two are satisfied. This 
difference, according to the OTP, is important: the Prosecutor is not required to 
establish that an investigation or prosecution is in the interests of justice. The 
interpretation and application of the ‘interests of justice’ test may lie in the first 
instance with the Prosecutor, but is subject to review and judicial determination by 
the Pre Trial Chamber. 1083 
 
Taking into consideration the ordinary meaning of the terms in their context, as well 
as the object and purpose of the Rome Statute, the OTP points out that only in 
exceptional circumstances will the Prosecutor of the ICC conclude that an 
investigation or a prosecution may not serve the ‘interests of justice.’ According to 
the OTP, the investigations conducted required consideration of the question of the 
‘interests of justice’ prior to proceeding for an application for arrest warrants or 
summonses.1084 As already pointed out, in order for a case to be admissible, not only 
do the crimes have to be within the jurisdiction of the Court, but they must also meet 
the higher threshold of being of ‘sufficient gravity to justify further action’ of the 
Court in terms of Article 17(1)(d). In determining whether the situation is of 
sufficient gravity, the Office considers the scale of the crimes, the nature of the 
crimes, the manner of their commission and their impact. Before considering 
whether there are substantial reasons to believe that it is not in the ‘interests of 
justice’ to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor will necessarily have already come 
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to a positive view on admissibility, including that the case is of sufficient gravity to 
justify further action.1085 
 
 
8.1.4 Interests of victims 
 
As pointed out above, Article 53 (1) obligates the Prosecutor to take into 
account the interests of victims before starting an investigation or prosecution. It 
requires the prosecutor, in deciding whether to initiate an investigation, to consider, 
among other things, whether taking into account the gravity of the crime and the 
interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an 
investigation would not serve the interests of justice.1086 The OTP considers that the 
‘interests of victims’ includes the victims’ interests in seeing justice done, but also 
includes other essential interests such as their protection, as indicated by the Rome 
Statute.1087 
 
One of the great innovations of the Rome Statute and the Rules of Evidence and 
Procedure is the important role accorded to victims. Until the establishment of the 
ICC, international criminal courts and tribunals established since Nuremberg had 
given only sparse consideration to victims’ views and concerns and limited space for 
their active engagement with such institutions beyond the role of prosecution 
witness.1088  For the first time in the history of international criminal justice, victims 
have the possibility under the Statute to present their views and concerns to the 
Court and participate in all stages of the proceedings before the Court.1089  The 
scheme is designed, inter alia, to recognise victims’ suffering, let them ‘experience 
and perceive justice, thus contributing to their healing process and the rebuilding of 
peaceful societies’1090  As already noted, for the people who suffer most from crimes 
under ICC jurisdiction, the Rome Statute created the Trust Fund for Victims, having 
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two mandates: (i) to implement Court-ordered reparations; and (ii) to provide 
physical and psychosocial rehabilitation or material support to victims of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC.1091  Reparations may be granted to direct and 
indirect victims, including the family members of direct victims.  
 
Compared to domestic courts, the discretionary powers of an international court 
prosecutor have been controversial.1092  Given the multitudes of cases national courts 
adjudicate, only very exceptionally will a selection decision spark challenges to the 
legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system.1093As Greenwalt noted, no aspect of 
the ICC institutional architecture provoked more controversy than ‘the provision for 
a standing independent prosecutor authorized to initiate investigations and 
indictments subject primarily to judicial rather than political constraints.’1094 Every 
choice has made has been criticised, for instance, that Lubanga, was not senior 
enough and child soldiering was not serious enough; the Court should have 
investigated British soldiers for war crimes committed in Iraq; and the Court’s focus 
on situations in Africa is inappropriate. 1095 The former prosecutor Luis Moreno-
Ocampo argued that his decisions were apolitical—that he is simply implementing 
the provisions of the Rome Statute. As noted, the Statute does not however clear 
selection criteria and goals. This lack of clearly defined goals and priorities poses a 
serious challenge to the ICC’s legitimacy.1096 The selectivity imperils ICC’s goals of 
retribution and deterrence. Amann notes that ‘because of the selectivity and 
randomness, the paucity of punishment not only narrows the breadth of specific 
deterrence, but also diminishes general deterrence by signalling a risk of punishment 
too low to dissuade a rational wrongdoer.’1097 Of the penological goals, Drumbl 
points out that expressivism is a tertiary goal that emerges occasionally in the 
international jurisprudence’ but it ‘may be a more plausible justification for the 
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punishment of extraordinary international criminals.’1098 For Drumbl just like 
deterrence and retribution, however, the expressive value of law and punishment is 
also weakened by selectivity and indeterminacy in the operationalisation of law and 
punishment, as well as the political contingency of the entire enterprise.’1099 
DeGuzman argues that ‘[T]he ICC’s core selectivity problem is that the Court lacks 
sufficiently clear goals and priorities to justify its decisions.’1100 She, however, 
contends that purposive selection of cases can have expressive value. DeGuzman 
argues that the classical rationales for criminal law—deterrence and retribution— 
although valid for ICC’s work, do not provide an adequate basis for selection 
decisions.1101 The ICC’s meagre resources mean that it can have only a limited impact 
in each of these areas.1102 More recent theories of restorative justice, which urge a 
greater focus on rebuilding relationships, also provide a partial justification for the 
work of the ICC, but do not provide an adequate basis for the Court’s selection 
decisions. 1103 I have already argued in the previous chapters that extra-judicial socio-
political objectives would better be undertaken by other institutions. The Court 
simply lacks the resources to make any significant progress toward such locally 
oriented goals. 1104 DeGuzman asserts that the Court’s decisions about which 
situations and cases to select for prosecution should aim primarily to maximize the 
Court’s expressive impact. 1105 While the ICC can make only a very small impact in 
terms of such goals as retribution and deterrence, the Court can effectively promote 
global norms with a limited number of illustrative prosecutions.1106 
 
To a large extent, DeGuzman provides the theoretical framework for this study. This 
thesis argues that the most plausible justification for the prosecution of Lubanga is 
expressivism. Expressivism has also been under-explored, particularly in ICL. 
Recently, scholars have begun to explore expressivism as a primary justification for 
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international prosecution and penality.1107 Authors have since generated a body of 
scholarship calling special attention to law’s expressive dimension and social 
meaning.1108 Expressive theories posit that law, like other forms of expression, 
manifests states of mind, including beliefs, attitudes, and intentions.1109 Law 
therefore, has ‘social meaning.’1110 Identification of social meaning thus plays a key 
role in expressivist writings.1111 Expressivism and constructivism have affinities. 
What is crucial to the constructivist framework is the nexus between norms, law and 
social meaning.1112 Prosecutions can provide this nexus. An expressive approach to 
ICL suggests that a primary purpose of international criminal trials is to express 
global norms.1113 This proposition is not just ideologically plausible but based on a 
consideration of the court’s situational constraints (practical/institutional) discussed 
earlier. The propagation of norms is what the court can realistically achieve. As Cote 
notes, ‘[i]nternational criminal justice remains largely symbolic and has limited 
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resources that require exemplary selective prosecutions.’1114 Expressivism therefore 
‘is not just the best justification for the ICC’s work; it also provides the most 
appropriate theoretical basis for the Court’s resource allocation decisions.1115 The 
ultimate objective of expressivism is the reinforcement of the law through 
internalisation of global norms. This is a far more purposive, worthwhile and realistic 
objective for international criminal courts than retribution and deterrence.  
 
An objective to disseminate global norms presumes a normative community. I have, 
for the greater part of the thesis, attempted to articulate normative developments in 
child soldiering through the purview of cosmopolitanism. A regime of norms against 
the conscription, enlistment and use of children has emerged and crystallised. An 
expressivist approach to international criminal justice highlights and promotes the 
recognition and internalisation of the norms. Although still in its infancy, the ICC 
‘has already become a powerful symbol of a long-hoped for international legal order 
in which universal human rights and cosmopolitan ideals of justice can win 
protection from the imperatives and intrusions of statecraft.’1116 To enhance the ICC’s 
legitimacy, it will be necessary to develop such goals and priorities in a manner that 
reflects the values of the ICC’s constitutive communities.1117 For Roach, the ICC has a 
moral duty to investigate all serious crimes within its jurisdiction in the service of 
global communitarianism.1118 
 
The expressive prescription raises questions about what global norms the ICC should 
seek to express and in what order of priority in the absence of international 
consensus about the goals of the Court.1119Ambos and Stegmiller point out that given 
‘the high number of communications and referrals to the ICC, a focused strategy 
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setting out the criteria for situation and case selection and prioritisation should be 
one of the priorities of the Prosecutor.’1120An emerging body of scholarship has 
proposed prioritisation of under-enforced norms. The strategy of ‘thematic 
prosecutions’ would orientate cases around particular themes of criminality.1121 Such 
themes may take the form of focused or thematic investigations and prosecutions of 
these crimes, or the construction of crime-specific institutional capacity within the 
criminal justice system.1122 The selection and prosecution of such crimes would be 
illustrative in stigmatising previously under-the-radar crimes whose egregiousness is 
now recognised. A ‘cosmopolitan trial’ on child soldiering ensures that the court 
firstly recognizes the universal rights of children above states. Secondly, the 
proliferation of child soldiering across the globe makes an expressive approach an 
ideal objective for the ICC. Thematic prosecutions fulfill the current preconditions 
for selections, gravity, interests of justice and interests of victims. 
 
8.2 Thematic prosecutions 
 
As already observed, international courts operate against significant constraints. 
They cannot be expected to pursue each and every incidence of violence that would 
fall within their jurisdiction. 1123Some element of selection and prioritization, which 
is not uncommon even for most domestic criminal courts, is thus rather inevitable in 
the practice of international criminal courts.1124  There has, however, been little 
discussion of how this selectivity may be justified.1125 As noted in the preceding 
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chapters, such selective prosecution renders Western principles of retribution and 
deterrence ill-suited for the crimes that international criminal courts prosecute. The 
few cases that the ICC selects can perform an illustrative function. The ICC is 
particularly situated to propagate global norms. The selection of cases to be 
investigated and brought to trial determines the narratives to be established, the 
authoritative ‘historical truth’ of a conflict and social meanings to be pronounced by 
the court. Social meanings reflect what ‘a society’s values, what it esteems, what it 
abhors.’1126 Social meanings can carry stigma. If an action creates a stigma, that 
stigma is a social meaning.1127 Megret points out that prosecutors at tribunals and 
courts should recognise the assigning stigma to certain types of behaviour as an 
important objective.1128 The prosecutor has the upper hand in launching the process 
of designating what is most worth stigmatizing.1129 Hierarchy in stigma reflects 
international criminal justice’s expressivist ambition.1130 An emerging body of 
scholarship suggests the creation of prosecutorial themes for particular crimes to 
enhance their stigma.’ Thematic prosecution’ refers to the prosecutorial practice of 
selecting certain crimes and prioritising particular phenomena within international 
criminal indictments, usually for purposes related to the best use of limited 
resources,1131 but often also due to the symbolism of elevating attention on a given 
matter of international concern.1132 Such an approach would aim at creating stigma 
around such crimes through illustrative prosecutions. The idea of exclusive 
prosecution of certain crimes was used in some of the earliest prosecutions for 
international crimes after Second World War.1133  The practice of ‘thematic 
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at the International Criminal Court’ (2012) 33 Michigan Journal International Law 265, 
1133See J. Bush, ‘The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What 
Nuremberg Really Said’ (2009)109 Columbia Law Review 1167–1173, discussing the history behind 
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prosecutions’ in international criminal law may be traced back to Nuremberg where 
trials were divided according to the particular participation of segments of the 
German society in the war and their spheres of activity.1134 The trials of medical 
professionals for their role in medical experimentation on human subjects and in the 
programme of mass euthanasia1135 and of legal professionals for furthering Nazi 
programmes of persecution, sterilisation, and extermination through the 
development of legislation and penal processes.1136 In recent years, emerging 
literature and jurisprudence have focused on thematic prosecution of offences 
against children and sex crimes.1137 Although ‘feminism is not the only force behind 
the rise of thematic prosecution it is definitely the most significant.’1138 Thematic 
prosecutions can be located within the cosmopolitan project. Moral cosmopolitanism 
refers to accounts that retain a commitment to treating all human beings with equal 
concern within a global frame.1139 Cosmopolitan feminist projects are characterised 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
United States of America v Friedrich Flick et al., Judgment, 22 December 1947; US Military Tribunal 
at Nuremberg, United States of America v Carl Krauch et al., Judgment, 30 July 1948; US Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg, United States of America v Alfried Krupp et al., Judgment, 31 July 1948; US 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, United States of America v Karl Brandt et al., Judgment, 19 August 
1947; Nuremberg Military Tribunal, United States of America v Josef Altstötter et al., Judgment, 4 
December 1947, cited in M. deGuzman  ‘An Expressive Rationale for the Thematic Prosecution of Sex 
Crimes’)in M. Bergsmo (ed) Thematic Prosecution of International Sex Crimes  FICHL Publication 
Series No. 13 (Torkel Opsahl Academic E-Publisher, Beijing,  2012) 
1134See M. deGuzman,  ‘An Expressive Rationale for the Thematic Prosecution of Sex Crimes’)in M 
Bergsmo (ed) Thematic Prosecution of International Sex Crimes  FICHL Publication Series No. 13 
(Torkel Opsahl Academic E-Publisher, Beijing,  2012For an outline of the subsequent Nuremberg 
trials, see K. Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal 
Law, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011) 
1135US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, US v Karl Brandt et al., Judgment of 19 July 1947, Trials of 
War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. II, 
1950, pp. 171–300 (the Medical Case) 
1136US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, US v. Josef Altstoetter et al., Opinion and Judgment of 3 
December 1947, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control 
Council Law No. 10, Vol. III, 1951, 954–1199 (the Justice Case) cited in N. Jain, ‘Going beyond 
prosecutorial discretion: institutional factors influencing thematic prosecution’, in M. Bergsmo (ed) 
Thematic Prosecution of International Sex Crimes  FICHL Publication Series No. 13 (Torkel Opsahl 
Academic E-Publisher, Beijing 2012);. For these observations, see also J. Kyriakakis, ‘Developments in 
international criminal law and the case of business involvement in international crimes’ (2012) 94 
International Review of the Red Cross 
1137 J. Hagan, Justice in the Balkans: Prosecuting War Crimes in the Hague Tribunal, (University of 
Chicago Press 2003) 181–182; M. Bergsmo et al., The Backlog of Core International Crimes Case 
Files in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Torkel Opsahl Academic Epublisher, Oslo 2010)  109, footnote. 46, 
cited in M. deGuzman,  ‘An Expressive Rationale for the Thematic Prosecution of Sex Crimes’ in M 
Bergsmo (ed) Thematic Prosecution of International Sex Crimes  FICHL Publication Series No. 13 
(Torkel Opsahl Academic E-Publisher, Beijing 2012) See eg S. Greijer, ‘The Thematic Prosecution of 
Crimes Against Children’ in M. Bergsmo (ed), Thematic Prosecution of International Sex Crimes 
(Torkel Opsahl Academic E-Publisher, Beijing 2012); 
1138A. Quijano,  ‘Science and International Thematic Prosecution of Sex Crimes: A Tale of Re-
Essentialisation’  in M. Bergsmo (ed), Thematic Prosecution of International Sex Crimes  FICHL 
Publication Series No. 13 (Torkel Opsahl Academic E-Publisher, Beijing  2012) 12 footnote 1 
1139Niamh Reilly ‘Cosmopolitan Feminism and Human Rights’ (2007) 22 Hypatia 180 
210 
 
by a critical, practical engagement with legal discourse and a radical critique of the 
public-private configuration in international law.1140In addition to the 1990s global 
campaign for women’s human rights, other significant examples include efforts to 
ensure the inclusion of feminist analyses and gender perspectives in the ICC statute 
and the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which addresses women’s 
roles in peace building and post-conflict reconstruction.1141 Feminists successfully 
pushed for prioritising and isolating the prosecution of sex crimes between 1995 and 
2001 when the ICTY issued the first indictments and verdicts exclusively for counts 
of rape and sexual slavery in Kunarac et al.1142– also known as the ‘Foča cases.’ 
Thematic prosecution of international sex crimes involve the selection and 
prioritisation of sexual crimes over and above other crimes for investigation and 
prosecution at national or international judicial institutions.1143 This arrogation of 
pre-eminence to crime is inevitably controversial.  There is a need to justify focus on 
one given crime and its accompanying normative framework, rather than focusing on 
other core international crimes.1144 This will help prevent norm over-expansion, 
contested interpretations, and, more importantly, the dilution of international 
consensus and commitment.1145 However, its proponents argue that: 
 
‘[T]o thematically prosecute certain crimes does not necessarily mean that such 
crimes are prioritised over other crimes, which will be left unaddressed, but rather 
that such crimes are investigated and prosecuted in a thematic way, meaning that 
methods specific to the acts and the victims are employed.’1146 
Sex crimes should not always be prioritised over killing crimes: each case and 
situation presents unique characteristics, making it imprudent to proffer categorical 
arguments about when prosecutors should give priority to particular crimes.1147  A 
                                                          
1140Ibid  
1141Ibid  
1142Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vuković, ICTY Trial Judgment, [22 
February 2001] IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T 
1143B. Olugbuo, Thematic Prosecution of International Sex Crimes and Stigmatisation of Victims and 
Survivors: Two Sides of the Same Coin? in M. Bergsmo (ed), Thematic Prosecution of International 
Sex Crimes (Torkel Opsahl Academic E-Publisher, Beijing, 2012), 109 
1144M. Bergsmo, A. Skre, C. Wui Ling and E. Wood, ‘Introductory remarks - Examining Thematic 
Prosecutions and the Challenges of Understanding and Proving International Sex Crimes’ FICHL 
Policy Brief Series No. 11 (2013) 
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case selection decision that appears justified in isolation may nonetheless be ill- 
advised when viewed in the context of the other prosecutions in the situation.1148 
Examining the concept and practice of prosecutorial thematisation requires the 
engagement of theoretical questions.1149 Despite the increased focus on sex crime 
prosecutions in recent years, no effort has been made, either at the tribunals or in the 
scholarship, to provide a philosophical justification for the practice of giving priority 
to sex crimes.1150 Crime selection and prioritisation in the field of criminal justice for 
atrocities primarily takes place in response to the practical challenge of prudently 
applying limited resources.1151Jain has argued that the institutional structure of the 
ICC might support thematic prosecutions centred on crimes that are ‘less universally 
regarded, at least in practice, as equally deserving of condemnation.’1152 The 
advocates argue that the strongest justification for a special focus on sex crimes at 
international courts lies in the need to express the undervalued norms prohibiting 
such crimes.  In other words, such an approach would serve expressive objectives. 
DeGuzman argues boldly: 
‘ …if international criminal law aims to express global norms it should often seek to 
promote the norms against sex crimes even at the expense of other important norms. 
The need for such special emphasis lies in the history of under-enforcement of sex 
crimes in both national and international for a as well as in the discriminatory 
expression inherent in the crimes themselves.’1153 
 
 
The argument on prosecutorial thematisation has focused on gravity. Historically, 
sex crimes have been considered less serious than murder crimes.1154 The evidence 
that many people consider rape less serious than murder does not, however, 
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establish that murderers are more deserving of punishment than rapists as a moral 
matter.1155 DeGuzman argues that the context of conflict in which many international 
crimes are perpetrated legitimises killing. She posits: 
 
‘[K]illing one’s enemy is the very purpose of war. International humanitarian law 
legitimise the intentional killing of other people in many circumstances. As ‘such, one 
who violates those laws by, for example, killing in a manner that is disproportionate 
to legitimate military objectives may be less culpable for crossing that ill-defined 
boundary than one who kills intentionally in peacetime.’1156  
 
In contrast, sex crimes are never legitimate – the wartime context does nothing to 
reduce the culpability of those who perpetrate such crimes. Moreover, sex crimes 
involve discrimination and/or persecution based on gender, which enhances the 
culpability of their perpetrators.1157 For these reasons, the culpability of a rapist will 
sometimes be higher than that of a killer in the international context. 1158 Expressive 
theories of criminal justice essentially focus upon the social meaning ascribed to the 
practice of criminal justice. The prosecution of sexual violence crimes serves to 
express to the international community generally that these acts are illegal and those 
who committed or permitted them are to be held accountable and condemned. Buss 
describes this as ‘social meanings communicated and interpreted through legal 
processes.’ 1159 
8.3 Child soldiering and thematic prosecutions 
 
I do not herein focus on sex crimes. The subject has received considerable 
attention.1160 However, the approach to crimes of sexual violence provides a useful 
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framework for analysing child soldiering, the focus of this thesis. The arguments 
above can be transposed to the case of children and armed conflict. The ICC has 
outlawed child soldiering. Expressivists argue that when the Court is faced with 
having to choose particular situations and cases over others that also deserve its 
attention, such decisions should aim to maximise Court’s expression.1161 Historical 
under-enforcement, perceptions of lesser gravity and discrimination of a ‘weaker’ 
group comport with the precepts of ‘expressive’ thematic prosecutions. Identification 
of social meaning plays a key role in expressivism.1162A ‘collective conscience’ has 
emerged on the social meaning of child soldiering. A plethora of legal instruments 
has been promulgated to protect the rights of children. The regime includes the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); the Optional protocol on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict; (OPAC); the Convention concerning the 
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child 
Labour; the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the Universal 
Article 25 (2); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 24) 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 10) 
as well as soft law instruments. 1163 However, jurisprudential examination suggests a 
dearth in the ‘social meaning’ of child soldiering owing to under-criminalisation. 
Comparatively, the use of children in armed conflict has historically been less 
stigmatic.The true goal of stigmatising practices should be to stigmatize the 
crimes.1164 
8.3.1 Under-enforcement 
 
Child recruitment and sexual violence have been frequent in military conflicts since 
far back in history, but these practices have been considered differently in different 
time periods.1165 Rape, for instance, was seen both as a property crime and as a crime 
against the honour of the husband or the family before being considered as a crime 
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against women or a ‘gender crime.’1166 Rape and sexual violence were codified as 
international crimes much earlier than child recruitment, although initially in a 
limited manner.1167 Comparatively, sex crimes were prosecuted earlier as illustrated 
by the Foča cases at the ICTY. As illustrated in Chapter 3, historically, child 
soldiering has been under-criminalised, and thus also been less stigmatic compared 
to the murder crimes. In the hierarchy of mass crimes or ‘mass atrocities’, child 
soldiering has appeared less ‘atrocious’. The statutes of criminal tribunals did not 
protect children who participated in warfare. Children who participated in military 
conflict were regarded as ‘brave’, ‘heroic’ and ‘patriotic. The four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions are silent with regard to the direct involvement of children in armed 
conflict, but Geneva Convention IV on the protection of civilians makes a number of 
important references to children and their protection. On the other hand, the two 
1977 Additional Protocols (‘AP’) I and II to the Geneva Conventions are perfectly 
explicit in their prohibition of the acts of recruiting or using children under the age of 
15 in armed conflict. Such acts are not, however, considered by these instruments as 
‘grave breaches.’1168 
 
The first prosecutions for child soldiering were conducted at the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (SCSL) established in 2002. An important contribution in the area of 
international criminal law by the SCSL relates to the Norman Case.1169The defence 
had invoked the doctrine of nullum crimen sine lege 1170(no crime without law) 
arguing that the recruitment of child soldiers was not a crime when the crimes were 
committed – before 1996 - until the Rome Statute of 1998 establishing the ICC, 
ratified in 2002. In May 2004, the SCSL issued a landmark decision affirming that 
an individual may be held criminally responsible for the recruitment of child 
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combatants. The Appeals Chamber of the Special Court held that the recruitment of 
child soldiers, namely the conscription, enlistment and use to participate actively in 
hostilities of children aged under 15, was a crime under customary international law 
attracting individual criminal responsibility since at least November 1996.  
Recognition of the prohibition was ‘both widespread and virtually universal in 
international treaties, state practice, and other international resolutions and 
instruments.’1171 The recruitment of children into armed conflict ‘is and was 
unquestionably a violation of international humanitarian law at the time the alleged 
offences took place.’1172 
 
However, Happold asserts, the authority of the decision is weakened by the 
unconvincing evidence relied upon by the Appeal Chamber in coming to its 
conclusions and by a strong dissent from one of the judges.1173  In his dissent, Judge 
Robertson distinguished conscription from enlistment, arguing that individual 
criminal responsibility did not attach to the offence of enlistment until the Rome 
Treaty of the International Criminal Court was adopted in July 1998.  Justice 
Robertson described conscription as ‘implying some use of force, implying 
compulsion, albeit in some cases through force of law. 1174  The narrower crime of 
‘abduction and forced recruitment of children under the age of 15 years into armed 
forces or groups for the purpose of using them to participate actively in hostilities’ 
was a crime under customary international law during the period in question. 
However, in his view, the broader crime of ‘conscripting or enlisting children under 
the age of 15 years into armed forces or armed groups or using them to participate 
actively in hostilities’ was not such a crime.1175 Accordingly, he argued, the 
indictment for enlistment before this date violates the principle of nullem crimen 
sine lege (no crime without law).1176In concluding that the prohibition on child 
recruitment had crystallized as customary international law before November 1996, 
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the Appeal Chamber simply based its findings on the widespread ratification of AP II 
and the CRC, as well as the lack of any reservations to the CRC specifically seeking to 
avoid Article 38.1177 
Happold also notes that the OPAC simply put an obligation on states to take 
measures to prevent the use of child combatants by non-governmental armed 
groups, where in many such cases the threat of criminal sanctions would seem to be 
the only measure available. OPAC imposes no concomitant obligation on states to 
criminalise illegal uses of child soldiers by their officials.1178 Further, opinion juris on 
criminalisation of child soldiering by states is lacking. Only three examples could be 
found of states having explicitly criminalized child recruitment prior to 1996 and two 
of them were on the basis that the state had criminalized all breaches of AP II.1179   
Whether the outlawry of child soldiering has assumed customary law status or not, 
no examples of a person having been prosecuted for having recruited child soldiers 
could be found.1180 Conduct is criminalisable when it involves wrongful harm that is 
fairly imputable to the person being (criminalised) blamed for that harm.1181 On the 
other hand, under-criminalisation suggests that ‘some very harmful and destructive 
actions or inactions that are not criminal should be.’1182  Without specific criminal 
statutes, then acts - regardless of how offensive, harmful or egregious they are – are 
not crimes.1183The crime of conscription, enlistment and use of child combatants did 
not exist in the statutes of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and other 
tribunals. International criminal justice appeared fixated on crimes of human 
extermination. The Holocaust, Sebrenica and Rwanda, for example, tend to readily 
evoke a sense of outrage. For instance, after the Nazi atrocities, the crimes were 
described as ‘radical evil.’1184Some argue that genocide is the worst crime, followed 
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by crimes against humanity and then war crimes.1185The ICTR described genocide as 
‘the crime of crimes’.1186 Under this paradigm, mass violence is constructed as 
something extraordinarily transgressive of universal norms.1187 The under-
criminalisation of child soldiering appears to be the result of the focus on the 
prevention of future deaths of civilians1188 arising from these human-sponsored 
catastrophes. Comparatively, thus, crimes of mass human eliminationism have been 
expressed in jurisprudence and literature since Nuremberg.1189  Child soldiering was 
criminalized in the SCSL statute, drawing its provisions from the Rome Statute of 
1998, establishing the ICC. Thematic prosecutions would thus be premised on 
elevating the stigma or social meaning of children’s participation in armed conflict. 
8.3.2 Child soldiering: Gravity 
 
A common element in international criminal law is ‘gravity’. As noted above, the use 
of children in armed conflict appeared a lesser ‘atrocity’ or none at all because it did 
not eventuate in mass deaths. Thus, it did not draw a sense of any gravity. ‘Gravity’ 
appears the key criterion in the Rome Statute,1190 but it does not define it. The OTP, 
according to its own guidelines, assesses this criterion having regard to both 
quantitative and qualitative considerations, including: (a) the scale of the crimes (b) 
nature of the crimes (c) manner of (d) their impact.1191 Child soldiering often occurs 
at a large scale with children rounded conscripted or persuaded to join state armies 
or/and armed groups. The use of children in armed conflict may not result in the 
horror-inducing mass fatalities, but it can be argued that ‘non-murder’ crimes are 
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still no less egregious or extraordinary. Evidence suggests that children’s 
participation in war has long term psycho-social impact.1192Those who survive often 
suffer trauma, injury, abuse, and psychological scarring from the violence and 
brutality they experience.1193 The ‘exposure to chronic and traumatic stress during 
development leaves the children with mental and related physical ill-health, notably 
PTSD and severe personality changes.’1194 Such ‘exposure also deprives the child 
from a normal and healthy development and impairs their integration into society as 
a fully functioning member.’1195 Non-murder crimes could be deemed more egregious 
because society has to contend with the ill-effects on the living than the dead. Greijer 
points out that ‘the selection of crimes in international courts should reflect the 
reality in which sexual slavery and the transformation of young children into 
slaughter machines– that is, crimes involving a complete deprivation of the victims’ 
value as human beings, or ‘murder of the soul’1196 – can, depending on the situation, 
be of greater gravity than the deprivation of lives on a battlefield.’1197Considered in 
this manner, the thematic selection of child soldiering falls within the prosecutorial 
conditions of ‘gravity.’ When faced with a situation in which a great number of the 
victims are survivors, special attention needs to be paid to the restorative potential of 
international criminal justice.1198 The goal of restorative justice may in some cases 
justify the choice to prosecute sex crimes and crimes against children, and to invest 
the necessary resources in order to do so in a way that is sensitive to the 
particularities of those crimes.1199 While crimes involving killings are universally 
recognised as crimes of the most serious nature, it seems important to work for an 
equal recognition of the gravity of sex crimes and crimes against children, which 
severely affect the future of an already war-torn society and its members.1200 
 
                                                          
1192 C. Bayer,  F. Klasen and H. Adam  ‘Association of Trauma and PTSD Symptoms With Openness to 
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1193See ‘What’s Going on – Child Soldiers’ 
http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/childsoldiers/whatsgoingon/ 
1194E. Schauer and T Elbert, ‘The Psychological Impact of Child Soldiering’ in E. Martz (ed.) Trauma 
Rehabilitation After War and Conflict, (Springer New York 2010) 
1195Ibid 
1196 B. Nowrojee, ‘Your Justice is Too Slow: Will the ICTR Fail Rwanda’s Rape Victims?’ United 
Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Occasional Paper 10, November 2005, p. 1.   
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8.3.3 Discrimination 
 
Drumbl points out that at the very core of the extraordinariness of atrocity crimes is 
conduct – planned, systematized, and organized – that targets large numbers of 
individuals based on their actual or perceived membership in a particular group that 
has become selected as a target, in particular on discriminatory grounds. 1201The 
gravity of genocide relates to segregation for elimination in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group.1202‘[C]onviction requires proof that the 
victim was seen as belonging to such a group; that is, that the victim was chosen 
because of perceived membership in a group targeted for destruction. This complex 
mens rea - this element of a group mentality - characterizes genocide and no other 
crime.’1203One premise ‘to give priority to sex crimes in setting the expressive agenda 
of international courts is that, unlike killing crimes, sex crimes virtually always 
involve the perpetrator’s discriminatory valuation of a group – usually women.’ 1204 
However, consideration of ‘gravity’ does not take into account this selectivity. This 
argument can be transposed to child soldiers. Children are recruited into armed 
forces and groups because they are targeted as impressionable, easy to manipulate 
and fearless. If the gravity of genocide is based on selectivity of certain groups, the 
gravity of child soldiering can also be premised on the targeting of a particular age 
group. While children lack the physical capacity of grown adults, they exhibit certain 
tendencies that some military leaders find appealing. Child soldiers considered ‘more 
fearless, loyal and obedient.’1205 A Congolese soldier summarises three main reasons 
why children make good soldiers: ‘they obey orders; they are not concerned about 
getting back to their wife and family and they don’t know fear.’1206 The conscription 
and enlistment of children for war ends are expressions of harms by the perpetrators. 
Anderson and Pildes state that: ‘A person suffers expressive harm when she is treated 
                                                          
1201 M Dumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge University Press 2007) 
1202See eg Rome Statute, Art. 6 
1203 D. Amann, ‘Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide’ (2002) 2 International Criminal Law 
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1204 M. deGuzman,  ‘An Expressive Rationale for the Thematic Prosecution of Sex Crimes’ in M 
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1205 S. Gates and J. Andvig, ‘Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict’, paper presented at the Dutch 
Flemish Association for Economy and Peace, 22 June 2006. 
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according to principles that express negative or inappropriate attitudes toward 
her.’1207  Such expressions contest widely-held social meanings and have concrete 
negative consequences.1208 ‘Expressive harms’, unlike the injuries typically 
recognized by the common law, are not material (physical or economic) injuries.1209  
Rather, they specifically focus on the message - usually a message of racial, gender, 
or religious inferiority,1210 or in this case, ‘inferior’ age group. Child soldiering is thus 
an expressive harm based on discrimination. Child soldiering, as an expressive harm, 
illustrates the traditionally harmful imbalance of power relations between a stronger 
and weaker category of human beings. Discriminatory crimes are in greater need of 
prevention because they express the perpetrator’s view that not just the victim, but 
an entire class of people, is less valuable and thus deserving of ill 
treatment.1211According to Hampton, punishment is thus justified because it is a 
required response to another expressive act: the wrong.1212  To intentionally wrong 
another person is to treat that person as having lower value than oneself; it is to 
demean her.1213 Not only is criminal law expressive; so too is the criminal behaviour 
it addresses.1214 The concept of expressive harm is germane to the problem of child 
soldiering. The deliberate conscription, enlistment and use of children in hostilities 
are based on the vulnerability of a weaker age group that can be sacrificed. 
 
8.4 Thematic prosecutions and cosmopolitan justice 
 
Constructivists consider shared international norms to have an impact because of 
their mutually constitutive nature: interacting actors construct norms; norms guide 
                                                          
1207 E. Anderson and R. Pildes, ‘Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement’  ( 2000) 148 
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Pildes and R. Niemi ‘Expressive Harms, ‘“Bizarre Districts” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-
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the actors’ behaviour; and norms may change the definition of the actors’ preferences 
and even identity.1215The expressive function of law is central for our identity…’1216 
That identity attributes the positive effects of ICL to a ‘collective conscience’1217 or the 
‘totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society,’ 
1218 in this case the ‘international society.’  The laws and prosecution for child 
soldiering would illustrate the humanistic values on child soldiering – ‘a concern for 
human beings that extends beyond borders’1219that cosmopolitanism and the 
‘collective conscience’ expound. The centrality of cosmopolitanism is the recognition 
of every individual’s equal moral standing.1220Treating people as ends in themselves 
requires thinking universally.1221 Restricting moral concern to one’s own state 
renders any belief in equality incomplete.1222 If the purpose of international 
prosecution is to reaffirm the values and identity of the international community, 
that identity is more seriously threatened by crimes involving discrimination than by 
non-discriminatory crimes.1223  A crime that conveys the perpetrator’s devaluation of 
a particular class of people is more worthy of condemnation than a comparable act 
that does not.1224 Human equality is at the centre of cosmopolitan discourse. Drawing 
from Kant, Hayden stresses the centrality of the individual as an equal being and 
member of a global community.1225 Cosmopolitan duties ‘to recognise individual 
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equality apply to individuals as well as the global institutional/legal order.’1226 The 
CRC states that ‘no child should be treated unfairly on any basis’1227Assuming the 
international community is a ‘community’ in a meaningful sense, Sunstein asserts, 
‘that community may have an ‘integrity interest’ in countering normative expression 
that conflicts with the community’s vision of its identity.’1228 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
The prosecutor holds significant power in the selection of cases. However, each time 
his selections have been confronted by controversy. This is because the prosecutor is 
accused of acting from political motivations. As has been noted, such controversy 
arises because the ICC has lacked clear goals for the cases it selects. This thesis 
argues that the most plausible philosophical justification for the cases the ICC selects 
is the expressive function of law. This chapter has focused on ‘thematic prosecutions’ 
as an expressive function. ‘Thematic prosecution’ refers to the prosecutorial practice 
of selecting certain crimes and prioritising particular phenomena within 
international criminal indictments, usually for purposes related to the best use of 
limited resources,1229 but often also due to the symbolism of elevating attention on a 
given matter of international concern.1230Historically, the jurisprudence on military 
conflicts and its attendant literature appear to have given prominence to killing 
crimes. This primacy of the massacre subsumed other transgressions during political 
and social catastrophes. Sex crimes and crimes again children did not feature on the 
radar of international statutes and judicial processes. The feminist lobby has made 
an impact in influencing approaches to sex crimes. This chapter has sought to 
transpose arguments advanced for ‘thematic prosecutions’ for sex crimes to child 
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soldiering. Thematic prosecutions intend to give priority to under-judicialised 
crimes. Some the justificatory grounds for prioritising sex crimes are the under-
recognised gravity, historical enforcement failure and the discriminatory nature of 
the crimes. These observations apply to child soldiering. Until the establishment of 
the SCSL, the conscription, enlistment and use of children in armed conflict had been 
under-criminalised. I have argued above that this focus could also have been the 
result of international criminal law’s concentration on mass murder crimes. While 
mass killings are indeed grave, there is a plausible argument that ‘non-murder’ 
crimes are serious – or even more serious – considering societies have to contend 
with the ill-effects of conflict on the living. Psychological problems and possibilities 
of recidivism pose considerable threats to post-conflict societies. Further, child 
soldiering is a discriminatory crime targeting a vulnerable social group. However, 
this selectivity has not been part of the calculus of gravity. Thematic prosecutions 
have been conceptualised to reorient international criminal law towards these under-
recognised crimes. Ultimately, the goal is to advance cosmopolitan norms and 
identity affirmation by shoring up social meanings of under-enforced norms through 
focused penology, and also develop prosecutorial approaches to such crimes.    
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CHAPTER NINE 
LUBANGA AND EXPRESSIVISM 
 
Introduction 
 
International criminal justice is bereft of a viable theory suitable for its own context. 
The paradigm of ICL has been burdened by multifarious objectives.  However, these 
goals are either unsuitable or expand beyond the core functions of the court. This 
thesis argues that the most plausible philosophical justification for the selection and 
prosecution of Lubanga is the expressive function of law. Expressivism is a modest 
but important goal. It takes cognisance of the gravity of crimes, the constraints of 
international courts and proposes a socio-pedagogical function. International 
criminal justice remains largely symbolic because of limited resources; international 
courts can only conduct illustrative prosecutions.1231 Neither the legal mandate of the 
ICC nor the resources available to it are sufficient to allow it to fulfil the world’s high 
expectations.1232 In Lubanga, the Pre-Trial Chamber approved the Prosecutor’s 
Policy Paper statement of 2003 that as a general rule the OTP should focus its 
investigative and prosecutorial resources on those who bear the greatest 
responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organization allegedly responsible 
for those crimes.1233Thus, ‘the primary significance of the International Criminal 
Court will be its symbolic significance.’1234 The few cases that the ICC can prosecute 
may perform illustrative functions.’ Thematic prosecution’ as a penal approach 
presents a justificatory framework for prioritisation and ‘illustration’ of particular 
crimes.  This is an expressive objective.Rather than objectives of retribution and 
deterrence, an expressive approach to ICL suggests that a primary purpose of 
international criminal trials is to express global norms.1235 This is a more plausible 
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rationale considering the constraints of the courts, which limit the number of 
defendants. 
 
Apart from resource-based arguments, as Drumbl notes, there ‘is cause to believe 
that expressivism may be a more plausible justification for the punishment of 
extraordinary international criminals.’1236 Although both expressivism and 
deterrence aim to discourage future atrocities, they take different routes.1237 
Deterrence theories assert that individuals will be dissuaded from committing 
extraordinary international crimes because of fear of getting caught. Expressivist 
theories, instead, adopt a more of an intergenerational focus that speaks to audiences 
beyond those already tempted to commit crimes.1238 ‘[P]unishment may not simply 
frighten individuals who might themselves commit crimes but also play a role in 
communicating the standards of a community to its members, thereby influencing 
their moral and social development…’.1239 I have pointed out the objective of 
propagating international norms is based on the presumption of an existing 
normative community. The Rome Statute ‘is a particularly significant development 
because of the constitutive symbolic function of criminal law as a community-
creating, community-maintaining device.’1240 Rather than expectations on deterrence 
the ICC, would instead serve as ‘a symbolic affirmation of the ties that hold a 
community together and by fostering a sense that one is a law-abiding citizen.’1241 An 
expressive justification for the prosecution of Lubanga would be premised on the 
propagation of the cosmopolitan values against egregious crime of child soldiering. 
With these observations in mind, this chapter seeks to apply expressivism to 
Lubanga. The chapter focuses more on the ‘practical’ approach to expressivism. The 
chapter highlights practices that enhanced and depreciated the expressive value of 
Lubanga. This chapter is organised as follows. The first section discusses the ICC 
and expressive effect of its status as the most prominent global penal institution. The 
second part attempts to apply expressivism to Lubanga, examining (a) the expressive 
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function of selection, trial, verdict; and punishment. The third part discusses media 
and norm transmission. The last part discusses norm internalisation. 
 
9.1 ICC jurisdiction: situational opportunity 
 
9.1.1 Complementarity 
 
Even where the ICC has jurisdiction, it will not necessarily act. It is a court of last 
resort. States have the first responsibility and right to prosecute international crimes. 
The ICC may only exercise jurisdiction where national legal systems fail to do so, 
including where they purport to act but in reality are unwilling or unable to 
genuinely carry out proceedings.1242 ‘Unwillingness’ implies some form of action by 
or on behalf of the concerned state, while ‘inability’ means that judicial activity is not 
possible because of ‘a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of [a state’s] 
national judicial system’ which precludes it from obtaining ‘the accused or the 
necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise … carry[ing] out its proceedings.’1243 
The principle of complementarity is based both on respect for the primary 
jurisdiction of States and on considerations of efficiency and effectiveness, since 
States will generally have the best access to evidence and witnesses and the resources 
to carry out proceedings.1244 The establishment of an international order wherein 
national institutions respond effectively to international crimes, thereby obviating 
the need for trials before the ICC, would indeed be a major success for the Court and 
the international community as a whole.1245 As a consequence of complementarity, 
the number of cases that reach the Court should not be a measure of its efficiency. 
The ‘sad reality, however, is that national institutions have all too frequently proven 
unable or unwilling to address international crimes.’1246 International criminal 
justice remains relevant. 
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Whereas the ICC faces situational constraints, court is ‘a highly visible, institutional 
trademark of the international rule of law, respect for human rights, and 
accountability for those who participate in the worst of atrocities.’ 1247 Because of its 
status, the ICC therefore enjoys a ‘situational opportunity’ to propagate 
(international) social meanings. Law has ‘social meaning’1248 related to the stigma it 
creates.  While the ICC promotes ‘positive complementarity’ – the need for states to 
prosecute crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC – the international court remains 
the most prominent criminal law platform to propagate global norms.  To ‘be 
prosecuted by the ICC is in a sense a double stigma: The substantive charge imposes 
stigma, but so does the fact that one is being tried by the ICC, a body that presents 
itself as an emanation of mankind.’1249 Since these offences are constructed as being 
of concern to humanity as a whole, which ‘deeply shock the conscience of humanity’ 
it is such crime that can justify an internationalisation of their prosecution…’1250 
There ‘is an assumption…that the punishment inflicted by an international tribunal 
operating prominently on the global agenda at the cusp of history has enhanced 
expressive value in asserting the importance of law and the stigmatization of the 
offender who transgresses that law.1251 Selection of crimes to prosecute, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, is critical. ICC prosecutions carry particular stigma given 
their highly selective character and the attendant belief, apparent from public 
opinion, that the prosecutor ‘must be pretty sure’ of her case to have selected a 
particular defendant.1252 For Durkheim, the true goal of stigmatising practices should 
be to stigmatise the crimes themselves as forms of reprehensible deviancy, rather 
than the individuals as such.1253 
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While the SCSL made jurisprudential breakthrough with the first conviction on child 
soldiering, its lower status limited its capacity to express, stigmatise and reinforce 
the global norms against child soldiering. Compared to domestic courts, 
international criminal tribunals have superior qualities in norm expression.1254 The 
SCSL may indeed have served expressive purposes in the immediate and afflicted 
Sierra Leonean community. However, its seminal ruling on child soldiering has been 
more a subject of legal academy than a matter of broad international consumption by 
the media and ordinary people. The SCSL is most frequently referred to within the 
context of another story.1255 At times the Court has been mentioned in discussions 
about future war crime trials for Iraq and Darfur, and at other times in the context of 
controversial institutional matters, such as the legal battles of staff members.1256 
International criminal law (ICL) ‘purports to serve multiple communities - ethnic or 
national communities — and the figurative ‘international community.’1257Criminal 
law is supposed to be concerned with harms to ‘the whole community, considered as 
a community, in its social aggregate capacity.’1258 The Rome Statue alludes to crimes 
that ‘deeply shock the conscience of humanity.’1259 The ICC thus becomes the symbol 
of the collective conscience, ‘its living expression in the eyes of all.’1260 The criminal 
law process serves as ‘a symbolic affirmation of the ties that hold a community 
together and by fostering a sense that one is a law-abiding citizen.’1261 Some have 
argued against the surrender of prosecution for international crimes to domestic 
jurisdictions. Durkheim pointed out that ‘specificity of modern criminal justice 
systems is that this collective reaction is exercised through the medium of body 
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acting upon those of its members who have violated certain rules of conduct.’1262  
Since these offences concern to humanity as a whole, international institutions 
representative of the global community become legitimated as the ideal institutions 
to dispense justice and inflict punishment.1263 
 
‘[I]t must be kept in mind that only crimes which ‘deeply shock the conscience of 
humanity’ can justify an internationalization of their prosecution, which involves a 
far-reaching blow to the competence of domestic courts on an issue which otherwise 
would come under matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
States … when such serious crimes are at stake … it is then important that they not be 
‘confiscated’ by any particular state, including the one in which the crime has been 
committed or of which the victims or the authors are nationals.’1264 
 
9.2 Lubanga: expressive selection? 
 
To suggest that the most plausible justification for the prosecution of Lubanga is 
expressivism is not to state this was the deliberate motivation behind his trial. 
Instead, the thesis argues it ought to be the most viable premise compared to the 
ICC’s dominant penological objectives of retribution and deterrence. On March 
2005, the DRC issued a warrant of arrest on charges of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, including crimes of murder and illegal detention. Under the OTP’s 
principle positive complementarity, it would have encouraged national prosecution. 
The DRC national justice system was functional at the time. The court only 
proceeded against Lubanga because the DRC did not include the charge of 
conscription, enlistment and using child soldiers. 1265 Fatou Bensouda, then Deputy 
Prosecutor of the ICC noted:  
‘It is the view of the Office of the Prosecutor that the abuse of child soldiers has gone 
largely unrecognised and unpunished for too long. . .  Regardless of the outcome of 
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(Viking Press 1965) 254, 269 
1264 K. Kleffner, Internationalised Criminal Courts  (Oxford University Press 2004) 437, 438  
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these proceedings, the hearing (on Lubanga) represents an unprecedented 
opportunity to shine a spotlight on this abuse of children worldwide.’1266 
 
 Some assert that the selection of child soldiering crimes was purposeful on the part 
of the ICC. Bergsmo and Wui Ling, for instance, suggest that: ‘[B]y ‘singling out the 
theme of recruitment and use of child soldiers in its first case, the ICC legitimises the 
very idea of thematic prosecution at the international and national levels.’1267 Greijer 
seems to argue, however, that the exclusive prosecution of Lubanga for the crimes of 
recruiting and using children in armed conflict did not represent a deliberate strategy 
of the OTP.1268 Rather, ‘the context in which the Lubanga investigation unfolded 
strongly influenced the case against him.’1269According to Greijer, two arguments 
seem to have influenced the choice to try him solely for crimes against children. 
1270‘First, it is hard to deny that the overwhelming evidence of massive, and often 
brutal, child recruitment and the gravity of that crime played a role in selecting it for 
prosecution. Second, there was an important element related to the Court as such 
and its credibility.’1271She also points out that failing to arrest the LRA members 
indicted for the Uganda situation, made it imperative for Lubanga to be prosecuted, 
even if that would mean trying him for only a fraction of the crimes he may have 
been responsible for.1272 Risking the disappearance of Lubanga and a possible 
subsequent failure to arrest him simply was not an option. Geijer notes: 
‘In this sense, the principle of opportunity was used to its maximum. Although this 
may not represent an ideal prosecutorial strategy, the fact that it is a unique situation 
in the Court’s developing case law thus far tells us that we should not be too hard on 
this relatively new and inexperienced institution.’1273 
 
                                                          
1266F. Bensouda, Deputy Prosecutor of the ICC, Statement at the OTP Monthly Media Briefing 3 (28 
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FICHL Publication Series No. 13 (Torkel Opsahl Academic E-Publisher, Beijing,  (2012),2 
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As DeGuzman points out, the ICC lacks sufficiently clear goals and priorities to 
justify its decisions.1274  She argues that when the Court is faced with having to 
choose particular situations and cases over others that also deserve its attention, 
such decisions should aim to maximize the Court’s expression.1275 It has been 
arguedthat prosecutors at tribunals and courts should recognise that assigning 
stigma to certain types of behaviour is an important objective.1276  For  Durkheim, the 
objective  should be to stigmatize the crimes themselves as forms of reprehensible 
deviancy, rather than the individuals .1277  As such, the prosecutor has the upper hand 
in launching the process of designating what is most worth stigmatising.1278 It is she 
or he who will typically be criticised if certain states, groups, crimes, or victims are 
insufficiently represented in charges.1279 
 
During the confirmation of charges against Lubanga, the OTP presented narrow 
charges of recruiting, enlisting and actively using child soldiers. The ICC Chamber 
later strongly deprecated ‘the attitude of the former prosecutor in relation to the 
issue of sexual violence.’1280  Former ICC prosecutor Moreno Ocampo had advanced 
extensive submissions regarding sexual violence in his opening and closing 
submissions at trial. In his arguments on sentence, he contended that sexual violence 
is an aggravating factor that should be reflected by the Chamber. However, the 
Chamber noted that  ‘not only did the former prosecutor fail to apply to include 
sexual violence or sexual slavery at any stage during these proceedings, including in 
the original charges, but he actively opposed taking this step during the trial when he 
submitted that it would cause unfairness to the accused if he was convicted on this 
basis.’1281 The Confirmation Decision did not include any findings in this regard.1282 
Ultimately, the Chamber ruled: 
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‘On the basis of the totality of the evidence introduced during the trial on this issue, 
the Majority is unable to conclude that sexual violence against the children who were 
recruited was sufficiently widespread that it could be characterised as occurring in 
the ordinary course of the implementation of the common plan for which Mr 
Lubanga is responsible. Moreover, nothing suggests that Mr Lubanga ordered or 
encouraged sexual violence, that he was aware of it or that it could otherwise be 
attributed to him in a way that reflects his culpability.’1283 
 
The Chamber did not address whether acts of sexual violence can be counted as 
‘using [children] to participate actively in hostilities.’ The controversial decision to 
charge Lubanga only with crimes related to child soldiers may indeed have been 
animated by expressive goals.1284 Expressivists suggest that the decision to proceed 
in the absence of evidence of arguably more serious crimes such as murder and rape 
seemed to reflect a desire to promote the relatively new and ill-established norm 
against the recruitment and use of child soldiers.1285 This ‘thematic approach’ seems 
to be supported by Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo’s contention that a separate charge 
of sexual violence would detract from the fact that the girls were, first and foremost, 
child soldiers.1286When a prosecutor focuses on charges against a suspected offender 
in a ‘particular evolving area of international criminal law, there is a possibility of 
worldwide attention being drawn to that area of criminal actions.’1287The exclusion of 
sexual violence and failure to make a declaration on the state of the offence would 
later trigger a legal debate as evidenced by the dissenting opinion of Justice Odio 
Benito,1288 in academia1289 and the international community.1290Dissenting opinions 
or judgments have been an important feature of international courts for many 
years.1291 
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9.2.1 Expressive function of Lubanga arrest and trial 
 
Expressivism does not just focus on the expressive role of punishment but the 
expressive role of the legal process.1292 Expressivists contend that arrest, trial, 
conviction and punishment appreciate public respect for law.1293Trials in particular 
are ‘expressive acts broadcasting the news that mass atrocities are, in fact, heinous 
crimes.’1294The ‘dramaturgy of the trial process’ is a tool for norm projection in 
international criminal law.1295  What emerges is an intensely dramaturgical process 
that narrates a story.1296 By dramatizing the effect of the law-breaking conduct 
through the spectacle of trial making, Lubanga made clear what was not previously 
understood.1297 
‘Trials can educate the public through the spectacle of theatre – there is, after all, 
pedagogical value to performance and communicative value to dramaturgy. This 
performance is made all the more weighty by the reality that, coincident with the 
closing act, comes the infliction of shame, sanction and stigma upon the 
antagonists.’1298 
 
Since ‘expressivism is concerned with the narrative and messaging function of law, it 
places considerable importance on the methodology of how individuals are convicted 
and punished and, thereby, has come to value due process and legalism.’1299 
Therefore, we should not just focus on the expressive role of punishment but the 
expressive role of the legal process.1300 ‘Deterrence’ and ‘retribution’ feature as 
pronouncements at the tail-end of trials. For all its faults, it can be observed from 
Lubanga that the court went to great lengths to protect the due process rights of the 
accused and ensure a fair trial. After the trial started on 13 June 2008, the Court 
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announced a stay of the proceedings because the Prosecution was unable to make 
available potentially exculpatory materials.1301 The Prosecutor had obtained the 
evidence on a confidential basis from several sources, including the UN, and these 
sources had refused to disclose it to the Defence and, in most cases, to the Trial 
Chamber.1302 Trial Chamber explained that ― ‘[t]he disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence in the possession of the prosecution is a fundamental aspect of the 
accused’s right to a fair trial.’1303 On 2 July 2008, Trial Chamber I issued an order 
granting unconditional release to Lubanga.1304 The Prosecution appealed the order 
which was given suspensive effect, meaning that the accused would not leave 
detention until the Appeals Chamber had resolved the issue.  
 
On 11 July 2008, the Prosecution requested Trial Chamber I to resume trial 
proceedings and to revoke the order of release of Lubanga. But Trial Chamber I 
decided to maintain the stay of the proceedings. Lubanga, however, remained in 
detention until a final decision was taken by the ICC Appeals Chamber on the appeal 
of the order granting him unconditional release. On 21 October 2008, the Appeals 
Chamber rejected the appeal by the prosecutor to revive the trial. The judges, 
however, ruled that Lubanga’s release is not the ‘inevitable’ consequence and ‘the 
only correct course’ to take.’1305The judges remanded the matter back to the Trial 
Chamber for a new determination. On 18 November 2008, Trial Chamber I 
announced the trial would start on 26 January 2009.  
 
To procure witnesses in the DRC, the OTP used several ‘intermediaries’; individuals 
who would assist the investigation by sourcing former child combatants and 
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communicating with them and their families.1306 During the trial, nine witnesses who 
claimed to have been child combatants in the FPLC gave evidence at the trial. Not 
one of the witnesses was found by the Court to have been honest and reliable.1307 
Most of the judgment focuses on the findings in relation these witnesses and the 
‘intermediaries’ who may have manipulated them.1308 Ultimately, the court convicted 
Lubanga without depending on the direct testimony of underage members of his 
militia. The ‘judgment evinced the view that conviction need not necessarily depend 
on the testimony of children; rather, conviction for child soldiering may be secured 
on the testimony of others, coupled with certain documents-most importantly in 
Lubanga, videotapes of the defendant surrounded by bodyguards whose very young 
age was evident even without the benefit of birth certificates or grade school 
rosters.’1309 The absence of important records diminished the expressive impact of 
the Lubanga.1310 It is to be hoped ‘that a richer trove of creditable evidence will be 
adduced in subsequent international prosecutions.’1311 For the first time in the 
history of international criminal justice, victims have the possibility under the 
Statute to present their views and observations before the Court.1312 The recognition 
of victims’ participatory rights in criminal proceedings is a novelty in international 
criminal law.1313 It has been asserted that victims can provide the Court with 
knowledge that only those who experience these crimes can give and ‘their 
attendance in person at the trial may help in establishing the truth.’1314  The Chamber 
authorised 129 victims to participate.1315  The Chamber dismissed the testimony of 
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the three victims who gave evidence.1316 However, as a concept, the participation of 
victims, although represented during proceedings by legal practitioners, adds to the 
dramaturgy and expressive value of the trial process.  
 
Expressivism is designed to strengthen faith in the rule of law among the general 
public;1317 it transcends retribution and deterrence in claiming as a central goal the 
crafting of historical narratives, their authentication as truths, and their pedagogical 
dissemination to the public.1318The President of the Yugoslavia Tribunal stated that 
in international criminal trials, ‘a fully reliable record is established of atrocities so 
that future generations can remember and be made fully cognisant of what 
happened.’1319 The ‘desire to set the historical record straight, and to restore the 
integrity of human remembrance, is greatly strengthened by the belief that truth 
telling about the past is a necessary precondition for reconciliation and avoidance of 
future conflicts.’1320 The ‘power to discover and represent facts provides these trials a 
unique opportunity to shape the historical knowledge of the atrocities that 
transpired.’1321 Also ‘[G]raphic accounts of past human rights abuses and war crimes 
may be a powerful tool to internalize norms prohibiting such conduct.’1322However, 
problems arise because adversarial systems have to deal with competing narratives. 
As Osiel notes, in transitional trials ‘the criminal courtroom will inevitably be viewed 
as providing a forum in which competing historical accounts of recent catastrophes 
will be promoted... and judgments likely will be viewed as endorsing one or another 
version of collective memory.’1323 The procedural scrupulousness and rigour of 
authentication in Lubanga in, for example, the insistence on the availability of 
exculpatory evidence and the elimination of witnesses and victims lacking credibility 
suggest that efforts to establish that a plausible historical record on Lubanga were 
made. The perceived fairness of the trial may have enhanced the sociological 
                                                          
1316Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-
01/06-2842, TC [14 March 2012] para 485–502 
1317 ibid 173 
1318 ibid 
1319 A. Cassese, ‘Reflections on International Criminal Justice’  (198) 61Modern Law Review1, 1 
1320 M. Damaska, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ (2008) 83Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 329, 335 
1321V. Padmanabhan ‘Norm Internationalization through Trials for Violations of International Law: 
Four Conditions for Success and Their Application to Trials of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay’ (2009) 
3 Journal of International Law 427, 438 
1322Ibid 
1323 M. Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory and the Law (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1997), 39-40. 
237 
 
legitimacy and norm internalization. What the court may have lacked in sociological 
legitimacy, the trial recouped in procedural legitimacy.  
 
9.2.2 Expressive role of Lubanga verdict 
 
Expressivists are interested in ‘how legal ‘statements’ might be designed to change 
social norms.’1324 The expressive value of story-telling is enhanced when it takes the 
form of a judicial pronouncement, cloaked in a mantle of authority, which can intone 
an aura of impartiality.1325 As Douglas notes, trials tell stories and narrate events – 
publicly – and then impose punishment on the guilty in a manner that can shame 
and stigmatize.1326 It ‘is the judges who ultimately decide whether stigma will be 
confirmed through judgment.’1327 The court ruled that Lubanga as the President of 
the UPC/FPLC, and as the evidence had demonstrated, was simultaneously the 
Commander-in-Chief of the army and its political leader. He exercised an overall 
coordinating role over the activities of the UPC/FPLC. He was informed, on a 
substantive and continuous basis, of the operations of the FPLC.1328 He was closely 
involved in making decisions on recruitment policy and he actively supported 
recruitment initiatives.1329 He personally used children below the age of 15 amongst 
his bodyguards and he regularly saw guards of other UPC/FPLC members of staff 
who were below the age of 15. The Chamber concluded that these contributions by 
Lubanga, taken together, were essential to a common plan that resulted in the 
conscription and enlistment of girls and boys below the age of 15 into the UPC/FPLC 
and their use to actively participate in hostilities.1330  He was found guilty as a co-
perpetrator.  The court concluded:  
 
‘The accused and his co-perpetrators agreed to, and participated in, a common plan 
to build an army for the purpose of establishing and maintaining political and 
military control over Ituri. This resulted, in the ordinary course of events, in the 
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conscription and enlistment of boys and girls under the age of 15, and their use to 
participate actively in hostilities.’1331 
 
Lubanga’s FPLC recruited children by abduction, and put pressure on the population 
to permit recruitment and to accept the enlistment of children during the 
recruitment campaigns.1332 Apart from reinforcing law, trials ought to clarify it. 
 
‘And it is here that lies the great potential of international criminal tribunals, in their 
role in the development of humanitarian norm, via the elaboration of crimes that 
ensue from their violation; transporting us from theoretical or doctrinal speculations 
to concrete determinations of the constitutive elements of these crimes.’1333 
 
Lubanga as the first international proceeding involving only child-soldiering crimes 
‘offered a first interpretation of the main features characterising these crimes…’1334  
and it ‘more generally provided early clarifications on both procedural and 
substantive legal issues relevant to the international criminal justice system 
established by the Rome Statute.’1335 The Prosecution charged Lubanga under 
articles 8(2)(e)(vii) and 25(3)(a) of the Statute with the war crimes of conscripting 
and enlisting children under the age of 15 years into an armed group and using them 
to participate actively in hostilities. The Lubanga judgment dealt with a number of 
issues of law. All had didactic value. Because expressivism aims at altering norms, I 
shall, however, concentrate on decisions that had pertinent socio-pedagogical value 
or failed to advance this goal. For instance, I will not focus on minutiae of the 
decision that the conflict in Ituri was of a non-international and not international 
character. These aspects have been unpicked comprehensively elsewhere.1336 Instead, 
I shall concentrate on socially-oriented or socially valuable messages that would have 
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made DRC society, and indeed the international community, learn some aspects 
about child soldiering that might not have been clear. 
9.2.2.1 Recruitment 
 
The word ‘recruiting’, which is used in the Additional Protocols and in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), was replaced by ‘conscripting’ and 
‘enlisting’ in the Statute.1337The Trial Chamber ruled that Article 8(2) (e) (vii) 
established three different offences, which constitute war crimes if they took place in 
the context of, or are associated with, a non-international armed conflict. The Trial 
Chamber made a distinction between ‘conscription’ and ‘enlistment’ on the basis of 
the child’s consent. ‘Enlisting’ is defined as ‘to enrol on the list of a military body’ and 
‘conscripting’ is defined as ‘to enlist compulsorily.’ 1338 Therefore, the distinguishing 
element is that for conscription there is the added element of compulsion.1339Both of 
these, according to the Trial Chamber, are forms of recruitment, thus the distinction 
is irrelevant. This is an important clarification that might hold didactic value among 
armed forces and rebel groups. In assessing the evidence, the court noted for 
instance, that a witness seemed to consider that ‘voluntary’ enlistment is not a form 
of recruitment or a crime. However, recruitment, the court ruled, does not 
necessarily involve the conscription of children by force, given the many alternative, 
non-forceful ways of persuading children to join the military ‘voluntarily’ that were 
available.1340 The consent of a child to his or her recruitment does not provide an 
accused with a valid defence1341 but it may assume relevance only in relation to the 
determination of sentences or victim reparation. This is due to the fact that a girl or a 
boy under 15 years of age is unable to provide ‘genuine and informed consent when 
enlisting in an armed group or force.’1342 
 
These offences are committed at the moment a child under the age of 15 is enrolled 
in, or joins an armed group, with or without compulsion. In addition, they are 
continuous crimes, meaning that they only end when the child reaches 15 years of age 
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or leaves the force or group.1343On the conduct of using child soldiers to participate 
actively in hostilities, the Trial Chamber held that the reference to the expression ‘to 
participate actively’ covers a wider range of activities and roles than the expression 
‘direct participation’ used by Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.1344 I 
discuss this aspect below 
 
9.2.2.2 Nature of participation 
 
The Chamber also had to interpret the term ‘using [children] to participate actively in 
hostilities’ as contained in the charge. As noted from the Cape Town and Paris 
Principles (see Chapter 4:4.5), the definition of child soldiering has expanded from 
just direct military combat. The participating victims and the prosecution wanted the 
Trial Chamber to interpret ‘participate actively in hostilities’ as broadly as possible to 
include all of the children who were recruited by the UPC, even those who did not 
engage in combat on the front lines.1345 The Court had to decide whether the use of 
children as guards of military objects, bodyguards for commanders, couriers, spies 
and so on constituted ‘using them to participate actively in hostilities.’ The Lubanga 
judgment concluded the underlying common feature was whether the child 
concerned is, at the very least, a ‘potential target.’ The Chamber stated that: 
 
‘Those who participate actively in hostilities include a wide range of individuals, from 
those on the front line (who participate directly) through to the boys or girls who are 
involved in a myriad of roles that support the combatants. All of these activities, 
which cover either direct or indirect participation, have an underlying common 
feature: the child concerned is, at the very least, a potential target. The decisive 
factor, therefore, in deciding if an ‘indirect’ role is to be treated as active participation 
in hostilities is whether the support provided by the child to the combatants exposed 
him or her to real danger as a potential target. In the judgment of the Chamber these 
combined factors-the child's support and this level of consequential risk-mean that 
although absent from the immediate scene of the hostilities, the individual was 
nonetheless actively involved in them. Given the different types of roles that may be 
performed by children used by armed groups, the Chamber's determination of 
whether a particular activity constitutes 'active participation' can only be made on a 
case-by-case basis.’1346 
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Although absent from the immediate scene of the hostilities, the individual was 
nonetheless actively involved in them.1347  The ICC reaffirmed the expanding 
conception of actively participating in warfare as had been advocated by NGOs. 
Those who participate actively in hostilities include a wide range of individuals, from 
those on the front line (who participate directly) through to the boys or girls who are 
involved in a myriad of roles that support the combatants. 
 
9.2.2.3 Child soldiering and sex crimes 
 
As already noted, the chamber did not consider sexual crimes. The prosecutor 
adduced significant evidence of these crimes. Young girls participated in combat, 
they acted as guards and went out with the patrols, and in this sense they undertook 
the same routine duties as the other soldiers.1348 However, they were also used as 
sexual slaves and domestic servants. Their most important role was to assist the 
commanders by cooking, along with ‘other feminine tasks, routine tasks carried out 
by women.’1349 The Chamber took into account the evidence concerning domestic 
work undertaken by girls under the age of 15 when the support provided by the girl 
exposed her to danger by becoming a potential target.1350Although girls were often 
used to prepare food, they were also used to provide sexual services for the 
commanders. The commanders particularly treated the girls as if they were their 
‘women’ or their ‘wives.’1351 Commander Abelanga kept a girl under 15 years old at his 
home, for a considerable period of time. It was commonly known and commented on 
that this girl was Abelanga’s ‘wife.’ She prepared the commander’s food and 
notwithstanding her saying ‘I don’t want to’, her cries were heard at night.1352 
Commander Ndjabu retained another as his bodyguard (she later became pregnant 
by the brigade commander). 1353 
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A witness stated the girls she met at demobilisation centres, except for a few who had 
been protected by certain women in the camps,  claimed they had been sexually 
abused, most frequently by their commanders but also by other soldiers. Some fell 
pregnant, resulting in abortions; and there were instances of multiple abortions.  The 
witness gave evidence that the psychological and physical state of some of these 
young girls was catastrophic.1354 The youngest victim of this sexual abuse interviewed 
by the witness was 12 years old. The witness stated that some of those who became 
pregnant were thrown out of the armed group and ended up on the streets of 
Bunia.1355 
However, the Prosecutor failed to include allegations of sexual slavery or sexual 
violence in the charges. The majority of the Trial Chamber considered these acts to 
be irrelevant in connection to the charge of child soldiering. The situation would have 
been different if the OTP had also charged Lubanga with sex crimes. Although sexual 
violence is an element of the legal definition of the crimes of enlistment, conscription 
and use of children under the age of 15 to participate actively in hostilities, crimes of 
sexual violence are distinct and separate crimes that could have been evaluated 
separately by the Chamber if the Prosecutor would have presented charges against 
these criminal conducts.1356 Therefore, the evidence was considered irrelevant for the 
purposes of Article 74 of the Rome Statute stating ‘[T]he decision shall not exceed the 
facts and circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to the 
charges.’ These crimes or facts related to them were not included in the decision on 
the confirmation of charges handed down by the Pre-Trial Chamber. The Trial 
Chamber did not make any findings of fact on the issue, particularly as to whether 
responsibility was to be attributed to Lubanga.1357 While there are provisions to 
recharacterise crimes,1358 this can only be done within the facts and circumstances 
described in the charges. Article 74 (2) of the Rome Statute does not allow the Trial 
Chamber to rule beyond what is brought before the Court by the OTP. In her 
dissenting opinion, Judge Odio-Benito, pointed out that the majority ‘seems to 
confuse the factual allegations of this case with the legal concept of the crime, which 
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are independent’.1359 Judge Odio-Benito proposed the inclusion of sexual violence 
within the legal concept of using child soldiers to participate actively in the 
hostilities.1360 However, such recharacterisation would be inconsistent with Article 
23(2) of the Statute, which explicitly states that ‘the definition of a crime shall be 
strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy.1361  In case of ambiguity, the 
definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted, 
or convicted.1362  Therefore, the Trial Chamber excluded that a decision pursuant to 
Article 74 can cover factual allegations potentially supporting sexual slavery, since 
they had not been included in the decision on the confirmation of charges.1363The 
omission of these crucial components of child soldiering diminished expressive 
mileage of Lubanga. While the prosecutor advanced arguments about non-combat 
roles, his preclusion of sexual violence and sexual slavery under participating 
‘actively in hostilities’ shut an avenue for broad interpretation and evidence of sexual 
violence at trial.1364 The court was also reticent on ruling whether it constituted 
participating actively in hostilities, risking making the element invisible. This 
omission has devalued the full expression of the character of child soldiering. It 
failed to stigmatise adequately the sexual component of child soldiering. 
 
Dissenting opinions have played a remarkable role in the development of 
international law.1365 The importance of dissents is ‘due to the public nature of the 
proceedings and the fact that such decisions often address novel issues over which no 
solid body of jurisprudence has yet developed.’1366 Judge Benito argued that the 
Chamber should have clarified the law (on whether sexual violence constitutes 
participating actively in hostilities); in her opinion, by not doing so ‘the Majority of 
the Chamber is making this critical aspect of the crime invisible.’1367On the other 
hand, it has been argued that the focused charges on Lubanga triggered ‘an 
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international awareness of the social, psychological and legal nature of what 
constitutes the crime of conscripting or enlisting children into militias and using 
them to participate actively in hostilities…’1368The Prosecutor is responsible for 
designating what is most worth stigmatizing.1369 It is she or he who will face criticism 
‘if certain states, groups, crimes, or victims are insufficiently represented in 
charges.’1370In the Sentencing Decision, the Trial Chamber, with strong language, 
explicitly admonished former Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo:  
 
‘The Chamber strongly deprecates the attitude of the former Prosecutor in relation to 
the issue of sexual violence. He advanced extensive submissions as regards to sexual 
violence in his opening and closing submissions at trial, and in his arguments on 
sentence he contended that sexual violence is an aggravating factor that should be 
reflected by the Chamber. However, not only did the former Prosecutor fail to apply 
to include sexual violence or sexual slavery at any stage during these proceedings, 
including in the original charges, but he actively opposed taking this step during trial 
when he submitted that it would cause unfairness to the accused if he was convicted 
on this basis.’1371 
 
The possible consequence is that perpetrators of child militarisation may consider 
rape less stigmatic. Nonetheless, the Lubanga judgment still offered ‘interesting 
insights on the socio-pedagogical role of international criminal justice.’1372 A defence 
witness testified that Lubanga’s UPC did not have a policy of systematically 
recruiting children into the FPLC. Recruitment was not necessary, he pointed out, 
because ‘a lot of recruits came to get revenge for their families who had been killed’ 
and so they were ‘very keen volunteers.’1373 The Trial Chamber noted that from the 
defence witness’ account it appeared he considered that ‘voluntary’ enlistment was 
not a form of recruitment or a crime. As the Trial Chamber pointed out, recruitment 
did not necessarily involve the conscription of children by force, given the many 
alternatives, non-forceful ways of persuading children to join the military 
‘voluntarily’.1374 The Trial Chamber accepted the approach adopted by the Pre-Trial 
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Chamber that ‘conscription’ and ‘enlistment’ are both forms of recruitment, in that 
they refer to the incorporation of a boy or a girl under the age of 15 into an armed 
group, whether coercively (conscription) or voluntarily (enlistment).1375 However, the 
exclusion of sex crimes hampered the advancement in the development of law on 
child soldiering.  
9.2.3 Expressive role of Lubanga punishment 
 
The problem of penology in particular, however, concerns the appropriate 
explanation and justification of the legal institution of punishing wrongdoers.1376 
When a perpetrator is punished for committing a harm, what is the justification for 
that punishment?1377 The Prosecution in Lubanga had sought the maximum term of 
30 years. He was sentenced to 14 years in prison but will serve eight. The Rome 
Statute does not outline purposes to be pursued in meting out sentences. In 
considering the purposes of punishment at the ICC, the Chamber took into account 
the Preamble of the Statute, which provides the retributive objective that ‘the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go 
unpunished.’1378  The ICC was established ‘to these ends and for the sake of present 
and future generations.’1379The Chamber stated that the principal historical objective 
underlying the prohibition against the use of child soldiers is to protect children 
under the age of 15 from the risks that are associated with armed conflict, and 
particularly they are directed at securing their physical and psychological 
wellbeing.1380 This includes not only protection from violence and fatal or non-fatal 
injuries during fighting, but also the potentially serious trauma that can accompany 
recruitment, including separating children from their families, interrupting or 
disrupting their schooling and exposing them to an environment of violence and 
fear.1381 The court thus managed to place the gravity of child soldiering globally. The 
Lubanga judgment regurgitates the classical objectives of retribution and 
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deterrence1382 as primary goals. The principle of proportionality-that penalties be 
proportionate in their severity to the gravity of the defendant’s criminal conduct- has 
traditionally been a basic requirement of fairness.1383 Assessing the appropriate 
sentence is problematic. What would be the appropriate sentence for perpetrators of 
the Holocaust genocide? The ‘image of Adolf Eichmann, Josef Mengele and other 
Nazis in their dotage, tending their rose gardens in South America make no 
utilitarian sense whatsoever. They will not do their crimes again, nor would their 
punishment deter others.’1384 
 
The reactions to Lubanga’s sentence suggested dissatisfaction. Dana, for instance, 
states that ‘[F]or ICC Presiding Judge Adrian Fulford to stare down at Lubanga and 
forcefully declare that his crimes are undoubtedly very serious crimes that affect the 
international community as a whole[,]’but then impose a punishment that is less 
than half of the maximum term penalty available under the ICC Statute must have 
been perplexing, even for supporters of the Court.1385 As already been noted, many 
people in Ituri also believed Lubanga’s sentence was lenient, and did not fit the 
crime. The quantum of sentences is almost invariably controversial. Sentences 
deemed to be too high are considered vengeful and inappropriate.1386 For instance, it 
has been argued Charles Taylor’s sentence of 50 years was highly 
disproportionate.1387 
 
Expressivist theories, on the other hand, look at the messaging effect of verdict and 
punishment, in particular the symbolic value of penology.1388 Expressivism is, 
however, criticised for not providing sufficient justification for penology either.1389 
‘To condemn meaningfully’, as Anderson and Pildes assert, ‘requires not a mere 
utterance, even in the form of a stern lecture from the bench, but a practice of 
                                                          
1382Ibid  para 16  
1383 A. von Hirsch, ‘Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment’ (1992) 16 Crime and Justice 55, 
55 
1384 A. Oldenquist, ‘An explanation of retribution’ (1988) 85 Journal of Philosophy 464, 464 
1385S. Dana, ‘The Limits of Judicial Idealism: Should the International Criminal Court Engage with 
Consequentialist Aspirations?’  (2014) 3 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 30  
1386 For a discussion on human rights and sentencing, see eg D. van Zyl Smit and A. Ashworth 
‘Disproportionate Sentences as Human Rights Violations’ (2004) 67 Modern Law Review 54 
1387 K. Heller, ‘The Taylor Sentencing Judgment: A Critical Analysis’ (2013) 11 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice835 
1388D. Amann, ‘Message as Medium in Sierra Leone’ (2001) 7 ILSA Journal of International & 
Comparative Law 237, 238  
1389See eg G. Dingwall and T. Hillier, ‘The Banality of Punishment: Context Specifity and Justifying 
Punishment of Extraordinary Crimes’ (2010) 6 International Journal of Punishing and Sentencing 6 
247 
 
punishment socially understood to express condemnation effectively, such as 
incarceration.’1390 However, expressivism does not discard the idea of punishment. 
The difference is in interpreting what punishment would serve. According to 
Feinberg, the expressive function of punishment serves important social 
purposes.1391 Punishment, he posits, is deemed a conventional device for the 
expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of 
disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of the punishing authority himself or 
of those ‘in whose name’ the punishment is inflicted.1392 Punishment, in short, has a 
symbolic significance largely missing from other kinds of penalties.1393 It maintains 
the normative force of the law.1394 International judges have occasionally invoked 
expressive goals in justifying the sentences they impose. In the sentencing judgment 
in the ICTY’s Erdemović case for example, the judges wrote that:  
 
‘[T]he International Tribunal sees public reprobation and stigmatisation by the 
international community, which would thereby express its indignation over heinous 
crimes and denounce the perpetrators, as one of the essential functions of a prison 
sentence for a crime against humanity.’1395 
 
While expressivism is essentially ‘utilitarian’, on its account, punishment is delivered 
to strengthen faith in rule of law among the general public, as opposed to punishing 
simply because the perpetrator deserves it or because potential perpetrators will be 
deterred by it.1396 Although it seems a ‘reach for legalist punishment to exact 
retribution or deter individuals…instilling fear of getting caught, punishments bears 
greater promise to educate future generations about the effects of extreme evil and 
edify a moral consensus…’1397The ICTY in Kupreskic held that: ‘[T]his (punishment) 
should be done in order to strengthen the resolve of all involved not to allow crimes 
against international humanitarian law to be committed as well as to create trust in 
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and respect for the developing system of international justice’1398Citing the Nikolic 
Sentencing Judgment at the ICTY, the AFRC Judgment at the SCSL stated:  
 
‘One of the main purposes of a sentence is to influence the legal awareness of the 
accused, the surviving victims, their relatives, the witnesses and the general public in 
order to reassure them that the legal system is implemented and enforced. 
Additionally, sentencing is intended to convey the message that globally accepted 
laws and rules have to be obeyed by everybody.’1399 
 
Expressivism only ‘self-consciously focuses less on the immediate instrumental value 
of punishment—as a tool of either retribution or deterrence on the rational actor 
model—and more on the long-term normative values served by any system of 
criminal law.’1400After all, the Rome statute proclaims that the ICC was established 
‘for the sake of present and future generations.’1401  In short, expressivists posit that 
whether or not punishment fits the crime, penology is justified if it transmits socially 
valuable messages. Damaska argues, for instance, that ‘a court decision suitable for 
the advancement of human rights culture in world society at large may produce a 
negative effect in communities from whose horrors international criminal courts 
derive their cases.’1402He further contends that international judges ‘should not be 
swayed by hostile local responses to their decisions if they are generated by values or 
attitudes whose transcendence is the pedagogic aim of international criminal 
justice.’1403 Disregarding ‘such beliefs, despite adverse local responses, may be 
facilitated by the prospect that they will lose their virulence as soon as passions 
unleashed by conflict subside, and extraterritorial pedagogic signals encounter a 
more congenial climate (relate to concerns over punishment).’1404 
 
Perhaps a consideration has to be made of what else international tribunals and the 
ICC in particular, can realistically achieve, considering the constraints the court 
faces, having discarded retribution and deterrence as lesser plausible rationales for 
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its work. As Duff put it, philosophical theories must attend to the empirical 
actualities of that which they theorise.1405The court, it would appear, is ideally 
situated to and can realistically express global norms against egregious crimes as 
most serious offences. In that sense, the punishment of war crimes, for instance, 
would be seen as a special case, requiring a different sort of justification from that 
which was applicable to the institution of punishment as a whole.1406The expressive 
value of the punishment of extraordinary international criminals will thus be 
strengthened to the extent that this value can be distinguished from that of punishing 
ordinary common criminals.1407  A more purposive utilitarian account  
 
‘...might aim to take into account other communicative effects of punishment which 
go beyond simple deterrence. Punishment may not simply frighten individuals who 
might themselves commit crimes but also play a role in communicating the standards 
of a community to its members, thereby influencing their moral and social 
development…’1408 
 
From this perspective, image of the Nazis imprisoned in their old age would make 
sense. The objective of preventing recidivism at such age and inflicting ‘pain’ on them 
is less plausible. Instead, punishment would be denunciatory and an affirmation of 
collective values.The role of punishment, according to Durkheim:  
‘is not what it is ordinarily perceived to be. It does not serve, or serves only 
incidentally, to reform the offender or to scare off potential imitators. Its 
effectiveness in these respects is questionable-at any rate, mediocre. Its real function 
is to maintain intact the cohesion of society by sustaining in all its vigour communal 
consciousness.’1409 
 
It is this community affirmation effect that is crucial. Punishment reaffirms and 
reinforces collective beliefs about what constitutes right and wrong.1410 If crime did 
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not exist, a community would have to invent it in order to retain its sense of being a 
community.1411 Expressive law is most important for its effect, not on criminals, but 
on honest, law-abiding people.1412 It not only keeps them law-abiding; it helps hold 
the community together. While the indications suggest norm internalisation might 
be taking place in some places in the DRC, the penal aims of expressivism transcend 
local spaces affected by conflict. The ICC serves the international community. As 
such it engenders the cosmopolitan purpose of international law. The ‘[I]nternational 
criminal justice institutions will not enjoy legitimacy unless they are seen to operate 
according to the values of the expressivist Everyone, both the society directly affected 
by a tragedy and the amorphous, sometimes legalistic audience known as 
‘international society.’1413The cosmopolitan elements to international criminal law 
suggest that its audience is the entire human community.1414 A legal regime helps to 
constitute our identity as individuals who believe in the rule of law.1415However, the 
ICC in Lubanga was surprisingly reticent in propounding this function in 
international criminal law. The Lubanga judgment simply regurgitated the classical 
objectives of retribution and deterrence1416 as primary goals.  
 
9. 3 Mass crime and norm internalisation 
 
Although both expressivism and deterrence hope to discourage future atrocities, they 
proceed differently.1417 Since expressivist theories adopt an intergenerational 
approach1418  and moral and social development,’1419 the ultimate objective is norm 
internalisation. One conception suggests norms are ‘internalised, and become 
embedded in domestic legal and political processes.’1420 International legal scholars 
(constructivists in particular) have explained how transnational actors interact and 
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cause international norms to become internalised into domestic structures.1421 There 
‘is a gap in the legal scholarship on how norms are translated on the local level.’1422 
Norm internalisation herein is not regarded mainly as the acceptance of 
international law by states but the internalisation of norms of international law by 
individuals within ‘international society.’ While international criminal courts are 
largely symbolic, a more purposive justification for prosecution of such egregious 
crimes would be premised on a long term objective of internalising norms in 
individuals especially in affected communities. Otherwise would serve little purpose. 
Internalisation occurs when ‘a norm’s maintenance has become independent of 
external outcomes - that is, to the extent that its reinforcing consequences are 
internally mediated, without the support of external events such as rewards or 
punishment.’1423 
 
Despite Damaska’s apparent disregard for the impact of court decisions on local 
communities, he partially concedes, that ‘the importance of considering local 
responses to the decisions of international criminal courts can hardly be 
overemphasized. From the standpoint of the courts’ pedagogic mission, these 
responses may often deserve to be attributed greater weight than favourable.’1424 
Trials are ‘central to the norm internalisation process.’1425 Such an objective is much 
more important in communities affected by conflict. New (international) norms or 
social meanings can gradually become internalised by the different actors.1426 Such 
an objective is critical for crimes of ‘mass’ nature that involve wide communal 
engagement. Norms become entrenched, and actors come instinctively to obey them, 
through repeated participation, or ‘cycle(s) of interaction, interpretation, and 
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internalisation’ fostered by international institutions like the Tribunals.1427An 
expressivist model of international law and international criminal law would 
envisage embedding norms with the aim of compliance by actors over time. 
Expressivism places importance on social meaning thus focusing on broader society. 
When norms are internalised, they assume a particular social meaning within 
society. The prosecution and punishment of Lubanga would produce and reinforce 
the social meaning on the undesirability of child soldiering. Padmanabhan points out 
that norm internalisation appears to be an attractive trial objective when three 
conditions are met. 1428 
 
‘First, there is a clear international criminal prohibition on the conduct in question 
and the cost of continued violations of the norm is high. This creates a great desire to 
prevent future violations. Second, the prohibition in question is not deeply rooted in 
the personal or social morality of the community, creating a risk that this community 
will violate the norm. Generally, this community is that of the defendant. Often the 
defendant is just one of many members of his community who has violated 
international law, creating a need to deepen that community’s commitment to 
international law. Third, there exists a population of potential defendants whose 
trials might produce narratives sufficient to deepen social commitment to the norm 
in question.’1429 
 
It would appear Lubanga fulfils all these precepts. Child soldiering is now regarded 
as a war crime, which clearly prohibits conscription, enlistment and the use of 
children in armed conflict. Nonetheless, child militarisation in Lubanga’s 
‘community’ of the DRC has continued. According to a UN report, almost 1,000 cases 
of child recruitment by armed groups were verified by the mission between 1 January 
2012 and 31 August 2013.1430 This trend would suggest that the norm is not deeply 
rooted, either for cultural relativist or rationalist reasons. Lubanga’s trial would thus 
aim to deepen commitment to international norms against child soldiering. The 
objective of prosecution would be to inculcate normative standards over generations. 
Based on it,  
 
‘the internalizer is expected to show higher intolerance with regard to norm violation 
than both those who follow the norm under external enforcement and those who are 
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spontaneously motivated to behave accordingly. Violation is a disturbing factor for 
the internalizer, which might lead it to weaken and even revise the commitment 
made. Hence, norm internalizers are expected to be more consistent and compliant 
than externally-enforced norm observers and endogenously motivated agents...’1431 
 
For the expressivist, punishment can impede the early indoctrination phases in 
which ordinary people become assimilated into the machinery of mass crime. This 
objective of punishment differs from deterring individuals after they have become 
habituated into crime by desire or desperation.1432 The ICC would thus make 
expressivism, with the aim of norm internalisation, its primary rationale for 
selection, prosecution and punishment. Human rights groups point out that the 
prosecution and punishment of Lubanga at the ICC played a crucial role in raising 
global awareness on child soldiering. 1433Human Rights Watch (HRW) concluded 
that the Lubanga case had ‘undeniably contributed to raising awareness about the 
plight of child combatants in the DRC, and among those who previously thought that 
crimes relating to child combatants were not ‘serious’—including parents in Ituri who 
had their children join militia groups.’1434 An HRW research study concluded: 
[the ICC prosecution] is particularly important among families who gave their 
children voluntarily as an act of solidarity to the relevant militia, which they felt 
represented their interests. In this regard, child protection agencies admitted that the 
Lubanga case seems to have reached out to families in the region much more 
effectively than years of their own campaigning.1435 
The Coalition for the International Court also stated that the biggest impact of the 
Lubanga trial was that there was ‘no doubt in eastern DRC about the fact that child 
soldiering is a crime.1436 The social meaning of child soldiering was beginning to take 
hold. Previously ‘people thought that children were doing military service that was 
somehow legitimized by the state of conflict.’1437 The use of children as part of the 
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armed groups had become normalized, especially before the conviction of 
Lubanga.1438 
 
‘When one explained the concept of child recruitment, people were often confused. 
They obviously saw the crimes like pillaging, rape, murder as the main crimes. The 
child recruitment for them was seen like almost an obligation or right of the armed 
groups...’1439 
 
A legal representative for 22 of the 133 victims in Lubanga explained that some of his 
clients were not aware of the fact that their recruitment was a crime under 
international criminal law.1440Since the ICC had become active in Ituri, children 
themselves had been educated about their rights and sensitized to their roles as both 
victims and perpetrators in a way which may impact their own future behaviour.1441 
The awareness campaign calling for children to leave armed groups in the DRC 
succeeded in demobilising 557 children between March and August 2013.1442Like the 
SCSL cases, Lubanga   ‘is simply indicative of a slowly changing consensus, from a 
time when we accepted that children could be war heroes by performing intelligence, 
communications or other acts of bravery to our contemporary recognition of the 
importance of the developmental needs of children and youth.’1443  Human rights 
groups in the DRC claimed such effect from Lubanga.1444 
9.3.1 Lubanga and norm transmission 
 
Drumbl points out that: ‘[T]here is an assumption, which at first blush seems 
perfectly plausible, that the punishment inflicted by an international tribunal 
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operating prominently on the global agenda at the cusp of history has enhanced 
expressive value in asserting the importance of law and the stigmatization of the 
offender who transgresses that law.’1445 However the expressive value is ‘assailed…by 
the reality that this value often is externalized from afflicted local communities owing 
to the distance and mistrust evident between such communities and the machinery 
of international criminal justice.’1446 This is a valid observation. Most of international 
criminal trials have been conducted away from affected communities. This would 
diminish the ‘ICC’s situational opportunity’ and prompt arguments about conducting 
proceedings within the affected geographical spaces. However, security concerns and 
the lack of credible judicial systems in the affected countries have necessitated the 
externalisation of proceedings. International criminal courts have resorted to the use 
of the media. The ICC communications strategy in Lubanga emphasised leveraging 
both local and international media.1447Comparatively, the coverage of the Lubanga 
trial was extensive.1448Radio serves as the primary means of accessing information, 
as 54 percent of the population of eastern DRC listens to the radio on a daily 
basis.1449Summaries of the proceedings were broadcast  through national television 
and radio stations, as well as via seven local community radio stations in Ituri 
reaching an audience of 25 million and1.8 million, respectively.1450Social media have 
also proved to be platforms for dissemination. At the conviction of Lubanga, the 
former Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, 
Radhika Coomaraswamy stated: ‘Today, impunity ends for Thomas Lubanga and 
those who recruit and use children in armed conflict. In this age of global media, 
today’s verdict will reach warlords and commanders across the world and serve as a 
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strong deterrent.’1451 However, as already argued, deterrence is a rather ambitious 
expectation.  Kony 2012, a video produced by the charity, Invisible Children, fitted 
into this value system; it coincided with the Lubanga trial and was named the most 
shared social video in 2012.1452It reached 100 million views.1453The Guardian 
remarked, ‘In the space of a week, the unique torment of children who are 
conscripted to kill and be killed has been thrust back into the forefront of global 
consciousness.’1454  However, the video has been criticised for misrepresentations 
and oversimplification of the Ugandan conflict. But as Ruha Devanesan, fellow at 
Berkman Centre observed ‘You have to make the issue relevant to [people] 
somehow…Invisible Children managed to take an issue far removed from the 14- to 
25-year-old target segment and make it personally relevant.’1455 
 
A significant portion of social learning and socialization occurs through exposure to 
the mass media.1456 Several prominent research traditions in the area of media effects 
have already demonstrated that media may influence audiences’ judgements of social 
reality, including that of social values and norms.1457 Scholarly work on expressivism 
does not seem to recognise the role of the media. The mass media act as an enforcer 
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of social values in many ways.  One background assumption of news is ‘the 
consensual nature of society: the process of signification - giving social meanings to 
events - both assumes and helps to construct society as a consensus.’1458 The news is 
constructed to fit into this ‘central value system,’  ‘collective conscience’ or ‘moral 
community’   
9.4. ‘Expressive’ Outreach 
 
Expressivism premises itself on the expression of global norms of such a community. 
Under expressivism, recall that the intended audience ‘is not just the wrongdoer of 
most concern to deterrence and retributive theorists. It is also the Everyone of most 
interest to expressive theorists: the law-abider and the lawmaker, the activist and the 
private citizen, and even the potential victim, today and tomorrow.’1459The ICC 
formulated public information strategies 1460 which would utilise the media. The 
Outreach Action Plan in Lubanga targeted at, in part, an international audience 
through international media.1461The Lubanga communications strategy would 
‘communicate and reinforce the messages specifically tailored towards an 
international audience, and will continuously review them to ensure that they 
continue to be communicated clearly and accurately to them.’1462 Outreach schemes 
can be perceived as an expressive function of the Court. It was concluded that with 
the ‘international community as an audience’, Lubanga served an ‘important didactic 
and pedagogical goals of teaching the international community about the tragedy of 
child soldiers.’1463 However, if expressivism aims to change norms, foster moral 
development and achieve norm internalisation, is it important to focus more 
critically on the communities of the defendant. While expressivism has a broad 
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approach, ‘a high priority demand on international criminal courts should be to 
establish effective lines of communication with local audiences.’1464There does not 
seem to be an anomaly between a court pronouncing the socio-pedagogical purpose 
of trial and punishment on one hand and implementing that objective on the ground. 
The creation of a ‘moral community’ can only be achieved by bringing changing and 
aligning norms of different societies with values of that broader community. 
Outreach ought to be distinguished from the socio-political idealism of international 
criminal courts. The purpose of outreach would ideally be ‘informational’ and 
educative about a particular case and the norms it seeks to project.   International 
courts stand to achieve more in terms of norm internalisation when they have direct 
engagement with communities affected by hostilities.  In some of these communities, 
child soldiering has been attributed to cultural particularist or rationalist impetuses. 
And has been noted with regards to ‘voluntary’ recruitment of children for purposes 
of armed conflict, such practice might, in fact, be out of ignorance. Indeed, trials may 
achieve global norm internalisation through expressivism in such communities, and 
media can perform the role disseminating global norms. However, the media may 
genuinely not understand the law, or may portray it in misleading or oversimplified 
ways.’1465 The ‘media coverage may be sensational, giving a disproportionate focus on 
the antics of defendants.’1466 Outreach programmes can provide accurate portrayals 
of proceedings. The Lubanga outreach programme also aimed, and more 
importantly, at making the judicial proceedings accessible to the communities within 
the DRC where child soldiering was rife.  Human rights lawyers noted: 
 
‘Outreach is needed all the more because the ICC may often hold trials far away from 
the scene of the alleged crimes, and apply law with which most people in the 
communities affected by the crimes are unfamiliar.’1467 
 
The DRC has experienced child soldiering for several years. A research report by 
HRW concluded that ‘many people in the region did not view the use of child soldiers 
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as being illegal or a particularly serious crime.’1468 As Padmanabhan noted, norm 
internalisation as an objective is ideal when ‘the prohibition in question is not deeply 
rooted in the personal or social morality of the community, particularly that of the 
defendant,…1469 ‘and that there exists a population of potential defendants whose 
trials might produce narratives sufficient to deepen social commitment to the norm 
in question’.1470 However, trials will achieve norm internalisation if international law 
is accepted as a legitimate regulatory agent.1471Surveys conducted from September to 
December 2007 among a sample population of 2,620 individuals in the Ituri district 
in Oriental province and the provinces of North and South Kivu in the DRC revealed 
that among the means to achieve justice, the eastern Congolese population endorsed 
the national court system (51 percent), followed by the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) (26 percent).1472 
 
 
 
 
(Table 1 : A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice and Social Reconstruction in 
eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,’ The Human Rights Centre, University of California, Berkeley,; 
the Payson Centre for International Development, The International Centre for Transitional Justice, 
August 2008) 
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These findings raise questions about the sociological legitimacy of the court - 
perceptions of relevant audiences that the legal authority is legitimate or its decisions 
are justified and accepted for reasons beyond fear of sanctions.1473Sociological 
legitimacy is critical to norm internalisation. While there was support for the ICC as a 
means of achieving justice in the DRC (26 percent of respondents), there was low 
awareness among the population of eastern Congo (27 percent) and in Kinshasa 
(28%) of the ICC or of the first scheduled trial against Lubanga in eastern DRC (28 
percent) and Kinshasa (29 percent).1474Nevertheless a majority of those in eastern 
DRC who had heard about the ICC would like to participate in its activities (67 
percent).1475 (See ‘table 1’ above)  The ICC outreach scheme in Lubanga can help 
enhance the legitimacy of the court; it is aimed at raising awareness on the 
commencement of the trial and the level of understanding by the public concerning 
the process of the trial in various aspects: the alleged crimes, the concept of fair trial 
and the role of each of the parties and participants.1476The overall objective of the ICC 
formulated public information strategies was to advance ‘the Court’s strategic goal of 
being a well-recognised and adequately supported institution and to maximise the 
Court’s preventative impact.’1477 Such projects can also help clarify contentious issues 
such as sentences. In 2008, the ICC intensified outreach activities in the Ituri 
Province. Video summaries of the proceedings were screened to large audiences in 
Bogoro, Kasenyi, Tchomia, Nyakunde, Marabo and Bunia, locations that had been 
affected by the conflict.1478Popular trials cultivate debate.1479The screenings were 
followed by lively debates. By highlighting ‘the educative-dialogical dimension it is 
thought that we can bring into focus the ways in which those who are likely to be 
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affected by an outcome gather to discuss, shape, and possibly expose themselves to 
learning something beyond their initial position.’1480 
 
Such outreach programmes are particularly relevant in communities producing the 
mass crimes international courts prosecute whether such crimes emanate from 
cultural or rationalist motivations. Crimes that involve widespread communal 
engagement may be better addressed through supplementary ‘expressive’ outreach to 
achieve norm internalisation. In Lubanga, multiple agents were involved in the 
conscription, enlistment and use of minors in armed conflict. A consequence of norm 
internalisation is that agents are much better at defending the internalised norms 
than externally-enforced observers.1481 Internalisation ‘is a good predictor of 
compliance and second order cooperation, that is - urging others to comply with the 
norms.’1482 ‘Norm defence’ or ‘norm support’ is crucial in the spreading and 
stabilization of norms over a population of autonomous agents.1483 This would 
reinforce the social meaning of law in societies. Human rights groups in the DRC 
were part of organisations that defended the role of the ICC and were active in 
gathering evidence against Lubanga.1484 They campaigned for the charges against 
him to be widened.1485 Lubanga thus brought child soldiering to the top of the 
agenda for such groups as well as fostering ‘norm defence.’ A cosmopolitan 
community can be reinforced when norms are defended and supported voluntarily.  
An important function of ‘expressive outreach’ is to express to express to the afflicted 
community that it is part of the broader international or ‘moral community’. These 
approaches transcend classical precepts of retribution and deterrence.  
 
Unlike retribution and deterrence, which are empirically indeterminate, ‘expressive’ 
outreach can be evaluated to assess norm internalisation. Societies can be educated 
through trial or proactive engagement about the conscription, enlistment and use of 
child combatants. The ICC has set up standardised and evaluation systems for 
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outreach programmes.1486 Evaluation of activities conducted in Kinshasa and Ituri, 
as well as external studies, demonstrate that the population exposed to Outreach for 
more than one year is beginning to have a better understanding of both the Court's 
mission and the legal processes that the Court follows.1487 External organisations1488 
have also sought feedback in the DRC. An evaluation report by UNICEF for the DRC 
in August 2013 stated: ‘It appears that recruitment overall is falling and the age of 
recruitment appears to have increased. UNICEF based its conclusions on the decline 
in the number of released children receiving reintegration packages, from 10,000 in 
2008 to 2,312 in 2011.1489  However, this finding may not be accurately reflective of 
the state of child soldiering as minors might not be continuing the fighting without 
submitting to demobilisation.  Both trials and extra-judicial activities may not 
produce immediate or positive results.  However, when they take broader effect, the 
results would be beneficial. An important benefit of internalisation is the reduction 
in costs of enforcement. When society internalise a norm, the necessity for coercive 
measures is diminished. Agents conform to norms not merely because of external 
sanctions such as material rewards or punishment. A consequence of this is lesser 
crime. The ICC prosecutes only a handful of defendants, partly because of lack of 
funding, cooperation of states and an enforcement mechanism. The ICC has stated 
that for it ‘to effectively deal with situations referred by the council ... it needs to be 
able to count on the full and continuing cooperation of all UN members, whether 
they are parties to (the court) or not.’1490 If the Court were to encounter 
simultaneously the constraints of slower contributions and the need to fund 
unforeseen events, it could find itself in a position of being unable to carry out 
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necessary Court operations due to lack of funds.1491 A consensus seems to have 
emerged that the OTP should negotiate the inherent limitations of prosecutorial 
capacity by focusing investigations and prosecutions on those culpable individuals 
who occupied the highest levels of political or military authority.1492These few cases 
the ICC prosecutes will suffice for expression of norms, and reduce more crime. 
Norm expression and stigmatization do not require that all or even most of the 
perpetrators be prosecuted to achieve a pedagogical function; a small number of 
illustrative prosecutions are sufficient to convey the necessary message.1493Unlike 
deterrence,’ which is intended to affect the calculus of individuals disposed to 
criminal conduct, norm promulgation seeks to ensure that community members 
never even consider committing crimes.’1494 Lubanga and later Ntaganda would 
reinforce global norms on child soldiering.  The ultimate objective ought to be 
internationalization of norms against child soldiering, locally and globally. 
Embryonic research on norm consumption after Lubanga is encouraging. Norm 
internalisation process will thus not only benefit the ICC through the actual 
compliance, but will also benefit the society as a whole (herein contributing states) by 
reducing the cost of norm enforcement. 
 
Another significant expressive dimension in Lubanga is the reparations for victims 
and their families. On 7 August 2012, Trial Chamber established, for the first time in 
the ICC’s history, principles for providing reparations to victims. The Chamber thus 
noted that pursuant to Rule 85 of the ICC Rules of Evidence and Procedure1495, 
reparations may be granted to: direct victims, who suffered harm resulting from the 
                                                          
1491See International Criminal Court Assembly of States Parties ‘Report of the Court on the options for 
replenishment of the Contingency Fund’ ICC-ASP/8/28 Eighth session The Hague 18-26 November 
2009 
1492 M. C. Bassiouni, ‘Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Other 
Serious Violations of Human Rights’ in M C Bassiouni (ed.) Post-Conflict Justice ((Transnational 
Publishers, Ardsley, NY, 2002) 3, 27  noting that ‘As a matter of policy, international prosecutions 
should be limited to leaders, policy-makers and senior executors. This policy does not and should not 
preclude prosecutions of other persons at the national level which can be necessary to achieve 
particular goals.’; see also A. Danner, ‘Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial 
Discretion at the International Criminal Court’ (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law   
510, 543 noting ‘That the international justice forum should be reserved for high-level perpetrators 
has gained wide acceptance.’ 
1493M. deGuzman, ‘Choosing to prosecute: Expressive selection at the International Criminal Court’ 
(2012) 33 Michigan Journal of International Law 265 
1494M. deGuzman,  ‘An Expressive Rationale for the Thematic Prosecution of Sex Crimes’)in M. 
Bergsmo (ed), Thematic Prosecution of International Sex Crimes  FICHL Publication Series No. 13 
(Torkel Opsahl Academic E-Publisher, Beijing 2012) 35 
1495 See 2002 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-ASP/1/3, Rule 85. 
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crimes of enlisting, conscripting and using children under the age of 15 in Ituri, DRC 
from 1 September 2002 to 13 August 2003; indirect victims, including family 
members of direct victims, along with individuals who intervened to help the victims 
or to prevent the commission of these crimes and legal entities, such as NGO or 
hospitals. The Chamber declared that reparations could be awarded on an individual 
or collective basis. Reparations can be part of punishment against the accused. 
However, in view of the indigence of Lubanga, it was decided that reparations in 
Lubanga will be implemented through the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV).1496The TFV 
would appear to transcend the core functions of court. However, the compensation 
for losses and restitution to victims has traditionally been component of justice 
through both criminal and civil law. In international law, reparations have a more 
important function. It has been noted that‘...geography does not assist victims, with 
the ad hoc tribunals and ICC located far from the countries where the atrocities were 
committed. This distance contributes to the isolation of victims from the mainstream 
of prosecutions.’1497 By recognising the harms committed and compensation for 
them, this project would also express to victims that they are part of the broader 
normative community. 
 
9.5 Conclusion 
 
The principal argument of this study is that the most plausible justification for 
prosecution and punishment of Lubanga is expressivism. Retribution and deterrence 
do not seem sufficient rationales for the work of the ICC. This chapter attempted to 
locate Lubanga within expressivism. The chapter discussed how the arrest, trial, 
verdict, punishment and the media performed an expressive function within DRC 
and beyond. Lubanga, as the first case by the ICC was bound to encounter some 
problems. Some shortcomings depleted the expressive value of the case. In 
particular, the lack of records and exclusion of sexual violence from the Court’s 
consideration diminished its expressive mileage. However, prosecutorial 
indiscretions ought not to discount expressivism as a plausible rationale for 
                                                          
1496Rome Statute Art.79 (1). The TFV was established for the benefit of victims within the jurisdiction 
of the Court, and of the families of such victims. 
1497 A. Wiersing, ‘Lubanga and its Implications for Victims Seeking Reparations at the International 
Criminal Court’ Summer Issue (2012) Amsterdam Law Forum 21, 23 
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international prosecutions.  With the few cases the ICC prosecutes, expressivism 
remains a viable theoretical basis for international law and ICL. Unlike the 
retributive and deterrence agenda, expressivism postulates that the rationale for 
penality at the ICC would be the expression of global norms. Despite some omissions, 
Lubanga provided insights into the crime of child soldiering. As has been illustrated, 
the dramaturgy or spectacle of trial in Lubanga served the purposes of norm 
projection. There is a considerable appreciation of child soldiering as a serious 
offence, starting with Lubanga’s arrest. Some components of the crime of ‘child 
soldiering’ were articulated. The crime was separated into ‘conscription’, ‘enlistment’ 
and ‘use’ of children in armed conflict although this had earlier been decided by the 
SCSL. The decision also clarified that ‘enlistment’ or voluntary recruitment 
constituted a crime, something, hitherto, unclear at least from the evidence of a 
witness. Critically, the court also decided that ‘participating actively’ in hostilities 
would only been be determined by whether a child was a ‘potential target.’ 
International criminal courts would play a far important function - probably the 
most possible out of the plethora of objectives - of expressing norms, clarifying the 
law and enhancing norm internalisation as the primary goal. The media coverage of 
Lubanga points to a considerable awareness of child soldiering as an international 
crime. The most significant impact may not be on the perpetrators, but civilians, 
such as parents and guardians of the children. Outreach programmes should be a 
fundamental component of international criminal justice mechanisms. While media 
play a critical role, they may not comprehend issues or distort them. A logical 
trajectory would presuppose ‘norm internalisation’ as the ultimate goal for ICL for it 
to be purposive. This is particularly important with regards to crimes of diffuse and 
widespread involvement that the ICC adjudicates. As an extension of the work of the 
court, ‘expressive’ outreach programmes are critical to the internalisation of norms. 
Evidence suggests that parents and children in Ituri became sensitised to the 
criminality of child soldiering. However, an expressive justification of penality at the 
ICC would look beyond the afflicted social spaces; child soldiering is an international 
crime prosecuted at an international court. Thus, the expression of norms ought to 
transcend the affected communities but aim at fostering cosmopolitanism through 
the gradual internalisation of norms against child soldiering.  
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CHAPTER TEN 
Introduction 
 
What purpose would the few cases of mass crime that the ICC prosecutes serve? The 
point of departure for the study was that ICL lacks a theory suitable for its own 
context. This lacuna has left the ICC without clear theoretical premise(s) to guide 
prosecution and punishment. At present, ICL and the ICC replicate domestic 
principles of penality. The main objective of this thesis was to reappraise 
international criminal law and, in particular the work of the ICC with reference to an 
extant case. The prosecution and punishment of Lubanga provided an opportunity to 
reflect on the ICC’s penological rationales. In the past, no case was available for 
scholars to theorise the work of the court in a substantive way. Lubanga, as the first 
case before the ICC, is important in assessing the court’s work and its future 
direction. The focus on child soldiering is, firstly, given, considering that Lubanga 
was the first case before the ICC. However, an important objective of this thesis was 
to accentuate the ‘mass’ nature of child soldiering. International courts adjudicate, 
primarily, mass crimes, regarded as most egregious. However, child soldiering has 
barely been articulated as such diffuse crime perhaps, or as grave, particularly 
because it does always eventuate in mass deaths. As has been argued in this thesis, 
child soldiering is a mass crime involving multiple social and political agents.  In that 
respect, it can help us analyse approaches of the ICC to mass crime.  
 
As already noted, national doctrinal frameworks of retribution and deterrence have 
also been advocated as objectives of international criminal law and mass crimes. I 
have argued here, however, that a cogent rationale for international penality would 
need to be cognisant of the fact that international criminal courts are largely 
symbolic. Owing to the constraints articulated in this study, the ICC can only conduct 
a few illustrative and symbolic prosecutions. A successive question would rest on 
what the ICC symbolises. While international ‘collectivism’ is imperfect, a global 
community of shared standards now exists.   ICC penality would thus represent the 
communal standards of the international society.  The thesis has argued that the 
most plausible philosophical objective for the prosecution and punishment of 
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Lubanga is expressivism. Expressivism is an under-studied rationale of ICL. 
However, as Drumbl, DeGuzman, Sloane and others have noted, there is cause to 
believe that it is the most viable premise for the punishment for extraordinary crime. 
An expressive approach to international criminal law would, primarily, propagate 
and reinforce the standards of the international society.  This final chapter concludes 
by harmonising and summarising these key issues and arguments rose in the thesis. 
In particular, it attempts to reconcile the analysis in the previous chapters. It then 
draws conclusions on the importance of the findings and their implications.  
10.1 Key arguments 
10.1.1 Contextual constraints 
 
The objective of this thesis was to make sense of the work of the ICC as reference 
point for the mass crimes the court prosecutes. The central proposition for this study 
is that ICL requires a theory of prosecution and punishment applicable to its 
context.1498 International criminal justice has operated against a plethora of 
expectations and aims. Theorisation of ICL appears divorced both conceptually and 
practically from context. Plausible theorisation ought to focus on what international 
courts can realistically achieve. In this study, I have categorised the weaknesses of 
international criminal justice as ‘practical/institutional’ and ‘idealistic/goal-related.’ 
Both weaknesses ought to inform theoretical perspectives. The ICC operates against 
numerous contextual constraints. Firstly, the court relies on financial largesse of 
states. However, not all states parties are able to provide the funding or meet their 
obligations. Further, the ICC lacks a coercive authority or police force to account for 
suspects. The court depends on the co-operation of states. Former President of the 
ICTY Gabrielle Kirk McDonald noted that, ‘the cooperation of states and 
international organizations is essential to the effective functioning of an international 
criminal institution.’1499 Article 86 of the Rome Statute stipulates that all states 
parties are obliged to ‘cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and 
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.’1500States that fail to meet 
                                                          
1498J. Ohlin, ‘Towards a Unique Theory of International Criminal Sentencing’  in G. Sluiter and S. 
Vasiliev (eds) Iinternational Criminal Procedure: Towards a Coherent Body of Law, (London: 
Cameron, 2009), 390 
1499G. McDonald, ‘Problems, Obstacles and Achievements of the ICTY’ (2004) 2 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 558, 565 
1500 See Rome Statute Art. 86 
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their financial obligations will be denied the vote. However, this appears a light 
disincentive to dissuade defaulting states. Where some states have chosen to co-
operate with the court, they have done so for political expediency with the 
acquiescence of the ICC. The ICC has at times, in its selection of cases, trumped 
fairness for pragmatic ends, focusing on non-state actors and exempting state actors. 
As in the case of the DRC, some state actors can consort with indictees, often rebels, 
for rationalist ends of achieving peace. In the face of the hurdles, international courts 
and tribunals have resorted to the UN Security Council, for example in the case of 
Sudan, and diplomacy. However, these efforts have not had a strong record of 
success. In theorising the ICC, we need to be sensitive to these contexts and their 
impact. The overall effect of these constraints is that the ICC can only prosecute a 
handful of defendants.  
 
10.1.2 Retribution and deterrence 
 
International criminal justice also faces a problem from the goals it has imposed 
upon itself. The ‘idealistic/goal-related’ weaknesses emanate from obscure and 
unachievable objectives. When deconstructed, international criminal justice’s 
principal goals have been retribution and deterrence.1501 The few convicts are 
supposed to be punished proportionately as well as deterring them and others from 
committing crimes in the future. Since Nuremberg, jurisprudence of the subsequent 
tribunal has evinced the preponderance of these two objectives. According to the 
Preamble of the ICC Statute and Articles 1 and 5, its objectives are the prosecution 
and punishment of the most serious crimes of international concern.1502 The Statute 
describes crimes prosecuted by the ICC as ‘unimaginable atrocities’, and ‘grave 
                                                          
1501See eg Prosecutor v Kupreskic, Judgment ICTY-IT-95-16-T [14 January 2000] para 848; 
Prosecutor v Kordić and Cerkez, ICTY-IT-95-14/2-A [ICTY Appeals Chamber, 17 December 2004] 
para 1076 (‘both individual [n.b. specific] and general deterrence serve as important goals of 
sentencing…’)Prosecutor v Popović, ICTY-IT-05-88-T, Trial Judgment, para 2128 (ICTY 10 June, 
2010); Prosecutor v Lukić, ICTY-IT-05-87 Trial Judgment, [20 July 2009] para. 1049; Prosecutor v. 
Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Trial Judgment, para 1144 [ICTY 26 February 2009]; Prosecutor v 
Delić, Case No 1T-04-83-T, Trial Judgment, [ICTY 15 September 2008] para 559; Prosecutor v 
Milošević, ICTY-IT-98-29/1-T, Trial Judgment, para 987 ;Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa, 
Sentencing Judgment SCSL-04-14-T [9 October 2007] para 26, citing Prosecutor v AleksoviskIT-95-
14/1-A Appeal Judgment ICTY [24 March 2000] para 185; Prosecutor v Kambanda ICTR-97-23-S 
Judgment and Sentence (TC) [4 September 1998] para 28 and Prosecutor v Nikolic IT-02-60/1-S 
Sentencing Judgment (TC) [2 December 2003] para 86 
1502See Rome Statute, Preamble, para 4 and Art. 1 and 5 
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crimes’ that ‘deeply shock the conscience of humanity.’1503 The ICC was established 
‘to these ends and for the sake of present and future generations.’1504 These 
provisions have been interpreted as meaning that retribution and deterrence are 
primary goals of the ICC.1505Both the gleeful post-conviction rhetoric and 
jurisprudence in Lubanga reflected these as primary goals. However, both theory 
and practice cast aspersions on the plausibility of these lofty objectives. The 
unreflecting mimicry of domestic law principles is problematic. International 
criminal law in its normative and institutional configuration is barely capable of 
serving the ICC’s borrowed and dominant objectives of retribution and deterrence. 
Several authors argue that the correlation between international criminal justice and 
such aims is tenuous. Because of the contextual constraints, international courts are 
unable to account for all offenders. Critics of retributive justifications for 
international trials note this inability of international courts to prosecute all or even 
most of the crimes committed in a given situation and the difficulty of inflicting 
retributively proportionate punishments.1506This thesis has noted that, because of 
the few cases can prosecute, the court is largely symbolic. Furthermore, a ‘mission 
creep’ appears to be occurring in international criminal justice. The goals are 
expansive and removed for the core functions of the court. These include 
incapacitation, access for victims, historicisation, reconciliation to reintegration and 
rehabilitation,1507 peace and security.1508These self-imposed demands are quite 
gargantuan.1509 A system that promises so much and fails to deliver can only court 
disillusionment. These objectives should be scaled down, and other objectives left to 
other mechanisms of public response to massive human rights violations.1510 
International criminal courts perform a more modest role in advancing the rule of 
                                                          
1503 Ibid 
1504 Ibid para 9 
1505 E. Mendes, Peace and Justice at the International Criminal Court: A Court of Last Resort 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), 143 
1506 M. deGuzman,  ‘An Expressive Rationale for the Thematic Prosecution of Sex Crimes’)in M 
Bergsmo (ed) Thematic Prosecution of International Sex Crimes  FICHL Publication Series No. 13 
(Torkel Opsahl Academic E-Publisher, Beijing,  2012)  
1507Just like in many influential ordinary justice systems, rehabilitation is given little effectivity. See 
e.g. Prosecutor v Miroslav Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-A [ICTY Appeals Chamber 20 July 2005]; 
Prosecutor v Kordić and Cerkez, IT-95-14/2-A [ICTY Appeals Chamber, 17 December 2004] para 
1079.  On reconciliation, see Prosecutor v Babić, [ICTY Appeals Chamber, July 18, 2005], Case No. 
IT-03-72-A 
1508 M. Damaska, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ (2008) 83Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 329  
1509 ibid 331 
1510 Ibid 330 
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law.1511 I have in this thesis limited such involvement to outreach and reparations for 
victims. 
 
10.1.3 Mass crime 
 
A cosmopolitan outlook towards mass crimes is not unfounded. Mass crimes, for 
their diffuse nature, threaten values of human life on a huge scale. ICL ‘crimes 
involve extraordinary collective dimensions and extensive communal 
engagement.’1512As distinct from common crimes, ‘international crimes are almost 
always committed not by one person but by several or many persons-a group, a band, 
a clique.’1513 Traditional, jurisprudence has considered genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes as ‘mass atrocities’. However, child soldiering, as now a 
war crime, has not been adequately articulated as mass crime.  Conceptually, mass 
crimes need not be acts eventuating in mass fatalities. Instead, they are widespread 
crimes involving multiple agents. As such, apart from the consequences of crimes, 
the dynamics of diffuse communal involvement are similar.   In this thesis, I have 
attempted to accentuate the ‘mass’ nature of child soldiering. Such an approach can 
assist in conceptualising a common theoretical justification for the mass crimes that 
the ICC adjudicates. Child soldiering involves mass conscription, enlistment and the 
use of children for purposes of war. .1514The replication of domestic penal rationales 
obscures the collective character of ICL crimes - a feature that distinguishes them 
from most similar crimes of violence in the national sphere.1515Therefore ‘we cannot 
simply project familiar national principles onto ICL. We must inspect and re-
                                                          
1511 Ibid  
1512 D. Robinson, ‘International criminal courts and tribunals: A cosmopolitan liberal account of 
international criminal law’ (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International Law  127, 128 
1513A Trainin, ‘Hitlerite Responsibility Under Criminal Law’ 79 (A.Y. Vishinski ed., Andrew Rothstein 
trans., Hutchinson & Co. 1945) (1944), 79 cited in M. Osiel ‘The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives 
against Mass Atrocity’ (2005) 105 Columbia Law Review 1751, footnote 2 
1514See eg D. Wippman, ‘Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice’ (1999) 23 
Fordham International Law Journal 473, 474  stating that  ‘the connection between international 
prosecutions and the actual deterrence of future atrocities, for instance, is at best a plausible but 
largely untested assumption’;  M. Drumbl  Atrocity, Punishment an International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2007)  noting that any anecdotal research must take into account the reality that 
atrocity continues to occur, unabated, in many places following the creation of criminal tribunals to 
punish perpetrators. 
1515 R. Sloane, ‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment’ (2006) Columbia Public Law & 
Legal Theory Working Papers, citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1, Judgment, para 191 (15 July 1999) 
(‘Most of the time [ICL] crimes do not result from the criminal propensity of single individuals but 
constitute manifestations of collective criminality: the crimes are often carried out by groups of 
individuals acting in pursuance of a common criminal design.’) 
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articulate those principles to take into account the special contexts encountered by 
ICL, which include massively collective action…’.1516The perpetrator of mass atrocity 
fundamentally differs from the perpetrator of ordinary crime.1517The hostilities with 
which international criminal justice is concerned often involve powerful passions.1518 
Deterrence, transposed to mass crimes, ignores the unique environments that foster 
such criminal behavior. While Arendt speaks of ‘radical evil’, often, offenders 
subscribe to group codes and are impelled, not by evil, but a genuine belief in a 
cause. Deterrence can distort the viability of the familiar cost-benefit calculus on 
which that model depends.1519  Further, the massive nature of atrocity cannot be 
reflected in retributive sanction because of restrictive human rights standards. 1520 
These ‘standards limit the amount of pain institutions can inflict upon convicts.’ 1521 
Inconsistencies in the quantum of punishment also arise because of the discretion 
reposed on judges.1522 Theorists, almost invariably, note that deterrence is 
notoriously difficult to assess. It is impossible to prove categorically that the 
existence or the type of punishment has had any bearing on subsequent events.1523  
Further, the belief that perpetrators make cost-benefit calculations before they 
commit crimes is extremely presumptuous.1524 But more significantly the crimes that 
international courts prosecute – mass crimes - are distinct from those adjudicated in 
domestic law. Given the contextual constraints of the court and theoretical 
incongruities, the question that has animated this thesis is: what is the most 
plausible philosophical justification for the selection and prosecution of Lubanga for 
the mass crime of child soldiering? This question – though specific to child 
militarisation, strikes at the heart of the philosophy of international law, and in 
particular mass crimes the ICC prosecutes. 
 
                                                          
1516 D. Robinson, ‘International criminal courts and tribunals: A cosmopolitan liberal account of 
international criminal law’ (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International Law  127, 129 
1517 M.Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law ( Cambridge University Press 2007) 
1518 M. Damaska, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ (2008) 83Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 329, 344 
1519 R. Sloane, ‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment’ (2007)  43 Stanford Journal of 
International Law 39, 40 
1520 M. Dumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007)15 
1521 Ibid 15 
1522 Ibid 15 
1523G. Dingwall and T. Hillier, ‘The Banality of Punishment: Context Specifity and Justifying 
Punishment of Extraordinary Crimes’ (2010) 6 International Journal of Punishing and Sentencing 6 
1524See eg I. Tallgren,  ‘The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law’(2002) 12 European 
Journal of International Law 561, 584 
272 
 
10.2 Expressivism 
 
International criminal law tends to speak to itself, the immediate gallery and 
epistemic communities. It many need philosophical recasting if it is to be purposive. 
As Dana puts it: 
 
‘Identifying a primary justification for international criminal law, of course, 
does not mean that ICL cannot make a meaningful contribution to other goals. 
However, it is imperative that the ICC coalesces around a primary justification 
for its work and set modest expectations. An idealism that avoids prioritizing 
goals and eagerly pursues them all can only delay the inevitable choice, as the 
experience of ad hoc international criminal tribunals reveals, because some of 
these objectives are in conflict.1525 
 
 
And Damaska points out that we must not accept the existing absence of orientation 
but select a goal as central to the mission of international criminal courts.1526 Both 
deterrence and retribution appear context-insensitive to the contextual constraints of 
international judicial institutions and the dynamics of mass crime. In this thesis, I 
have argued that the most plausible philosophical rationale for the prosecution of 
Lubanga is expressivism. The basic premise of expressivism is the messaging effect 
law and punishment. I have stated that ‘statutes and ‘shaming and naming’ may not 
be effective ways for norm transmission. International criminal justice processes 
present a more efficacious means for norm propagation. An expressivist approach in 
the case of the ICC would also be based on what the court can realistically achieve. 
Each ‘conventional goal of punishment in national law offers insights, but analysis of 
the extent to which retributive and deterrence theories can or should be coherently 
transposed to the international context reveals that the primary value that 
international punishment can realistically serve consists in its expressive 
functions.’1527The court can barely do much more. But expressivism is important as 
an objective. Although under-studied, as Drumbl asserts that there ‘is cause to 
believe that it (expressivism) may be a more plausible justification for the 
                                                          
1525 S. Dana, ‘The Limits of Judicial Idealism: Should the International Criminal Court Engage with 
Consequentialist Aspirations?’ (2014) 3 Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs 30 
1526 ibid 
1527  R. Sloane, ‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment’ (2007) 43 Stanford Journal of 
International Law 39 also R Sloane ‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment’ (2006) 
Columbia Public Law & Legal Theory Working Papers. 
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punishment of extraordinary international criminals.’1528The expressivist punishes 
to strengthen faith in the rule of law among the general public, as opposed to 
punishing simply because the perpetrator deserves it or because potential 
perpetrators will be deterred by it.1529As Wringe also points out that, ‘under an 
expressive approach, punishment may not simply frighten individuals who might 
themselves commit crimes but also play a role in communicating the standards of a 
community to its members, thereby influencing their moral and social 
development…’1530Although it seems a ‘reach for legalist punishment to exact 
retribution or deter individuals…instilling fear of getting caught, punishments bears 
greater promise to educate future generations about the effects of extreme evil and 
edify a moral consensus…’1531  As such, international law ought to have long-term 
objectives against egregious crimes. Trials in particular are ‘expressive acts 
broadcasting the news that mass atrocities are, in fact, heinous crimes.’1532The 
‘dramaturgy of the trial process’ is a tool for norm projection in international 
criminal law.1533 By dramatizing the effect of the law-breaking conduct through the 
spectacle of trial making, international criminal justice makes clear what was not 
previously understood: in this case, that recruiting, enlisting, and using children to 
fight is a war crime.’1534 Expressivism is particularly cognisant of what the ICC can 
realistically achieve. It takes into account the institutional prominence of the court, 
selectivity of the few cases it can adjudicate and the channels of global norm 
dissemination. Expressivism is therefore the most appropriate theoretical basis, 
considering the court’s limited resources.1535 
10.3.1 Thematic prosecution 
 
An analysis of the criminological and penal culture showed that until the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) adjudicated upon the matter and Lubanga at the ICC, 
                                                          
1528 M. Dumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
1529Ibid 173 
1530 B. Wringe, ‘War Crimes and Expressive Theories of Punishment: Communication or 
Denunciation? (2010) 16 Res Publica 119, 121 
1531 M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007),17 
1532 D. Luban,  ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International 
Criminal Law’  Georgetown Law Faculty Working Papers (2008), 9 
1533 D. Luban, ‘Beyond Moral Minimalism’ (2006) 20 Ethics & International Affairs 353, 355 
1534 L. Davis and P Hayner, ‘Difficult Peace, Limited Justice’ International Centre for Transitional 
Justice (March 2009), 31 discussing both the positive and negative effects 
1535 M. deGuzman,  ‘Choosing to prosecute: Expressive selection at the International Criminal Court’ 
(2012) Michigan Journal of International Law 265, 270 
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child soldiering was historically under-criminalised and under-judicialised. It is only 
with the Machel Report on the impact of armed conflict on children,1536 and 
following the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 
1989,1537 that the specific plight of children in the context of mass or systematic 
crimes began to capture international attention.1538  Before then, international 
crimes had been defined rather restrictively, influenced mainly by the historical 
contexts of the crimes committed by the Nazis during World War II.1539 With a few 
exceptions, little attention was devoted to the plight of children: crimes against 
children were left to be addressed by national judicial systems.1540 The 
establishments of the ICC and the SCSL, a few years after the publication of the 
Machel report, triggered major developments regarding the sanctioning of crimes 
against children.1541 Francis posits that with the unfolding events relating to 
prosecution for conscription, enlistment  and using child combatants the 
international community is beginning to wake up to the challenge of enforcing its 
numerous ‘paper protection’ instruments for the protection of children.1542 The 
SCSL’s landmark rulings on child soldiering laid the ground work for the prosecution 
of Lubanga.  
Child soldiering has historically been under-criminalised and under-judicialised. It 
would appear that, jurisprudentially, international criminal law was obsessed with 
mass killings; child soldiering did not feature on the statutes of the tribunals until the 
establishment of the SCSL and ICC. The paradigm of international criminal law has 
been shaped by cataclysmic events such as the Holocaust, Sebrenica and Rwanda. 
The primacy of massacres in ICL has subsumed the grave nature of non-murder 
egregious crimes.  A strategy some courts have adopted is to pursue ‘thematic 
prosecutions’ – that is, to orient cases around particular themes of criminality1543 
that has historically been under-enforced. ‘Thematic prosecution’ refers to the 
                                                          
1536C. Aptel ‘Children and Accountability for International Crimes: The Contribution of International 
Criminal Courts’ (2010) Innocenti Working Paper No. 2010-20. Florence, UNICEF Innocenti 
Research Centre. 
1537 ibid 
1538 ibid 
1539 ibid 
1540 ibid 
1541 ibid 
1542 D. Francis, ‘Paper Protection’ Mechanisms: Child Soldiers and the International Protection of 
Children in Africa’s Conflict Zones’ (2007) 45 Journal of Modern African Studies 207 
1543 M. deGuzman  ‘An Expressive Rationale for the Thematic Prosecution of Sex Crimes’ in M. 
Bergsmo (ed) Thematic Prosecution of International Sex Crimes  FICHL Publication Series No. 13 
(Torkel Opsahl Academic E-Publisher, Beijing,  2012), 11 
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prosecutorial practice of selecting certain crimes and prioritising particular 
phenomena within international criminal indictments, usually for purposes related 
to the best use of limited resources,1544 but often also due to the symbolism of 
elevating attention on a given matter of international concern.1545 
Such themes may take the form of focused or thematic investigations and 
prosecutions of these crimes, or the construction of crime-specific institutional 
capacity within the criminal justice system.1546 This strategy was used in some of the 
earliest prosecutions for international crimes after World War II.1547Emerging 
literature and jurisprudence have focused on thematic prosecution of offences 
against children and sex crimes.1548 Thematic prosecution of international sex crimes 
involves the selection and prioritization of sexual crimes over and above other crimes 
for investigation and prosecution at national or international judicial institutions.1549 
This arrogation of criminal pre-eminence is inevitably controversial. However, its 
proponents argue that: 
 
‘To thematically prosecute certain crimes does not necessarily mean that such 
crimes are prioritised over other crimes, which will be left unaddressed, but 
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rather that such crimes are investigated and prosecuted in a thematic way, 
meaning that methods specific to the acts and the victims are employed.’ 1550 
 
Law has social meaning.1551 Social meanings are a product of norms, or can produce 
norms. Any description of the effects of some legal rule is a product of expressive 
norms that give consequences identifiable social meanings…’.1552 Social meanings 
can carry stigma. If an action creates a stigma, that stigma is a social meaning.1553 We 
have traced the genesis of child militarisation from the glorified perceptions of the 
phenomenon.  Thematic prosecutions promote the social meaning of child soldiering 
that contrasts with heroic portrayals of child soldiers in the past, by shining a 
spotlight on this under-criminalised standard of international society. It is not clear 
whether the trial of Lubanga was a deliberate ‘thematic prosecution.’ Prosecutor 
Bensouda stated: 
The case against him (Lubanga) represented the first time that an international 
criminal tribunal or court decided to charge someone solely for the crimes of enlisting 
and conscripting children and using them in hostilities as child soldiers. The Special 
Court for Sierra Leone had charged individuals for this before. But they charged 
together with other offences. We concentrated only on this war crime based on our 
conviction that we have to demonstrate to the world the seriousness of this crime. To 
let the world know that a whole generation of children is being abducted and 
destroyed; robbing these children of their right to live, learn and play as children, and 
in many cases, depriving their countries and their communities of future leaders. 
When children are forced to undergo such traumatic experiences, it could lead to 
countless problems tomorrow. And through our prosecution in the Lubanga case, we 
were able to draw the world’s attention to that.1554 
 
10.3.2 Cosmopolitanism 
 
Expressivism presumes the existence of a global community. International criminal 
law ‘purports to serve multiple communities - ethnic or national communities — and 
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the figurative ‘international community.’1555 I have in thesis described the current 
state of international relations through the purview of cosmopolitanism. 
Cosmopolitanism seeks out commonalities between such cultures, acknowledges 
differences, and embraces pluralism and the building of a modus vivendi.1556 The 
‘regard for others does not stop at the boundaries of a given state; we are rightly 
concerned with the global community of humans;… emphasis is placed on humans 
rather than states…’1557 Cosmopolitanism has manifested itself through international 
legalism as a modus vivendi. International law has aimed at ‘creating coordination 
among multiple equilibria, making certain outcomes focal; the law can coordinate 
expectations around the ‘good’ equilibrium.1558For instance, international treaties 
setting standards and protecting the rights of children have received considerable 
ratifications from all regions. While ‘unenforced’ international law statutes may not 
have expressive value, they however express shared values of an international 
society. International criminal trials, as ‘law in action’, stand to serve expressive 
objectives by actively propagating communitarian standards. Thus cosmopolitanism 
‘resonates with the aspirations of ICL: a concern for human beings that extends 
beyond borders, a willingness to embrace alternative governance structures to 
supplement state structures, and inclusiveness of the concerns of the ‘international 
community as a whole.’1559According to Durkheim, the criminal process is, 
fundamentally, a manifestation of the ‘collective conscience.’1560 The ‘specificity of 
modern criminal justice systems is that this collective reaction is exercised through 
the medium of body acting upon those of its members who have violated certain 
rules of conduct.’1561 Expressivism seeks to allocate stigma to behaviour that violates 
collective standards. Damaška points out the ‘didactic objective’ for trials, or ‘socio-
pedagogical’ role of strengthening accountability for violations of international law 
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through exposure and stigmatization of wrongdoing.1562 Megret asserts that 
prosecutors at tribunals and courts should recognise the assigning stigma to certain 
types of behaviour as an important objective.1563 ‘A stigma-based approach’, he 
argues, ‘would recommend that we look for the impact of international criminal 
justice far beyond the immediate operation of the ICC, in the reinforcement of some 
sort of global ‘conscience collective.’1564 Expressivism, essentially seeks to allocate 
stigma to certain behaviours. Several tribunals have been set up since Nuremberg. 
The prosecution of international crimes ‘is often given pride of place within the new 
cosmopolitanism as the marker not only of the transition from classical international 
law to cosmopolitan law but of the emergence more broadly of a cosmopolitan 
consciousness that stretches across national boundaries.’1565 ICL may influence our 
underlying conceptions of identity.1566 The construction of a shared global identity is 
a necessary first step in the establishment of a cosmopolitan community.1567 The 
most fundamental way in which international law has an effect on identity creation is 
by contributing to building the particular community which identifies the need to 
respond to crimes.1568 Most recently, this has been the development of a 
cosmopolitan community, reflected in the idea that crimes against humanity and 
genocide are of universal moral concern.1569The recent emergence of attempts to 
exercise universal jurisdiction over such crimes is an explicit endorsement of their 
universal moral concern1570Since Nuremberg, we have witnessed a transformation 
from Realpolitik to ‘legal cosmopolitanism’. The ultimate value of international 
criminal law may rest not in its functions of retribution or deterrence, but in its role 
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in identity construction, in particular in constructing a cosmopolitan community 
identity embracing all of humankind.1571 Continuing to pursue the international 
criminal law project may be valuable insofar as it gives voice to, and thus shapes, the 
identity of individuals as participants in an international community.1572 To ‘abandon 
international criminal law would not only lose this socialising aspect of the law, but it 
might also send the message that we are giving up on trying to realize a globally 
shared cosmopolitan identity.’1573The Rome Statute is a particularly significant 
development because of ‘the constitutive symbolic function of criminal law as a 
community-creating, community-maintaining device.’1574 Child soldiering is a 
discriminatory crime, targeting the impressionable and vulnerable for use as 
weapons of war. If ‘the purpose of international prosecution is to reaffirm the values 
and identity of the international community, that identity is more seriously 
threatened by crimes involving discrimination than by non-discriminatory 
crimes.’1575 A crime that conveys the perpetrator’s devaluation of a particular class of 
people is more worthy of condemnation than a comparable act that does not.1576 Such 
‘expressive harms’ require countering by the law. International criminal law offers a 
vehicle for realizing a cosmopolitan community in which each individual human 
being is truly valued as a unit of moral concern1577 Assuming ‘the international 
community is a ‘community’ in a meaningful sense that community may have an 
integrity interest in countering normative expression that conflicts with the 
community’s vision of its identity.’1578Expressivism recognises the ability of 
international criminal proceedings to convey the values of the international 
community.1579 
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10.3.3 Lubanga and expressivism 
 
International criminal justice is largely symbolic; it has limited resources, faces 
political constraints, and thus cannot prosecute large numbers of defendants in cases 
of mass crime. The OTP has outlined that its assessment of gravity would consider: 
the scale of the crimes, the severity of the crimes, and the systematic nature of the 
crimes, the manner in which they were committed, and the impact on victims.1580 
The Chamber also approved the Prosecutor’s Policy Paper statement of 2003 that as 
a general rule the OTP should focus its investigative and prosecutorial resources on 
those who bear the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or 
organization allegedly responsible for those crimes.1581 With this small number of 
defendants, an expressive approach to ICL suggests that a primary purpose of 
international criminal trials is to express global norms.1582Norm expression and 
stigmatization do not require that all or even most of the perpetrators be prosecuted 
to achieve a pedagogical function; a small number of illustrative prosecutions are 
sufficient to convey the necessary message.1583 By dramatizing the effect of the law-
breaking conduct through the spectacle of trial making, international criminal justice 
makes clear what was not previously understood: in this case, that recruiting, 
enlisting, and using children to fight is a war crime.’1584Expressivism is therefore ‘not 
just the best justification for the ICC’s work; it also provides the most appropriate 
theoretical basis for the Court’s resource allocation decisions.’1585Apart from 
resource-based arguments, there ‘is cause to believe that expressivism may be a more 
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plausible justification for the punishment of extraordinary international 
criminals.’1586 
 
Trials are a way of redefining the community to include the victim within the 
community.1587 While the unprecedented role for victims to participate in trials, even 
if not called as witnesses at the ICC, may in part be motivated by a desire to provide 
victims with a forum to tell their story, it is also a means for establishing a 
community between the victims and the supporters of the Court, thereby expanding 
the boundaries of the cosmopolitan community.1588 
 
10.3.4 Norm internalisation 
 
The objective of establishing a cosmopolitan community can be achieved through 
norm internalisation. The mass media act as an enforcer of social values in many 
ways.  One background assumption of news is ‘the consensual nature of society: the 
process of signification - giving social meanings to events - both assumes and helps 
to construct society as a consensus.’1589Norm internalisation has been recognised as a 
long term objective of law.1590 To this end the study has attempted to graphically 
harmonise the concepts discussed in this thesis by customising Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s norm cycle model, incorporating expressivism (see Figure  2)  
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An expressivist model of international law and criminal law 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Trials are ‘central to the norm internalisation process’1591 within local communities. 
The purpose is to internalise, especially within a targeted audience, a respect for 
international law and for the norm in question or social meaning that drives the 
audience not to repeat the violation in the future.1592 Norm internalisation 
‘recognises this gap, and focuses on developing internal drives to follow the law, 
given that stable compliance with the law depends on an internal drive to follow the 
law regardless of enforcement.’1593This is, however, a long term project.  As Akhavan 
notes, criminal sanctions instil voluntary or ‘good faith’ respect for just conduct by 
discrediting inhumane and unjust conduct, the cumulative effect of which 
encourages habitual or subliminal conformity with the law.1594  Thus, the prevention 
                                                          
1591Ibid 
1592Ibid 
1593Ibid 435 
1594P. Akhavan, ‘Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United 
Nations War Crimes Tribunal’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 737, 741 
‘Cosmopolitanism’ 
2. Norm 
cascade 
3. Expressivism 4. Norm 
internalisation 
1. Norm 
emergence 
‘Norm 
entrepreneurs’ 
promoted, 
altered social 
meaning of child 
soldiering leading 
to establishment 
of norms 
Cascade 
followed broad 
acceptance of 
norms and 
‘social meaning’ 
of child 
soldiering 
Construction of 
legal texts and 
normative 
framework as 
expression of 
international 
norms on 
children and 
armed conflict 
Expression of 
norms through 
arrest, criminal 
trials, 
(thematic 
prosecutions) 
verdict and 
punishment for 
mass crime 
Awareness, 
internalisation 
of norms 
against child 
soldiering 
especially in 
affected 
communities 
(outreach) 
Media 
out 
ou 
283 
 
of future crimes is necessarily a long-term process of social and political 
transformation, entailing internalization of ideals in a particular context or ‘reality,’ 
or the gradual penetration of principles into power realities.1595It is unrealistic to 
expect Lubanga to effect immediate and dramatic changes to the practice of child 
soldiering.1596Respect ‘for international law, and a sense of morality modified to 
encompass prohibitions on genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious war 
crimes must be developed over time; the appropriate measurement of success may 
not be months or years but rather decades.’1597 
 
10.3.5 Outreach 
 
It was concluded that with the ‘international community as an audience’, Lubanga 
served ‘important didactic and pedagogical goals of teaching the international 
community about the tragedy of child soldiers.’1598As Damaška noted, the ‘socio-
pedagogical’ role of courts strengthen accountability for violations of international 
law through exposure and stigmatization of wrongdoing.1599Today, however, it is rare 
to find any jurisprudential analysis, consideration, or even awareness of the law-
education connection.1600 When people are conscious of the issue, they will support 
the abolition of the use of child soldiers.1601Indeed trials may achieve norm 
internalisation through expressivism, and media can perform the role disseminating 
global norms. It has been asserted that, ‘compared to national criminal courts, 
international criminal tribunals will often need to place greater emphasis on victim 
and witness support programs, as well as public education and outreach efforts.’1602 
As already argued, international courts should avoid engaging in programmes that 
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can be left to other organisations. Outreach programmes are best limited to 
providing information about trials and clarifying law and proceedings. International 
criminal trials stand to internalise norms more through such proactive engagement, 
particularly in the affected communities. Mass crime involves a profusion of agents 
and actors. The work of international criminal courts would be inadequate without 
direct contact with communities affected by social and political calamities. The ICC, 
located in The Hague, has formulated an outreach programme. Such a programme 
has been implemented in the DRC, the location of Lubanga’s crime. In this project, I 
incorporate outreach within the scope of socio-pedagogical function of expressivism. 
Expressivism aims to clarify the law; and media may misrepresent or misinterpret 
events out of sensationalist reasons or genuine lack of knowledge of the law and 
procedures. Outreach programmes can be conceptualised as the expressive function 
of law because such programmes can outline laws and reasons defendants were 
facing prosecution directly to affected communities. Unlike retribution and 
deterrence, which are empirically indeterminate, expressive outreach can be 
evaluated to assess norm internalisation. If international punishment is to have the 
cosmopolitan ‘community-creating’ effect around shared norms, outreach 
programmes would be an effective means of achieving this goal.   
 
A benefit of norm internalisation is norm defence’ or ‘norm support’. Norm defence 
is crucial in the spreading and stabilization of norms over a population of 
autonomous agents.1603 This would reinforce the social meaning of law in societies. 
Human rights groups in the DRC were part of organisations that defended the role of 
the ICC and were active in gathering evidence against Lubanga.1604They campaigned 
for the charges against him to be widened.1605Lubanga thus brought child soldiering 
to the top of the agenda for such groups as well as fostering ‘norm defence’. A 
cosmopolitan community can be reinforced when norms are defended and supported 
voluntarily. These approaches transcend classical precepts of retribution and 
deterrence.  
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Another important benefit of internalisation through criminal trials and proactive 
engagement is reduction in costs of enforcement when ‘agents begin to conform to an 
internal norm because doing so is an end in itself, and not merely because of external 
sanctions, such as material rewards or punishment.  This will reduce costs of norm 
enforcement.’1606 As already noted, the ICC does not have an enforcement 
mechanism. It relies on the ‘charity’ of states, not just in terms of funding, but 
enforcement. The ICC can only prosecute a handful of defendants, partly because of 
lack of cooperation of states and lack of an enforcement mechanism. The ICC has 
stated that for it ‘to effectively deal with situations referred by the council ... it needs 
to be able to count on the full and continuing cooperation of all U.N. members, 
whether they are parties to (the court) or not.’1607Among the ICC’s financial 
commitments are investigations, trials, legal representation and reparations funded 
primarily by states1608, the UN1609 and voluntary contributions.1610If the Court were 
to encounter simultaneously the constraints of slower contributions and the need to 
fund unforeseen events, it could find itself in a position of being unable to carry out 
necessary Court operations due to lack of funds.1611 A consensus seems to have 
emerged that the OTP should negotiate the inherent limitations of prosecutorial 
capacity by focusing investigations and prosecutions on those culpable individuals 
who occupied the highest levels of political or military authority.1612 The prosecution 
thus has to exercise selectivity. The ICC concluded a single case (Lubanga) after 10 
years in existence, spending $900 million during the period. Norm internalisation 
would, over time, reduce the number of offenders, and ultimately, costs.  Given the 
limitations of the ICC, norm internalisation as the ultimate aim of prosecution of 
mass crimes would appear a more realistic and most plausible philosophical 
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justification for ICC penality. Some commentators have, nonetheless, inferred the 
futility of international criminal courts’ didactic aspirations from the absence of 
discernible educational effects of their decisions.1613But as Damaska notes: 
 
‘...the absence of these effects in the short run does not preclude the possibility of 
their appearance in a time horizon of longer range. This is especially the case in 
communities traumatized by atrocities, where intense passions unleashed by conflict 
take time to subside. Jumping to pessimistic conclusions is also unwarranted, so long 
as the working of international criminal courts is not properly attuned to pedagogic 
objectives.’1614 
 
10.4 limits of the thesis 
 
The modest objective of this study was to reappraise aspects of ICL by bringing 
attention to a timely case before the foremost global criminal law institution to help 
us reflect on legal, in particular, penal theory and mass crime. The study does not 
discuss the whole mosaic of penal justifications in detail. Incapacitation, 
rehabilitation, reconciliation, restoration and access for victims and so on remain 
justifications for international criminal justice. While valid, these appear to be less 
salient in ICL nor do they provide sufficient and realistic justification for the work of 
an international court. As jurisprudence has shown, retribution and deterrence are 
the prominent rationales of ICL. Secondly, detailed exploration of each and every 
rationale of ICL would demand more space than is provide for in this thesis. 
Comprehensive analyses would thus compromise focused interrogation of issues 
under study. In any case, some of these objectives, such as rehabilitation and 
restoration, should be left to other organisations rather than be attached to the 
already wide range of duties imposed on courts. International courts seem to be 
setting objectives outside their core functions. While thesis discussed some of these 
rationales to reflect the array of aims, its theoretical framework focused mainly on 
retribution and deterrence. The thesis attempts to offer a contribution to 
international law and international criminal law by advancing an under-explored 
rationale. 
 
                                                          
1613J. Snyder and L. Vinjamuri, ‘Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies on 
International Justice’ (2003/4) 28 International Security 5,39-40 
1614 M. Damaska, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ (2008) 83Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 329, 364 footnote 27 
287 
 
While encouraging in its seeming support of the thesis and the theoretical framework 
that frames it, we ought to bear in mind that Lubanga represents an evolving crime 
of child soldiering and effect and furthermore, the impact of his trial and conviction 
might take some time to play out fully. The thesis does not, therefore, profess to show 
the immediate results of expressivist value of Lubanga. International criminal courts 
will not achieve much without reaching out to ‘victim communities.’ Much of that 
impact of the ICC will be contingent upon sustained proactive engagement with the 
affected community.  
 
Admittedly, this study does not focus on the broader rights of children because of its 
preoccupation with the child soldiering case before the ICC. The full extent of norm 
internalisation resulting from the expressive role of Lubanga is difficult to measure. 
However, research by human rights bodies show encouraging signs in terms of norm 
internalisation. Human Rights Watch (HRW) concluded that Lubanga had 
‘undeniably contributed to raising awareness about the plight of child combatants in 
the DRC, and among those who previously thought that crimes relating to child 
soldiers were not ‘serious’—including parents in Ituri who had their children join 
militia groups.’1615Since the ICC had become active in Ituri, children themselves had 
been educated about their rights and sensitized to their roles as both victims and 
perpetrators in a way which may impact their own future behaviour.1616 As Damaska 
notes, the effects of norm internalisation may take longer to appear in communities 
traumatised by atrocities until intense passions that cause conflict subside.1617 
 
10.5 Future Research 
 
Other than outreach, norm internalisation would, however, depend on cycles of 
prosecution. Perhaps, the greatest effect of expressivism with regards to child 
soldiering will be realised with the arrest of the elusive Ugandan rebel leader, Kony 
                                                          
1615 See ‘DR Congo: Q&A on the First Verdict at the International Criminal Court’ Human Rights 
Watch 29 February 2012 http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/29/dr-congo-qa-first-verdict-
international-criminal-court 
1616See ‘Steps towards justice, frustrated hopes: Some Reflections on the Experience of the 
International Criminal Court in Ituri.’ The International Refugee Rights Initiative and Association 
pour la promotion et la défense de la dignité des victims (APRODIVI) March 2012, 10 
1617 M. Damaska, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ (2008) 83Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 329, 364 footnote 27 
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(if he is captured alive) and the OTP chooses to conduct a putative thematic 
prosecution on the use of children in armed conflict. While Kony is associated with 
other brutalities, he has been notorious for his use of child soldiers. An internet 
campaign for the capture of Kony generated international responses. US troops have 
been deployed in Central Africa to search for Kony.  The recent arrest of Lubanga’s 
co-accused would provide an opportunity for the ICC prosecutor to address the 
inadequacies in Lubanga. 
 
On 22 August 20061618 and on 13 July 2012,1619 the ICC issued two warrants of arrest 
against Ntaganda.  Ntaganda was Deputy chief of staff of FPLC and Lubanga’s co-
accused. Despite the warrant of arrest issued for him and Lubanga, the DRC arrested 
and handed over only Lubanga, but recruited the former into the armed forces. He, 
however, left the army to rejoin rebel ranks. On 22 March 2013, Ntaganda voluntarily 
surrendered to the Court1620 and on 26 March 2013, he made his first appearance 
before the ICC. On 10 January 2014, the Prosecutor filed the Document Containing 
the Charges together with the list of evidence1621He was charged with 13 counts of 
war crimes (murder and attempted murder; attacking civilians; rape; sexual slavery 
of civilians; pillaging; displacement of civilians; attacking protected objects; 
destroying the enemy's property; and rape, sexual slavery, enlistment and 
conscription of child soldiers under the age of fifteen years and using them to 
participate actively in hostilities) and five counts of crimes against humanity (murder 
and attempted murder; rape; sexual slavery; persecution; forcible transfer of 
population) against Bosco Ntaganda allegedly committed in 2002-2003 in the Ituri 
Province of DRC. On 9 June 2014, Pre-Trial Chamber II decided that the Court has 
jurisdiction over the case, determining it admissible, confirming the charges 
presented by the Prosecutor against Ntaganda.1622 His trial has been set for June 
                                                          
1618  Pre-Trial Chamber I, ‘Decision on the Prosecution Application for a Warrant of Arrest”, 22 August 
2006, ICC-01/04-02/06-1-US-Exp-tEN.The warrant of arrest was initially issued under seal. On 28 
April 2008, Pre-Trial Chamber I decided to unseal the warrant of arrest, see ‘Decision to Unseal the 
Warrant of Arrest against Bosco Ntaganda”, ICC-01/04-02/06-18.  
1619 Pre-Trial Chamber II, “Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58”, 13 July 2012, 
ICC-01/04-02/06-36-Conf-Exp   
1620Pre-Trial Chamber II, ‘Decision on Setting the Date for the Initial Appearance and Related Issues’, 
22 March 2013, ICC-01/04-02/06-41, para. 7.   
1621See Document Containing the Charges (DCC) ICC-01/04-02/06-203-AnxA.   
1622See Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda ICC-01/04-02/06. 9 June 2014 
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2015. Future research would focus on how the Ntaganda case would provide 
remedies for the commissions and omissions in Lubanga. 
 
The objective of this thesis was not to give blind endorsement to the application of 
expressivism in Lubanga. Several issues impacted on the expressive value of the 
case. Prosecutorial procedure and substantive inadequacies need to be addressed for 
the full expressivist value of law and penality to be realised. For instance, the 
tendency to prosecute rebels, and not state actors would impact on the legitimacy of 
the court. Self-referring governments have opportunistically utilised the mechanism 
to delegitimise domestic rivals. This bias may create a sense of ‘victors’ justice’ – the 
prosecutor representing the triumphalism of the referring state. ‘[F]ailure to deal 
with the crimes committed by the accuser quickly discredits the trial in the eyes of 
the community of the accused, both as a fact-finding exercise and as a moral 
guidepost.’1623 It can be argued that the prosecution of state actors would generate 
more expressive value in some cases. The trial of a former head of State or high-
ranking official sends a message that even the most powerful political actors will be 
held answerable to the law.1624 Prosecuting ‘minor figures can undermine norm 
internalization by failing to create a sufficiently dramatic spectacle to communicate 
the perils of transgressing international law and express the stigma associated with 
such violations.’1625The ‘defendant’s community will not develop greater respect for 
international law, nor internalise international norms, if the trial’s narrative is 
insufficiently powerful to spawn moral reflection.’1626 
 
As a seminal case, Lubanga encountered a number of problems. Procedurally, the 
prosecutor would need to address issues that delayed the trial such as the 
unnecessary withholding exculpatory evidence. Further research would observe how 
the OTP would also address its methods of identifying witnesses and use of 
‘intermediaries’ who may have influenced them. In Lubanga not one of the witnesses 
                                                          
1623V. Padmanabhan ‘Norm Internationalization through Trials for Violations of International Law: 
Four Conditions for Success and Their Application to Trials of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay’ (2009) 
3 Journal of International Law 427,441-442 
1624D. Koller, ‘The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer’,(2008) 40 New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 1019, 1059 
1625V. Padmanabhan ‘Norm Internationalization through Trials for Violations of International Law: 
Four Conditions for Success and Their Application to Trials of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay’ (2009) 
3 Journal of International Law 427, 445 
1626ibid 
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was found by the Court to have been honest and reliable.1627 Lubanga was thus 
convicted without relying on the direct testimony of child soldiers but others, 
coupled with certain documents and videotapes.  Birth certificates or grade school 
rosters’ were not available. As has been noted, the absence of such important records 
diminished the expressive impact of the Lubanga.1628 ‘[C]rooked trials, though more 
effective in terms of securing convictions of defendants, are not venues for moral 
education because the historical narrative produced at such a trial will not be 
accepted as accurate by the defendant’s community.’1629 
 
For legal scholarship on child soldiering, the prosecutor’s approach to sex crimes will 
be one area of focus. ICC judges admonished the prosecutor for his failure to lay a 
separate charge of sexual violence. The Office of the Prosecutor chose to focus on 
crimes related to the use of child soldiers to the exclusion of sex crimes, thereby 
failing to reflect the full nature and dynamics of child soldiering. Following Lubanga, 
the OTP has published a policy paper which states that the ‘the Office will charge acts 
of sexual and gender-based crimes as different categories of crimes within the Court’s 
jurisdiction (war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide), in order to 
properly describe, inter alia, the nature, manner of commission, intent, impact, and 
context.’1630 
 
Notwithstanding its inadequacies, Lubanga provided an opportunity for the 
expressive function of law by highlighting other significant elements of child 
soldiering. Lubanga, as well as the case law of the SCSL including the recently 
delivered judgment against Charles Taylor, may offer interesting insights on the 
socio-pedagogical role of international criminal justice.1631 
 
                                                          
1627Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-
01/06-2842, TC, 14 March 2012 paras  479–80. 
1628D. Amann, ‘Children and the First Verdict of the International Criminal Court’ (2013) 12 
Washington University Global Studies  Law Review 411, 429 
1629V. Padmanabhan ‘Norm Internationalization through Trials for Violations of International Law: 
Four Conditions for Success and Their Application to Trials of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay’ (2009) 
3 Journal of International Law 427, 453 
1630See ‘Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes’ Office of the Prosecutor (ICC) June 2014, 
para 8; http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Policy-Paper-on-Sexual-and-Gender-Based-Crimes-
-June-2014.pdf 
1631 T Mariniello ‘Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: The First Judgment of the International 
Criminal Court’s Trial Chamber’ (2012) 1 International Human Rights Law Review 137, 146 
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‘They may contribute to strengthening the sense of accountability for recruiting and 
using child soldiers, by stigmatising these conducts as contrary to the fundamental 
values of the international community. Moreover, by defining and denouncing the 
criminal nature of heinous conduct, such as the conscription, enlistment, and use of 
child soldiers, these cases enhance the normative scope of international criminal law. 
Therefore, beyond the actual effect of the ICC’s decision on potential criminals, it is 
expected that the Lubanga judgment serves—toward the entire collectivity of States—
an important pedagogical goal of social acknowledgment of the values protected by 
international criminal justice.’1632 
 
To conclude, international criminal law needs to face up to its limitations. 
Retribution and deterrence cannot be proved or disproved in a methodologically 
sound way.  The ICC’s first case hopefully illustrates that expressivism bears promise 
as a rationale for its work on mass crimes. Empirical research could assess levels of 
awareness generated by both Lubanga and Ntaganda. Evaluation on comprehension 
of norms is a possible exercise. However, the OTP needs to address issues arising 
from Lubanga in order to maximise expressive objectives. The focus on figures 
considered ‘minor’ and exempting state actors may undermine norm internalisation 
by failing to create a sufficiently dramatic spectacle to communicate the perils of 
transgressing international law and express the stigma associated with such 
violations.’1633The trial of high-ranking state actors transmits a powerful message 
that even the most powerful political actors will not be exempted. Repeated often 
enough, this lesson will gradually be internalized and passed down to successive 
generations1634Prosecutorial indiscretions, however, ought not to discount 
expressivism, as a rationale, its plausibility as a premise for international 
prosecutions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1632 Ibid 
1633V. Padmanabhan ‘Norm Internationalization through Trials for Violations of International Law: 
Four Conditions for Success and Their Application to Trials of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay’ (2009) 
3 Journal of International Law 427, 445 
1634D. Koller, ‘The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer’,(2008) 40 New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 1019,1059 
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